A Sunday ramble.
The old enemies meet at Mudgee.
The statement above just qualifies as a message. It could be loosely described as a ‘safety message’ and would probably be palatable to the general public and acceptable to politicians. But does it go far enough, down to the equation radicals? It also begs the question is there a need for ATSB to get down to root causes and examination of same?
I think it does not; and believe that ATSB should, with a standard accident of this type, be providing ‘in-depth’ analysis, reporting the result, making recommendations and providing education.
We have now a situation where two, perhaps three ‘generations’ of newly fledged pilots have not been taught the ‘basics’, thoroughly, by those who were not taught the basics. The situation is clearly evidenced by the ludicrous exemption required, by junior instructors before they can demonstrate and teach the ‘low and slow’ envelope – HERE -.
I don’t know which is worse; a pilot who, whether through ignorance or intent deliberately placed an aircraft in an untenable situation; or, a pilot who did not recognise that the aircraft was in a ‘bad place’ and failed to correct the ‘error’. Dead either way: confounded by two ancient enemies. Manoeuvred by fate into a hellish position; low, slow, overbanked and no engine to rely on, as a last resort, to execute the time honoured ‘going around’. There was I believe enough time and space to effect an engine out landing, bank off and land straight ahead, rather than persist with runway alignment; but that is only an opinion and speculative. Without an engine and almost stalled, the only solution was to get some wind over the wings and make the best of a forced landing. Hobson's choice? absolutely.
The ‘figure of eight’ (fig 5 - p6) interested the ATSB, me too. If I’m reading the diagram correctly, the northerly position (97 KIAS @ 1394 AGL) looks to be ‘good’ for a circuit join 04 on crosswind leg – to downwind – etc. bog standard. The following track indicates a descent to the South (104 KIAS @917 AGL) followed by a turn North and a crosswind circuit join. I note the closest windsock is located on the main taxiway, toward the runways intersection. I wonder, was the initial intent to land 34? Quick overfly to check the windsock, left hand down and pedal the crate along ‘downwind’ to final 34. 97/1394 < 104/917 < 84/937 – lined up 34. Perfect for a glide approach engine out. Up until the position marked by the arrow (Fig 8 like orbit) you could be forgiven thinking the intent was to land straight ahead. Perhaps this is where the engine problem became apparent; too high with 937 to loose and not far to run. From the Fig 8 arrow, you could speculate on a ‘stretched’ glide, overhead to a tight base and join on a short-ish final.
I digress; it is impossible to know what was happening in the pilot’s mind and the ATSB have carefully avoided, as they should, idle speculation such as my ramblings. The main items of danger have been elucidated, clearly and succinctly; carby ice is a known killer, stretching a glide is as lethal now as it ever was; accelerated stall a deadly companion to low and slow. Killers all, for generations past.
Solution – probably (IMO) a retrospective to the days when a student was not sent ‘first solo’ without those dangers being firmly implanted in the thickest of heads. It is rare (or used to be) that a qualified pilot would get an aircraft anywhere near a ‘stall’, but the potential for these types of accident during ‘training’, particularly early in the piece, is high. Maybe the need for a ‘special’ qualification to teach how to avoid these known killers is redundant; perhaps all should know and fully understand the basics as a matter of course.
Aye well, just a speculative Sunday twiddle, by way of paying my respects for those who died and those that mourn their loss.
Toot toot.
The old enemies meet at Mudgee.
Quote:Safety message – “Although amateur-built aeroplanes operated in the Experimental category are not required to be fitted with a stall warning device, owner-pilots should consider the benefits of such devices as a last line of defence against the inadvertent approach to, or entry into an aerodynamic stall.”
The statement above just qualifies as a message. It could be loosely described as a ‘safety message’ and would probably be palatable to the general public and acceptable to politicians. But does it go far enough, down to the equation radicals? It also begs the question is there a need for ATSB to get down to root causes and examination of same?
I think it does not; and believe that ATSB should, with a standard accident of this type, be providing ‘in-depth’ analysis, reporting the result, making recommendations and providing education.
We have now a situation where two, perhaps three ‘generations’ of newly fledged pilots have not been taught the ‘basics’, thoroughly, by those who were not taught the basics. The situation is clearly evidenced by the ludicrous exemption required, by junior instructors before they can demonstrate and teach the ‘low and slow’ envelope – HERE -.
I don’t know which is worse; a pilot who, whether through ignorance or intent deliberately placed an aircraft in an untenable situation; or, a pilot who did not recognise that the aircraft was in a ‘bad place’ and failed to correct the ‘error’. Dead either way: confounded by two ancient enemies. Manoeuvred by fate into a hellish position; low, slow, overbanked and no engine to rely on, as a last resort, to execute the time honoured ‘going around’. There was I believe enough time and space to effect an engine out landing, bank off and land straight ahead, rather than persist with runway alignment; but that is only an opinion and speculative. Without an engine and almost stalled, the only solution was to get some wind over the wings and make the best of a forced landing. Hobson's choice? absolutely.
The ‘figure of eight’ (fig 5 - p6) interested the ATSB, me too. If I’m reading the diagram correctly, the northerly position (97 KIAS @ 1394 AGL) looks to be ‘good’ for a circuit join 04 on crosswind leg – to downwind – etc. bog standard. The following track indicates a descent to the South (104 KIAS @917 AGL) followed by a turn North and a crosswind circuit join. I note the closest windsock is located on the main taxiway, toward the runways intersection. I wonder, was the initial intent to land 34? Quick overfly to check the windsock, left hand down and pedal the crate along ‘downwind’ to final 34. 97/1394 < 104/917 < 84/937 – lined up 34. Perfect for a glide approach engine out. Up until the position marked by the arrow (Fig 8 like orbit) you could be forgiven thinking the intent was to land straight ahead. Perhaps this is where the engine problem became apparent; too high with 937 to loose and not far to run. From the Fig 8 arrow, you could speculate on a ‘stretched’ glide, overhead to a tight base and join on a short-ish final.
I digress; it is impossible to know what was happening in the pilot’s mind and the ATSB have carefully avoided, as they should, idle speculation such as my ramblings. The main items of danger have been elucidated, clearly and succinctly; carby ice is a known killer, stretching a glide is as lethal now as it ever was; accelerated stall a deadly companion to low and slow. Killers all, for generations past.
Solution – probably (IMO) a retrospective to the days when a student was not sent ‘first solo’ without those dangers being firmly implanted in the thickest of heads. It is rare (or used to be) that a qualified pilot would get an aircraft anywhere near a ‘stall’, but the potential for these types of accident during ‘training’, particularly early in the piece, is high. Maybe the need for a ‘special’ qualification to teach how to avoid these known killers is redundant; perhaps all should know and fully understand the basics as a matter of course.
Aye well, just a speculative Sunday twiddle, by way of paying my respects for those who died and those that mourn their loss.
Toot toot.