Further discussion.
Not being required at the Houseboat compound; I did some scratching around – (if “K” can’t make a garden seat in a day by now. Etc.) with regard to the ‘brace position’ and the benefit of shoulder harness. Wow! Experts to the left of me, Exponents of both arguments on the other. There has been a lot, a serious lot, of research done into ‘accident’ and the results of that research comes out at about 50/50 (give or take). It all seems to be dependant on a ‘given’ set of circumstances. In one case, the road safety analysis; it is a lay down misère for shoulder harness. But for aircraft accidents, the ‘Brace” position seems to carry some weight.
Of course ‘weight’ is the big denominator. Two shoulder harness additions in the back seats of a single engine whatever is something nothing; two or three hundred in a commercial jet is a significant penalty, for many valid practical reasons.
But, to me the big, as yet unanswered question is – who, in a crash scenario like the one we see at Middle Island, would stand the better chance of survival? The bloke who was briefed to adopt the ‘brace’ position before impact: or, the fellah who was upright and dependent on the ‘torso restraint’.
It is a valid question; one which insurance companies need to ask. No one minds the pennies to fit shoulder harness to ‘light’ aircraft: provided that the (ATSB favourite) statistical analysis of accident casualty and death can be used to demonstrate that ‘torso restraint’ is the ‘best practice’ way to go forward.
“Brace” has a huge scientific following. ‘Torso restraint’ is backed by the motor vehicle industry insurance. Perhaps ‘horses’ for courses’ is a good ideology. Average car crash speed is? Average aircraft crash speed is?
The Cessna which crashed (basically LOC - again) at Middle Island landed at about ‘fast car accident’ speed. It crashed, because ‘something’ caused the engine to quit; sudden and unexpected.
I ask only a few simple question: were the passengers briefed, pre flight, on ‘Brace’ – if not why not? Were the passengers ‘advised’ to ‘Brace’ before impact? Was there time, due to the low altitude for them to (a) don torso restraint; or, (b) adopt the ‘Brace’ position?
“In the unlikely event of a sudden engine failure” etc.
You see it is all well and good to say – retrospectively – this or that should have happened – or been fitted as part of standard equipment. It sounds good; but why was this possible scenario not addressed years ago?
Of course, had the aircraft engine just not given up the ghost when it did; matters may have worked out differently. The real cause of death was collision with terrain, the reason why this occurred is that the engine failed.
ATSB simply ‘don’t know’. I suggest they find out – quick smart; lots of potential failures, world wide, out there. Non with the placebo of ‘torso restraints’ fitted to alleviate the burden of hitting the Earth, very hard -- at speed. F=Ma always.
This leads us to the nub. CASA crucified the operator: yet ‘accepted’ their Emergency procedures; does that therefore make ‘em complicit? ATSB cannot define the radical cause and we are fobbed off with some fantasy that ‘torso restraints’ would have saved the whole thing. BOLLOCKS.
That CASA would tolerate and accept/approve the ALA inspection protocol is either gross negligence or plain ignorance. That ATSB would dare to state that they could not define ‘why’ the engine failed is a gross dereliction of sworn duty.
Not to worry – torso restraints – mandated will solve it. And, well it might; for the useless minister is living in a fantasy; a protected bubble of unadulterated Pony-Pooh. (And loving it).
Are we being conned? Are these clowns taking the Mickey Bliss?
I’ll have another Ale, quiet like, while all the C172 operators, mechanics and pilots have a little think about the ATSB conclusions and the CASA response.
Not being required at the Houseboat compound; I did some scratching around – (if “K” can’t make a garden seat in a day by now. Etc.) with regard to the ‘brace position’ and the benefit of shoulder harness. Wow! Experts to the left of me, Exponents of both arguments on the other. There has been a lot, a serious lot, of research done into ‘accident’ and the results of that research comes out at about 50/50 (give or take). It all seems to be dependant on a ‘given’ set of circumstances. In one case, the road safety analysis; it is a lay down misère for shoulder harness. But for aircraft accidents, the ‘Brace” position seems to carry some weight.
Of course ‘weight’ is the big denominator. Two shoulder harness additions in the back seats of a single engine whatever is something nothing; two or three hundred in a commercial jet is a significant penalty, for many valid practical reasons.
But, to me the big, as yet unanswered question is – who, in a crash scenario like the one we see at Middle Island, would stand the better chance of survival? The bloke who was briefed to adopt the ‘brace’ position before impact: or, the fellah who was upright and dependent on the ‘torso restraint’.
It is a valid question; one which insurance companies need to ask. No one minds the pennies to fit shoulder harness to ‘light’ aircraft: provided that the (ATSB favourite) statistical analysis of accident casualty and death can be used to demonstrate that ‘torso restraint’ is the ‘best practice’ way to go forward.
“Brace” has a huge scientific following. ‘Torso restraint’ is backed by the motor vehicle industry insurance. Perhaps ‘horses’ for courses’ is a good ideology. Average car crash speed is? Average aircraft crash speed is?
The Cessna which crashed (basically LOC - again) at Middle Island landed at about ‘fast car accident’ speed. It crashed, because ‘something’ caused the engine to quit; sudden and unexpected.
I ask only a few simple question: were the passengers briefed, pre flight, on ‘Brace’ – if not why not? Were the passengers ‘advised’ to ‘Brace’ before impact? Was there time, due to the low altitude for them to (a) don torso restraint; or, (b) adopt the ‘Brace’ position?
“In the unlikely event of a sudden engine failure” etc.
You see it is all well and good to say – retrospectively – this or that should have happened – or been fitted as part of standard equipment. It sounds good; but why was this possible scenario not addressed years ago?
Of course, had the aircraft engine just not given up the ghost when it did; matters may have worked out differently. The real cause of death was collision with terrain, the reason why this occurred is that the engine failed.
ATSB simply ‘don’t know’. I suggest they find out – quick smart; lots of potential failures, world wide, out there. Non with the placebo of ‘torso restraints’ fitted to alleviate the burden of hitting the Earth, very hard -- at speed. F=Ma always.
This leads us to the nub. CASA crucified the operator: yet ‘accepted’ their Emergency procedures; does that therefore make ‘em complicit? ATSB cannot define the radical cause and we are fobbed off with some fantasy that ‘torso restraints’ would have saved the whole thing. BOLLOCKS.
That CASA would tolerate and accept/approve the ALA inspection protocol is either gross negligence or plain ignorance. That ATSB would dare to state that they could not define ‘why’ the engine failed is a gross dereliction of sworn duty.
Not to worry – torso restraints – mandated will solve it. And, well it might; for the useless minister is living in a fantasy; a protected bubble of unadulterated Pony-Pooh. (And loving it).
Are we being conned? Are these clowns taking the Mickey Bliss?
I’ll have another Ale, quiet like, while all the C172 operators, mechanics and pilots have a little think about the ATSB conclusions and the CASA response.