It had to happen -
The ATSB published this 'milk and water' report October 1, 2020.
A 'LL' post on the UP – actually worth reading – and; spot on to boot.
LL - Interesting that isn't addressed in the report. Its not just QF 737s that only have the tiller on the LHS and at a critical point, particularly after a relatively high speed exit off the runway, the Captain has to take control of the aircraft. Another point not mentioned is functional blindness. The PIC didn't "see" rwy 06 because he wasn't expecting to see it, he also didn't "see" the aircraft lined up on 06. If you want a good example of functional blindness then just remember the bloke in the gorilla suit walking through the basketball passing competition. Most airline pilots would be familiar with this.
LL -”There is a lot more going on with this incident than is obvious to anyone not familiar with jet operations. The briefing; probably overly detailed and the Captain has already made up his mind how they are getting from the runway to the terminal. J2 is like the Haymarket roundabout in Melbourne and it should have been altered to be a 90 degree exit off the runway well before this. Look at the photo of the view to the terminal off J2, your eyeline goes to the terminal. Brand new FO is always going to be less situationally aware as they are still slightly behind the aircraft. Captains deal with that situation in different ways. Some will assume that because they have been cleared to line then they are fully up to speed, others will take it into account and slow the operation down. Despite all the briefings, all the HF training all the ICAO recommendations you cannot know what mental model the other pilot is operating to until it starts to manifest itself. There is only 19 seconds from entering J2 to crossing the stop bars, in that time there is a fair bit of activity going on in the flight deck including a change of rolls. Not a lot of time for the FO to comprehend that the Captain's idea of what is going to happen is different to his/hers.
LL - “I'm not critical of the report but I am not surprised that this occurred. The best safety action was Perth Airport getting rid of J2.
Concur - A good summary which leaves one wondering – once again – why the ATSB are using soft soap in place of 'operational expertise'.
Choc Frog – nicely summarized.
Toot – toot.
The ATSB published this 'milk and water' report October 1, 2020.
A 'LL' post on the UP – actually worth reading – and; spot on to boot.
LL - Interesting that isn't addressed in the report. Its not just QF 737s that only have the tiller on the LHS and at a critical point, particularly after a relatively high speed exit off the runway, the Captain has to take control of the aircraft. Another point not mentioned is functional blindness. The PIC didn't "see" rwy 06 because he wasn't expecting to see it, he also didn't "see" the aircraft lined up on 06. If you want a good example of functional blindness then just remember the bloke in the gorilla suit walking through the basketball passing competition. Most airline pilots would be familiar with this.
LL -”There is a lot more going on with this incident than is obvious to anyone not familiar with jet operations. The briefing; probably overly detailed and the Captain has already made up his mind how they are getting from the runway to the terminal. J2 is like the Haymarket roundabout in Melbourne and it should have been altered to be a 90 degree exit off the runway well before this. Look at the photo of the view to the terminal off J2, your eyeline goes to the terminal. Brand new FO is always going to be less situationally aware as they are still slightly behind the aircraft. Captains deal with that situation in different ways. Some will assume that because they have been cleared to line then they are fully up to speed, others will take it into account and slow the operation down. Despite all the briefings, all the HF training all the ICAO recommendations you cannot know what mental model the other pilot is operating to until it starts to manifest itself. There is only 19 seconds from entering J2 to crossing the stop bars, in that time there is a fair bit of activity going on in the flight deck including a change of rolls. Not a lot of time for the FO to comprehend that the Captain's idea of what is going to happen is different to his/hers.
LL - “I'm not critical of the report but I am not surprised that this occurred. The best safety action was Perth Airport getting rid of J2.
Concur - A good summary which leaves one wondering – once again – why the ATSB are using soft soap in place of 'operational expertise'.
Choc Frog – nicely summarized.
Toot – toot.