Oh, FCOL....(expletives deleted)
Only my opinion; humbly offered, in the hope of preventing another episode like the one presented in what is, IMO an excellent report into a fatal event offered by the ATSB. (Tim-Tam awarded). Proof positive that 'history' does, indeed, repeat itself; on a regular basis. The 'event' (no accident) is a classic.
If, (big one) I had the means and money, this ATSB report – HERE – would be the subject of a 'night' at the Aero Club. Couple of fellahin, one ATSB, one CASA, to walk those attending through the 'briefing' and discuss the whole thing; gloves off.
For starters; the BoM forecast; it was as clear as crystal. But, what of itself, was the forecast freezing level, the cloud type and what does that mean related to the proposed route, to be operated in an aircraft bereft of anti and de-ice equipment, non-pressurised, normally aspirated, single engine aircraft with just about enough horsepower to blow out a candle. High performance weather, low performance aircraft.
“Anyone can do the job when things are going right. In this business we play for keeps.”
Now, the BoM (bless 'em) provided a 'forecast' – the pilot selected the route. I read that forecast and my 'head' tells me to find a route and an altitude which will eliminate the need for equipment I don't have. Extra half hour airborne – so what. Consider the chart ( XX) consider the forecast, consider the lack of performance (between 7 and 10.000), oxygen and serious de/ anti ice equipment.
The 'freezing level' is defined – HERE -. But what 'is it' in relation to the other elements of a forecast. Cloud, mixing, up and down drafts super cooled moisture below the 0*c level?' is not, and it never, not ever was the start and stop point for ice accretion. Hell, in the Northern hemisphere, where they have and operate in 'real' weather, they pay 'attention' when MSL temperatures climb above a minus number. Why? Well 'ice crystals ' they are no problem (apart form the annoying 'Hiss'); but they dread the 'warmer' air where there is 'liquid' supper cooled water 'mixed' with the ice crystals. The 'danger area' is just below and just above the FZL. Mixing 'layers' at or about the FZL – in this case about the 10' mark, mixing layers in Cu shouts a clear warning. If the aircraft cannot 'top it' and carry the burden ice; then a lower level must be sought; should LSALT preclude this option then a diversion is the last resort. A better plan would be to 'step around' the parts of the journey which involved high terrain and 'mixing' layers. Better yet would be to plan 'around' the high risk (chancing it) weather over the high country.
Sorry; but this fatal, completely preventable event (for it cannot be deemed an 'accident) underpins all, IMO, that which 'wrong' at the grass roots of pilot training, that which allowed the 'thinking' related to yet another, avoidable event which claimed lives. It is not the first; let's see if 'we' can make it the last in a long line of 'ice and terrain' induced fatal events. For it was no accident; the dangers to this flight were clear, present and totally avoidable. Read the ATSB report; between he lines and look at the 'history' of similar events. It ain't rocket science.
“Nobody who gets too damned relaxed builds up much flying time.”
Right then; back in my box; I shall require Ale; now – now and lots of it.
Only my opinion; humbly offered, in the hope of preventing another episode like the one presented in what is, IMO an excellent report into a fatal event offered by the ATSB. (Tim-Tam awarded). Proof positive that 'history' does, indeed, repeat itself; on a regular basis. The 'event' (no accident) is a classic.
If, (big one) I had the means and money, this ATSB report – HERE – would be the subject of a 'night' at the Aero Club. Couple of fellahin, one ATSB, one CASA, to walk those attending through the 'briefing' and discuss the whole thing; gloves off.
For starters; the BoM forecast; it was as clear as crystal. But, what of itself, was the forecast freezing level, the cloud type and what does that mean related to the proposed route, to be operated in an aircraft bereft of anti and de-ice equipment, non-pressurised, normally aspirated, single engine aircraft with just about enough horsepower to blow out a candle. High performance weather, low performance aircraft.
“Anyone can do the job when things are going right. In this business we play for keeps.”
Now, the BoM (bless 'em) provided a 'forecast' – the pilot selected the route. I read that forecast and my 'head' tells me to find a route and an altitude which will eliminate the need for equipment I don't have. Extra half hour airborne – so what. Consider the chart ( XX) consider the forecast, consider the lack of performance (between 7 and 10.000), oxygen and serious de/ anti ice equipment.
The 'freezing level' is defined – HERE -. But what 'is it' in relation to the other elements of a forecast. Cloud, mixing, up and down drafts super cooled moisture below the 0*c level?' is not, and it never, not ever was the start and stop point for ice accretion. Hell, in the Northern hemisphere, where they have and operate in 'real' weather, they pay 'attention' when MSL temperatures climb above a minus number. Why? Well 'ice crystals ' they are no problem (apart form the annoying 'Hiss'); but they dread the 'warmer' air where there is 'liquid' supper cooled water 'mixed' with the ice crystals. The 'danger area' is just below and just above the FZL. Mixing 'layers' at or about the FZL – in this case about the 10' mark, mixing layers in Cu shouts a clear warning. If the aircraft cannot 'top it' and carry the burden ice; then a lower level must be sought; should LSALT preclude this option then a diversion is the last resort. A better plan would be to 'step around' the parts of the journey which involved high terrain and 'mixing' layers. Better yet would be to plan 'around' the high risk (chancing it) weather over the high country.
Sorry; but this fatal, completely preventable event (for it cannot be deemed an 'accident) underpins all, IMO, that which 'wrong' at the grass roots of pilot training, that which allowed the 'thinking' related to yet another, avoidable event which claimed lives. It is not the first; let's see if 'we' can make it the last in a long line of 'ice and terrain' induced fatal events. For it was no accident; the dangers to this flight were clear, present and totally avoidable. Read the ATSB report; between he lines and look at the 'history' of similar events. It ain't rocket science.
“Nobody who gets too damned relaxed builds up much flying time.”
Right then; back in my box; I shall require Ale; now – now and lots of it.