More 'Q' than 'A'.
While we are in question mode; there are a couple of additional points which, to me at least don't seem quite 'kosher' (Halal seeing as its Ramadan). Those crucial few seconds between a good, solid speed buffer above VMC and the loss of control. Neither of the crew were exactly 'new' to multi engine aircraft, nor turbine engines. The experience levels suggest much familiarity with the 'essentials' of managing an Engine Failure on Take Off (EFATO); the basics would have been drilled into them, the reaction almost instinctive.
Had this even been a couple of new chums; to gain a Check/Training tick and enough multi time to be progressed onto a turbine type; there would have been a significant amount of training and practice on asymmetric operations. In short, to operate this class of aircraft, you need to know your stuff, be able to recognise the danger areas and, importantly, be able to and have demonstrated prevention of a dangerous combination or at very least, be able to 'dig your way out' of the hole. My point is simple. How come in just a few seconds, two experienced, sane, sensible qualified pilots managed to loose so much speed, in so short a time, to the point where complete control was lost.
There is nothing in the ATSB report to convince me that it was 'pilot error'. Sorry too much; but, I just don't believe it. From 600 feet, with a what? 98 – 120 = 22KIAS above VMCA my granny could have shoved some power on and 'danced it out of the Daisy patch.
So what went wrong? I can identify half a dozen possible causes; but not one that experienced pilots would not recognise and be able to deal with. There is little mentioned by ATSB of the potential 'system' failures; there is no mention made of the 'trim' settings, there is no information on the power and condition levers final settings; there is no detail of the EEC system/ power lever relationship. In fact, after three years and a severe editing this bloody report is so gender neutral, it is unsure of what it is unsure of. We are no wiser now than we were three years ago. How do we prevent a reoccurrence from the ATSB report? We cannot is the short answer; we should be able to after a three year 'study'.
The excerpts from the Operations Manual are of deep concern. They carry the whiff of FOI interference with sound, tested operational practice. The wording has been messed about with to satisfy some whims or the dictates of more than one FOI. There is a lack of continuity, clarity and classification. That which is enshrined in Part A MUST be parallel with and reflect that contained in Part C. In fact anything in Part A but a reference to where to find the information in Part C should be torn out. I have read some seriously conflicted, CASA approved, operator paid for rubbish in several COM. The pug marks of FOI personal ignorance, arrogance and bias writ large across the pages. Which is why of course, the COM is usually used to keep the office door open.
No Ale for me tonight. I have been given two Sections of the ATSB report to read and digest, under threat of no darts if I slide off the hook. I would dearly love to get hold of the Ross Air Company Operations Manuals, from a decade ago to the latest version. What tale would that study tell, I wonder?
Right: back to the grindstone then; at least until dinner time – after that, all bets are off.
While we are in question mode; there are a couple of additional points which, to me at least don't seem quite 'kosher' (Halal seeing as its Ramadan). Those crucial few seconds between a good, solid speed buffer above VMC and the loss of control. Neither of the crew were exactly 'new' to multi engine aircraft, nor turbine engines. The experience levels suggest much familiarity with the 'essentials' of managing an Engine Failure on Take Off (EFATO); the basics would have been drilled into them, the reaction almost instinctive.
Had this even been a couple of new chums; to gain a Check/Training tick and enough multi time to be progressed onto a turbine type; there would have been a significant amount of training and practice on asymmetric operations. In short, to operate this class of aircraft, you need to know your stuff, be able to recognise the danger areas and, importantly, be able to and have demonstrated prevention of a dangerous combination or at very least, be able to 'dig your way out' of the hole. My point is simple. How come in just a few seconds, two experienced, sane, sensible qualified pilots managed to loose so much speed, in so short a time, to the point where complete control was lost.
There is nothing in the ATSB report to convince me that it was 'pilot error'. Sorry too much; but, I just don't believe it. From 600 feet, with a what? 98 – 120 = 22KIAS above VMCA my granny could have shoved some power on and 'danced it out of the Daisy patch.
So what went wrong? I can identify half a dozen possible causes; but not one that experienced pilots would not recognise and be able to deal with. There is little mentioned by ATSB of the potential 'system' failures; there is no mention made of the 'trim' settings, there is no information on the power and condition levers final settings; there is no detail of the EEC system/ power lever relationship. In fact, after three years and a severe editing this bloody report is so gender neutral, it is unsure of what it is unsure of. We are no wiser now than we were three years ago. How do we prevent a reoccurrence from the ATSB report? We cannot is the short answer; we should be able to after a three year 'study'.
The excerpts from the Operations Manual are of deep concern. They carry the whiff of FOI interference with sound, tested operational practice. The wording has been messed about with to satisfy some whims or the dictates of more than one FOI. There is a lack of continuity, clarity and classification. That which is enshrined in Part A MUST be parallel with and reflect that contained in Part C. In fact anything in Part A but a reference to where to find the information in Part C should be torn out. I have read some seriously conflicted, CASA approved, operator paid for rubbish in several COM. The pug marks of FOI personal ignorance, arrogance and bias writ large across the pages. Which is why of course, the COM is usually used to keep the office door open.
No Ale for me tonight. I have been given two Sections of the ATSB report to read and digest, under threat of no darts if I slide off the hook. I would dearly love to get hold of the Ross Air Company Operations Manuals, from a decade ago to the latest version. What tale would that study tell, I wonder?
Right: back to the grindstone then; at least until dinner time – after that, all bets are off.