Bricklaying and Choppers are things I know little about; (rubbish at both). So I hope the 'experts' in the field of 'helicopter operations' will forgive my presumption. Diffidence, caution and a complete lack of serious technical skills or operational savvy lead to this post initially being cautious and purely 'speculative'.
Even so; when I took a long, hard look at the ATSB 'snapshot' (below):-It set me to wondering : it just 'feels' operationally wrong – from a procedural POV. The sharp left turn to departure track, clearly in potential conflict with the arriving on descent, who must overfly the departing on a direct approach to the pad. In effect the approaching aircraft was a 'straight in' to the pad – the departing aircraft was almost as soon as airborne headed outbound 'on track'. The potential for conflict existed. The post from Pprune – below seems to come from one who has more insight than I about multiple rotary wing aircraft operating within a confined area, at high frequency.
Dog_on_Cat3.
So, there were two known, potentially conflicting routes established within the pre - planning of one company, at least in the horizontal.
The obvious question follows: Were there any height max/min limits in place to ensure vertical separation at or around the crossing point, precisely because the two pre - planned tracks coincide?
Seems to me that a 'behind and above' the departing would make some sense : or, departing must wait for 'clear air overhead'; or always turn away from the incoming landing pad until clear; no matter how I look at it or which way I work the scenario seems to me that unless clear visual contact is established and clear separation available, one way or another; there was always a chance of a close call.
Dog_on_Cat3.
The interim report makes clear further work is ongoing, so I am sure all such things are being considered. I hope so, on all accounts. If it turns out there were no vertical profiles in place I fear the lawyers will quickly put this one into the 'accident waiting to happen' category, and with some justification, especially given the high-cycle nature of the flight profiles being sold and the ever present 'A-post blind-spot' potential affecting all vehicles approaching on anything like a 90degree relative converging path. Several contributors to this thread pointed out early-on that this incident may well boil down to company SOP rather than anything else. My sense today is they were/are right. But...only time and the final report will decide. For that we must wait.
Amen – with or without SOP and approach limits and vertical profiles to a very busy, high cycle operation; it leaves you wondering about 'complacency' and 'compliance'. There must be a section in CAR translated into COM/ SOP which specifies and clearly sets down the 'procedure' for arriving and departing aircraft in a very narrow area of operations (risk assessment); surely. Or, perhaps a defined RT procedure for self separation – close in. But then I wonder about 'new type' operation, fatigue, hydration, frequency, complacency and 'familiarity' combining where no SOP regime is established and made an 'iron clad' rule, no matter the 'pressure' to keep the money rolling in.
As stated – not remotely expert in the field; but, it does appear to be that a potential conflict existed; now proven at great cost to be very real, despite the regulatory twaddle. How easily those holes in that famous cheese can align – so very, very quickly.
Yes I know – back in my box' – right?
Even so; when I took a long, hard look at the ATSB 'snapshot' (below):-It set me to wondering : it just 'feels' operationally wrong – from a procedural POV. The sharp left turn to departure track, clearly in potential conflict with the arriving on descent, who must overfly the departing on a direct approach to the pad. In effect the approaching aircraft was a 'straight in' to the pad – the departing aircraft was almost as soon as airborne headed outbound 'on track'. The potential for conflict existed. The post from Pprune – below seems to come from one who has more insight than I about multiple rotary wing aircraft operating within a confined area, at high frequency.
Dog_on_Cat3.
So, there were two known, potentially conflicting routes established within the pre - planning of one company, at least in the horizontal.
The obvious question follows: Were there any height max/min limits in place to ensure vertical separation at or around the crossing point, precisely because the two pre - planned tracks coincide?
Seems to me that a 'behind and above' the departing would make some sense : or, departing must wait for 'clear air overhead'; or always turn away from the incoming landing pad until clear; no matter how I look at it or which way I work the scenario seems to me that unless clear visual contact is established and clear separation available, one way or another; there was always a chance of a close call.
Dog_on_Cat3.
The interim report makes clear further work is ongoing, so I am sure all such things are being considered. I hope so, on all accounts. If it turns out there were no vertical profiles in place I fear the lawyers will quickly put this one into the 'accident waiting to happen' category, and with some justification, especially given the high-cycle nature of the flight profiles being sold and the ever present 'A-post blind-spot' potential affecting all vehicles approaching on anything like a 90degree relative converging path. Several contributors to this thread pointed out early-on that this incident may well boil down to company SOP rather than anything else. My sense today is they were/are right. But...only time and the final report will decide. For that we must wait.
Amen – with or without SOP and approach limits and vertical profiles to a very busy, high cycle operation; it leaves you wondering about 'complacency' and 'compliance'. There must be a section in CAR translated into COM/ SOP which specifies and clearly sets down the 'procedure' for arriving and departing aircraft in a very narrow area of operations (risk assessment); surely. Or, perhaps a defined RT procedure for self separation – close in. But then I wonder about 'new type' operation, fatigue, hydration, frequency, complacency and 'familiarity' combining where no SOP regime is established and made an 'iron clad' rule, no matter the 'pressure' to keep the money rolling in.
As stated – not remotely expert in the field; but, it does appear to be that a potential conflict existed; now proven at great cost to be very real, despite the regulatory twaddle. How easily those holes in that famous cheese can align – so very, very quickly.
Yes I know – back in my box' – right?