A- Hunting we will go.
“In court, CASA’s barrister Peter Ward said the regulator bore no responsibility for the accident, and pointed out that Danielle Wilson’s claim itself acknowledged that Helibrook was not complying with CASA’s approval for the human sling.”
“The only way CASA could be said on this pleading to have caused or contributed to the death of Mr Wilson was by approving the operations that involved him being slung underneath the helicopter,” he said, as reported by 'The Australian'.
I wonder, were the only crocodiles involved in the water? I think not. I also wonder if CASA can produce the paperwork detailing the requirements; checks, balances, training course details and the qualifications required to approve this operation. Certified training for company support, pilot qualification and the equipment required to conduct the operations, as specified. When one compares the staggering differences between Police, Ambulance and Rescue helicopter training, checking, educating and 'equipment' demanded, to the pathetic demands for 'operational sanity' on the Croc egg collecting mob; it results in much head shaking and flat out disbelief. Chalk -Cheese; pathetic, expensive and proven lethal.
“When setting expectations, no matter what has been said or written, if substandard performance is accepted and no one is held accountable—if there are no consequences—that poor performance becomes the new standard.”
There is an expression oft used “Man proposes, God disposes”. If one parlays that into an air operator 'proposes' then the 'gods' of the 'Authority' dispose and authorise. It presents, at surface level an implied sharing of the 'risk' analysis and mutual agreement that the proposed operation is as 'safe' as operationally and legally possible – a joint venture if you will, in the interests of public safety and operational compliance. Compliance with 'the rules' as scripted should provide adequate coverage of both Authority and Operator. It seems 'cut and dried' - on paper at least; until the wheels come off the apple cart.
There are two current - (one in abeyance) - 'classic' examples worthy of closer examination; not of the 'event' itself, but the aftermath. The 'wash-up' follows a well trodden path – down the rabbit hole into Alice's wonderland. Consider the latest 'big three' events: to wit, the Croc Egg fatal; the Middle Beach fatal and the Sea World fatal. There is one common thread running through the trio; 'not our fault' screams the 'Authority' as it limbers up trained court room killers for action. All well and good for them; off the hook and back to Latte land; at public expense. Hardly a ripple in the 'Ministerial' duck pond.
“We all know, of course, what to make of our newspapers. The deaf man writes down what the blind man has told him, the village idiot edits it, and their colleagues in the other press houses copy it.”
The whole of conducting 'safe' aviation operations is made up of three essential elements; of these, the most important is 'foresight'- the 'What if' analysis. You can pin fancy titles to it; dress it up to look like Clancy's vision splendid and drown it legal obfuscation all you like; but when the shit hits the fan -
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.”
So, what is the fool rambling on about? Simple stuff really, the stuff of experience, the stuff of common sense, the stuff of expecting the worst and hoping for the best., the stuff of hindsight and the stuff of sitting in a witness box facing down a top gun barrister. For example:-
Croc Egg collecting; worst case scenario as a start point. Chopper has an engine out; the 'bloke– on- the- rope' is (a) parked on a croc nest; (b) being lowered, lifted or transported to an 'off-hook' area. Two areas of high risk. Item (a) is self explanatory (toast); but (b) demands some thought. Single engine operations – failure demands 'auto rotation', your imagination can do the rest. Engine failure a remote risk – provided the maintenance is top notch; odds on it is unlikely – unless of course 'corners' have been cut and margins shaved. Fuel starvation – is a human factor; the law is clear enough. Can this be tracked back to an 'attitude' a company ethos, a cowboy mentality? If so, then that is where the system has been betrayed and IMO the blame clearly resides equally with the Authority for not noticing the 'attitudes' and stamping it out and the operator for encouraging normalized deviance. "She'll be right - no wuk'in furries'
Beach landings and 'Thrill' flights – what a battle this has become. Fine points of law and a load of blame being laid at the feet of the pilot. Once again, we must examine the basics of risk and eliminating that as far as practicable, and the pilot's approach to those risks. As with the Quadrio case, much is being made of the alleged 'antics' airborne, prior to the approach and landing. Company policy was to 'demonstrate' the effects of controls to the passengers on a 'thrill' flight'. So, Up, Down, left, right – to the 'Oooh's and Ahh's of the punters; joy flight stuff and harmless, conducted by an experienced pilot very, very familiar with the aircraft type: so far - so good. Next phase, the approach and landing. The 'strip was well familiar to the pilot; over 1000 beach landings in the log book, no accident history. Strip inspection duly and properly conducted; over shoot and set up to land. - 'Engine failure'. What caused the failure has not been determined by the ATSB investigation; however a forensic examination of the engine maintenance history tells a succinct tale. Consider, experienced on type, experienced in beach landings, senior pilot making a pig's ear of the emergency landing. Oh, there's reasonable doubt there by the bucket full. The operator seems to have reasonably considered and addressed the potential risk matrix; yet the pilot seems to be, despite all care being taken, set to be pilloried.
Item last – Sea World. Who's to bless and who's to blame is problematic. The ATSB have done not too bad a job on this report; however, there are some areas which are 'sketched' over. The most obvious being the 'conflict' points not being resolved prior to operations; new type with different pilot seating configuration (visibility) and the high speed; high frequency of turn around times. Much to consider, not least of all was the lack of CASA oversight, advice and even tacit approval of an established operator. That is the common theme underpinning these three fatal events.
“You're getting to be a big boy; and while I'm gone, you'll be the man of the family. I want you to act like one. You take care of Mama and Little Arliss. You look after the work and don't wait around for your mama to point out what needs to be done. Think you can do that?”
Aye, only my humbly offered opinions, but it seems to me that there are some 'holes' in the CASA 'operational expertise and understanding' knitting. Too much legalese and not enough hands on observation. Alas, non of this matters anymore than a fleas fart when it comes to politicians paying attention or being remotely responsible. Not bad work – if you can get it.
That's it ramble over – I have a choc rabbit to slaughter and an Easter egg hunt to supervise; be interesting to see who finds 'em first, the dogs or the kids. Odds on bet little dog; short odds big dog and the Mog will stay at home. No brains required.
Happy Easter – etc.
Selah...
“In court, CASA’s barrister Peter Ward said the regulator bore no responsibility for the accident, and pointed out that Danielle Wilson’s claim itself acknowledged that Helibrook was not complying with CASA’s approval for the human sling.”
“The only way CASA could be said on this pleading to have caused or contributed to the death of Mr Wilson was by approving the operations that involved him being slung underneath the helicopter,” he said, as reported by 'The Australian'.
I wonder, were the only crocodiles involved in the water? I think not. I also wonder if CASA can produce the paperwork detailing the requirements; checks, balances, training course details and the qualifications required to approve this operation. Certified training for company support, pilot qualification and the equipment required to conduct the operations, as specified. When one compares the staggering differences between Police, Ambulance and Rescue helicopter training, checking, educating and 'equipment' demanded, to the pathetic demands for 'operational sanity' on the Croc egg collecting mob; it results in much head shaking and flat out disbelief. Chalk -Cheese; pathetic, expensive and proven lethal.
“When setting expectations, no matter what has been said or written, if substandard performance is accepted and no one is held accountable—if there are no consequences—that poor performance becomes the new standard.”
There is an expression oft used “Man proposes, God disposes”. If one parlays that into an air operator 'proposes' then the 'gods' of the 'Authority' dispose and authorise. It presents, at surface level an implied sharing of the 'risk' analysis and mutual agreement that the proposed operation is as 'safe' as operationally and legally possible – a joint venture if you will, in the interests of public safety and operational compliance. Compliance with 'the rules' as scripted should provide adequate coverage of both Authority and Operator. It seems 'cut and dried' - on paper at least; until the wheels come off the apple cart.
There are two current - (one in abeyance) - 'classic' examples worthy of closer examination; not of the 'event' itself, but the aftermath. The 'wash-up' follows a well trodden path – down the rabbit hole into Alice's wonderland. Consider the latest 'big three' events: to wit, the Croc Egg fatal; the Middle Beach fatal and the Sea World fatal. There is one common thread running through the trio; 'not our fault' screams the 'Authority' as it limbers up trained court room killers for action. All well and good for them; off the hook and back to Latte land; at public expense. Hardly a ripple in the 'Ministerial' duck pond.
“We all know, of course, what to make of our newspapers. The deaf man writes down what the blind man has told him, the village idiot edits it, and their colleagues in the other press houses copy it.”
The whole of conducting 'safe' aviation operations is made up of three essential elements; of these, the most important is 'foresight'- the 'What if' analysis. You can pin fancy titles to it; dress it up to look like Clancy's vision splendid and drown it legal obfuscation all you like; but when the shit hits the fan -
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.”
So, what is the fool rambling on about? Simple stuff really, the stuff of experience, the stuff of common sense, the stuff of expecting the worst and hoping for the best., the stuff of hindsight and the stuff of sitting in a witness box facing down a top gun barrister. For example:-
Croc Egg collecting; worst case scenario as a start point. Chopper has an engine out; the 'bloke– on- the- rope' is (a) parked on a croc nest; (b) being lowered, lifted or transported to an 'off-hook' area. Two areas of high risk. Item (a) is self explanatory (toast); but (b) demands some thought. Single engine operations – failure demands 'auto rotation', your imagination can do the rest. Engine failure a remote risk – provided the maintenance is top notch; odds on it is unlikely – unless of course 'corners' have been cut and margins shaved. Fuel starvation – is a human factor; the law is clear enough. Can this be tracked back to an 'attitude' a company ethos, a cowboy mentality? If so, then that is where the system has been betrayed and IMO the blame clearly resides equally with the Authority for not noticing the 'attitudes' and stamping it out and the operator for encouraging normalized deviance. "She'll be right - no wuk'in furries'
Beach landings and 'Thrill' flights – what a battle this has become. Fine points of law and a load of blame being laid at the feet of the pilot. Once again, we must examine the basics of risk and eliminating that as far as practicable, and the pilot's approach to those risks. As with the Quadrio case, much is being made of the alleged 'antics' airborne, prior to the approach and landing. Company policy was to 'demonstrate' the effects of controls to the passengers on a 'thrill' flight'. So, Up, Down, left, right – to the 'Oooh's and Ahh's of the punters; joy flight stuff and harmless, conducted by an experienced pilot very, very familiar with the aircraft type: so far - so good. Next phase, the approach and landing. The 'strip was well familiar to the pilot; over 1000 beach landings in the log book, no accident history. Strip inspection duly and properly conducted; over shoot and set up to land. - 'Engine failure'. What caused the failure has not been determined by the ATSB investigation; however a forensic examination of the engine maintenance history tells a succinct tale. Consider, experienced on type, experienced in beach landings, senior pilot making a pig's ear of the emergency landing. Oh, there's reasonable doubt there by the bucket full. The operator seems to have reasonably considered and addressed the potential risk matrix; yet the pilot seems to be, despite all care being taken, set to be pilloried.
Item last – Sea World. Who's to bless and who's to blame is problematic. The ATSB have done not too bad a job on this report; however, there are some areas which are 'sketched' over. The most obvious being the 'conflict' points not being resolved prior to operations; new type with different pilot seating configuration (visibility) and the high speed; high frequency of turn around times. Much to consider, not least of all was the lack of CASA oversight, advice and even tacit approval of an established operator. That is the common theme underpinning these three fatal events.
“You're getting to be a big boy; and while I'm gone, you'll be the man of the family. I want you to act like one. You take care of Mama and Little Arliss. You look after the work and don't wait around for your mama to point out what needs to be done. Think you can do that?”
Aye, only my humbly offered opinions, but it seems to me that there are some 'holes' in the CASA 'operational expertise and understanding' knitting. Too much legalese and not enough hands on observation. Alas, non of this matters anymore than a fleas fart when it comes to politicians paying attention or being remotely responsible. Not bad work – if you can get it.
That's it ramble over – I have a choc rabbit to slaughter and an Easter egg hunt to supervise; be interesting to see who finds 'em first, the dogs or the kids. Odds on bet little dog; short odds big dog and the Mog will stay at home. No brains required.
Happy Easter – etc.
Selah...