A thing of wonder.
I wonder, quite often, about exactly ‘what’ it will take to manifest the serious changes to the entire operational system of real world aviation ‘safety’. At present the system is dysfunctional, to say the least and; IMO, bordering on dangerous, across the board. This recent fiasco at Darwin shines a very bright light on how the system is imploding.
First cab off the rank must be the actions taken by both flight crews. Middle of the night in the middle of nowhere; one on STAR, one on SID; two crew apiece, full deck radio, TCAS, good weather, no ATC, so self separation between aircraft required; – strictly, just another day at the office. Is it a company requirement to use SID and STAR for every departure and arrival, if so why? These are procedures designed for use with ATC support; and are very specific and rigid (rightly so) with regard to track and altitude; a railway track if you like. But, these are experienced pilots, well versed in operating their aircraft with all the published data available. One inbound, opposite direction to the departing – both using the same runway – potential for a head butting competition writ large. It would be reasonable to expect that before leaving the ramp, the outbound would make all the required radio calls; and that the inbound would respond – a brief conversation to formulate a ‘plan’ could also be reasonably expected. What should have been a routine self separation devolved into a TCAS (last ditch warning) that a conflict was real and occurring at a fast rate. I wonder just how hide bound to SOP flight crew are required to be. Perhaps the ‘tapes’ and ATSB can provide some sort of answer.
Then we must ask why an ATCO could not take a shift in the tower; even a short one to monitor and manage high capacity arrivals and departures. Particularly during the period of changeable weather as the ‘Wet season’ approaches its end and, indeed during the ‘Wet’ season, when the weather can become ‘awkward’ and uncooperative. Non RPT night traffic is rare (cargo/ medevac/ charter) however it does exist, but the airlines operate 24/7 – 365. Compared to the cost of a mid-air event, the relatively small cost of ‘someone’ doing an easy night shift, after hours, just to cover the scheduled heavies seems a very small price to pay to guarantee that the slim chance of a 737 and an A320 banging heads remains the stuff of nightmares.
All’s well that ends well; and, happily the last hope TCAS performed design function – head- on collision avoided, by a goodly margin. But the deep flaws within the ATC system are beginning to become a norm rather than a rarity; delays, staff shortages and the ‘penny pinching’ mindset of management cost operators a fortune and must; sooner or later, end up with someone, somewhere, one dark and stormy making the big hole into which all rhetoric, deception and denial will land, with thud. What price ‘safety’ then?
Toot – toot… ---…
I wonder, quite often, about exactly ‘what’ it will take to manifest the serious changes to the entire operational system of real world aviation ‘safety’. At present the system is dysfunctional, to say the least and; IMO, bordering on dangerous, across the board. This recent fiasco at Darwin shines a very bright light on how the system is imploding.
First cab off the rank must be the actions taken by both flight crews. Middle of the night in the middle of nowhere; one on STAR, one on SID; two crew apiece, full deck radio, TCAS, good weather, no ATC, so self separation between aircraft required; – strictly, just another day at the office. Is it a company requirement to use SID and STAR for every departure and arrival, if so why? These are procedures designed for use with ATC support; and are very specific and rigid (rightly so) with regard to track and altitude; a railway track if you like. But, these are experienced pilots, well versed in operating their aircraft with all the published data available. One inbound, opposite direction to the departing – both using the same runway – potential for a head butting competition writ large. It would be reasonable to expect that before leaving the ramp, the outbound would make all the required radio calls; and that the inbound would respond – a brief conversation to formulate a ‘plan’ could also be reasonably expected. What should have been a routine self separation devolved into a TCAS (last ditch warning) that a conflict was real and occurring at a fast rate. I wonder just how hide bound to SOP flight crew are required to be. Perhaps the ‘tapes’ and ATSB can provide some sort of answer.
Then we must ask why an ATCO could not take a shift in the tower; even a short one to monitor and manage high capacity arrivals and departures. Particularly during the period of changeable weather as the ‘Wet season’ approaches its end and, indeed during the ‘Wet’ season, when the weather can become ‘awkward’ and uncooperative. Non RPT night traffic is rare (cargo/ medevac/ charter) however it does exist, but the airlines operate 24/7 – 365. Compared to the cost of a mid-air event, the relatively small cost of ‘someone’ doing an easy night shift, after hours, just to cover the scheduled heavies seems a very small price to pay to guarantee that the slim chance of a 737 and an A320 banging heads remains the stuff of nightmares.
All’s well that ends well; and, happily the last hope TCAS performed design function – head- on collision avoided, by a goodly margin. But the deep flaws within the ATC system are beginning to become a norm rather than a rarity; delays, staff shortages and the ‘penny pinching’ mindset of management cost operators a fortune and must; sooner or later, end up with someone, somewhere, one dark and stormy making the big hole into which all rhetoric, deception and denial will land, with thud. What price ‘safety’ then?
Toot – toot… ---…