In August 2019, Airservices Australia announced that a review into organisational culture was to be commissioned and performed by Elizabeth Broderick.

a. Can you provide a status update?

b. What are the initial findings from the review, if any?

c. Please provide a copy of the review’s Terms of Reference.

d. Will the review process incorporate staff from all functional areas of Airservices?

e. What is the timeline for the different review processes within the review period?

A report issued in August 2019 by Tony North QC which initiated this review noted that 50% of all respondents to the report’s survey (75% for women) reported inappropriate touching, bullying, discrimination or sexual abuse over the past decade.

f. Over the last 10 years, what has been done at a corporate level to address bullying, harassment and discrimination?

g. Does Airservices Australia’s employee assistance provider provide reportable data that would allow you to proactively address specific problem areas for staff health and wellbeing?

a. If yes, please provide the numbers on how many staff have accessed EAP services and a breakdown of what services were accessed, for the past three financial years?

Answer:

a. Initial planning for the review is complete and employees are now being invited to participate in the process through confidential focus groups, interviews and written submissions. A survey is scheduled for February 2020.

b. No findings have been made at this point.


d. Yes.


f. Airservices has undertaken a range of activities to address bullying, harassment and discrimination over the past 10 years. This includes a major culture program, refreshing the corporate values, reviewing and updating relevant policies and procedures, implementing mandatory training, tailored interventions in specific work areas, and introducing multiple reporting pathways.
g. Below is a breakdown of the number of staff who have accessed Airservices’ EAP services for the past three financial years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Career Assist</th>
<th>Employee Assist</th>
<th>Family Assist</th>
<th>Legal Assist</th>
<th>Manager Assist</th>
<th>Money Assist</th>
<th>Nutrition &amp; Lifestyle Assist</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY16/17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY17/18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY18/19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Committee Question Number: 366
Departmental Question Number: SQ19-000389

Program: Accelerate Program and Enterprise Network Modernisation Program
Division/Agency: Airservices Australia
Topic: Accelerate Program and Enterprise Network Modernisation Program
Proof Hansard Page: Written (8 November 2019)

Senator Glenn Sterle asked:

a. The Accelerate Program was due to be completed by 30 June 2017 with a post-implementation review due by 30 December 2017. Could you please provide a copy of that review?

b. Airservices Australia performs a variety of technical functions, including the operation and sustainment of air navigation services and its infrastructure. Over the past five years, has the amount of work for technical staff increased or decreased in that period?

c. Can you provide a progress update on the Network Enterprise Modernisation Project (NEMP)?

d. What is the projected total impact upon full-time equivalent (FTE) levels for APS staff through the NEMP?

Answer:

a. A copy of the review is at Attachment A.

b. The overall demand on technical teams has reduced over the last five years as a result of optimised maintenance practices, better resilience, and reduced maintenance associated with modern communications navigation, surveillance and information systems.

c. The objective of the Enterprise Network Modernisation Program (ENMP) is to upgrade Airservices enterprise-wide telecommunications services. This is a key enabling initiative that underpins Airservices’ technology transformation program.

ENMP has three streams of activity currently underway:

1. The sourcing stream consists of a market tendering process to select a partner to provide planning, design, implementation and ongoing managed services to modernise Airservices’ enterprise wide telecommunications. The Request for Proposal (RFP) closed on 28 October 2019 and the evaluation process is expected to be completed in early 2020;

2. A business case and future service model will be finalised following the completion of the RFP evaluation process in mid-2020. If approved, contract negotiations with the selected partner(s) will commence for the final scope of services and costs; and

3. A sustainment stream is also underway to replace services that will retire before the end of 2020 to provide continuity for telecommunication services.

d. The impact on full-time equivalent (FTE) levels across the two potentially-affected teams is dependent on the RFP process and business base which will determine the service delivery outcome. Airservices continues to provide regular communications on the progress of the ENMP to the affected employees, their representatives and suppliers.

Attachments
- A: Accelerate Program Post Implementation Review
Change summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document version</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Change description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>23/11/17</td>
<td>Draft report issued to review team for comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>24/11/17</td>
<td>Amendments to incorporate review feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>29/11/17</td>
<td>Final report</td>
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Report distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jason Harfield</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive General Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melinda Evans</td>
<td>Office of the CEO Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Stoddard</td>
<td>Government Relations Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members of the PIR team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tracey Lawrance</td>
<td>Governance and Security Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Booth</td>
<td>Air Navigation Services (ANS) Customer Value &amp; Business Performance Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Oakley</td>
<td>Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS) Customer Value &amp; Business Performance Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Hind</td>
<td>Information Management and Technology (IM&amp;T) Service Design &amp; Delivery Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virat Behla</td>
<td>Finance Strategy &amp; Planning Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donna Benecke</td>
<td>Safety Assurance Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 1 – Executive Summary

1. Introduction

Airservices performs a critical role in the Australian aviation industry by providing air traffic management and aviation rescue and firefighting services. However, the aviation industry is evolving. New technologies are emerging, airline competition has increased, and there is a heightened focus on safety and efficiency. Whilst responding to these challenges, our declining financial and project delivery performance put at risk our ability to deliver against our transformation agenda. As a result, the CEO commissioned PwC Australia to conduct a Business Diagnostic and Efficiency Review in November 2015. The diagnostic identified a number of issues to be addressed:

- Whilst technology disruption was on the horizon and we needed to transform our information management capability, we didn’t have a clear strategy or plan to execute.
- Project performance has degraded and our return on investment was lower when compared to peers and like industries.
- Costs had grown faster than revenue and we faced a forecasted ~$13M loss in 2016.

2. Design of the Program

The Airservices Accelerate Program (the Program) was designed to address the issues identified in the Business Diagnostic and Efficiency Review. It was designed to rapidly improve capability, eliminate unnecessary cost and deliver value to our customers now and into the future. Improvement themes were grouped into three pillars:

1. **A New Operating Model** - Organising ourselves to work in a different way, with a simpler operating model based on customer needs, with less bureaucracy and more accountability.

2. **Assets & Projects Refocus** - Managing our assets and projects with more discipline to ensure we apply commercial standards.

3. **Technology Enablement** – Simplifying and standardising the corporate technology platform environment to automate workflow, reduce manual activity and improve timeliness of service delivery.

The Program (depicted at Appendix A) was delivered under a three-phase implementation program coordinated by the Accelerate Program Management Office (PMO) from March 2016 through to June 2017:
2. Build the foundations: Jun – Dec 2016

The Airservices Accelerate Program Transition Plan was approved by the Airservices Board in February 2016. The Accelerate Program was a key deliverable of our 2016/17 Corporate Plan.

3. Objective of PIR

The objective was to assess the performance of the Accelerate Program against the Board-approved objectives and benefits for:

1. Transition to the new operating model
2. Asset and project refocus
3. Technology enablement.

4. PIR methodology

Inputs for this PIR were obtained from Program documentation including Gate 3 closure reports, interviews, a survey of senior leaders and feedback from the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. Key stakeholders are summarised at Appendix B.

Two separate Safety PIRs have also been completed: the Program Safety PIR and the Asset and Project Refocus Safety PIR. Lessons learnt from these two PIRs are included in Section 4. The Program Safety PIR is provided in Attachment 1.

5. Key findings

The findings of this PIR support the conclusion that objectives and benefits were achieved and demonstrate how the problems identified in the Business Diagnostic and Efficiency Review have been addressed.

a) Objectives

Section 2 summarises how we met the objectives and summaries key achievements.

b) Benefits

The financial benefits were achieved, with $157m in savings achieved by 30 June and a further $20m in savings achieved post 30 June which is reflected in 2017/18 budgets. In
2016/17, we became a more financially secure organisation evidenced by $59 million underlying net profit after tax and a 15.2% decrease in operating expenses when compared to 2015/16.\textsuperscript{2}

Evidence collected during this PIR demonstrates that the non-financial benefits were achieved. Section 3 summarises how the non-financial benefits have been achieved. The foundations for enhanced asset and project management performance have been set along with the preparedness for digitisation and automation. The key lesson is that the transformation principles and the drive and momentum generated by the Program must continue. We must continue to find new ways of working and focus on continuous improvement.

\section{Safety Performance}

The Safety PIR concluded that, as planned at the commencement of the Accelerate Program, the major impact of changes occurred in the corporate and business support areas with operational service delivery and frontline operational and rostered staff effectively protected from any significant impact.

The application of the Safety Management System (SMS) at Program and initiative level was effective in managing operational safety risk and producing key evidence items of compliance. There is evidence to show that safety risk management was embedded into program management processes from concept, through planning and execution and into the closing phase of the program. As a result, analysis has confirmed that there were no occurrences that affected the safety of operational service delivery due to changes made under the Accelerate Program and Airservices' safety performance has been maintained or improved in line with longer term trends.

Safety lessons learnt have been identified and are summarised in Section 4. The Program Safety PIR is at Attachment 1.

\section{Lessons Learnt}

Section 4 summarises the lessons identified from a variety of internal stakeholders. Many of the lessons are relevant to large transformation programs including our OneSKY Program. A key success factor was our ability to create a singular organisational focus on the Accelerate Program to achieve the required outcomes and the protection of operational service delivery.

\textsuperscript{2} Airservices Annual Report 2016-17
and frontline operational and rostered staff from any significant impact. Key themes for the
lessons included:

1. **Simple design, governance and implementation principles** – The design of the
   program and principles were simple and focussed on the drivers for change. It addressed
   the fundamental problems identified in the Business Diagnostic and Efficiency Review.
   Agile decision making was key - execute swiftly, be outcomes focussed, make decisions,
   own them and move forward.

2. **Leader-led change** - Strong leadership is essential for success. The use of business
   change managers to coordinate operating model changes within business groups worked
   well. The Program also provided a great leadership opportunity for senior managers, in
   particular the Other Leadership Roles (OLRs) who had the opportunity to design their new
   teams in response to operating model principles.

3. **Design of the operating model** – The design principles and rollout of the new operating
   model worked well and set a good foundation for the technology and asset management
   work. The Voluntary Redundancy (VR) program provided a significant opportunity to
   move a large number of people and costs out of the business quickly. But there is a need
   to constantly challenge and refine our operating model to ensure right sizing and focus on
   new ways of working.

4. **Communication and stakeholder management strategies** – Structured, consistent
   and timely leader-led communications were essential to the success of the Program.
   Communication channels and activities were very effective. Whilst stakeholder
   management activities were generally effective, some negative feedback was received
   from some stakeholders including airports and Community Aviation Consultation
   Groups. Stakeholder management activities require review to ensure the right capability
   exists to implement stakeholder activities including community consultation.

5. **Asset and project refocus** - This pillar was a significant piece of work which involved
   some deep cultural challenges of merging operational technology (OT) and information
   technology (IT) people, processes and systems and alignment to a new service model.
   Work commenced late due to the organisational focus on operating model changes,
   however, the frameworks, which align with contemporary standards for asset
   management and projects, have been implemented. Work continues in 2017/18 to
   operationalise the Asset Management Framework and P3M Framework.

6. **Sustainability of benefits** – Work needs to continue to simplify and standardise
   processes to support the Corporate and Business Technologies (CBT) initiative.
   Leadership must focus on sustaining the Program’s principles and creating new ways of
   working.
7. **Technology enablement** – Expectations were placed on the organisation to recruit new capability and replace legacy IT systems that were seen to be constraining the business. The difficulty of building new capability and driving change at the same time was identified as a key lesson. We must continue to focus on simplifying and standardising processes to enable new ways of working through technology and unlock efficiencies.

8. **Risk and safety management** – Risk and safety management processes were consistently applied. A focus of risk management at the Program level enabled people to see the big picture. The Safety PIR identified fourteen lessons including early planning and clarification of safety requirements; clarity of key safety requirements and accountabilities; effective engagement with the Regulator; and culture and attitude play a fundamental role in maintaining safety.
Section 2 – Program objectives

The objectives of the three program pillars are summarised below, along with key achievements and key activities being progressed in 2017/18:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective - Redesign the operating model by simplifying management layers, improving spans of control, consolidating functions and eliminating duplication</th>
<th>Met: Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Achievements</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The new service oriented operating model was implemented on 1 July 2016. Implementation principles were consistently applied including:  
• Maintain service continuity – ensure core ATC and ARFF services are not impacted and risk and safety requirements are maintained – confirmed in Safety PIR.  
• Ownership – leader-led implementation of changes – this was a key lesson identified in Section 4 of this report. | ☐ Two customer centric services lines – ANS and ARFFS  
☐ The cost savings achieved through the new operating model are embedded in the 2017-2018 Corporate Plan.  
☐ Nine business groups reduced to five and leaner senior leadership team – 61 to 35  
☐ Recruited 300 plus people, injecting new capability into key areas like technology  
☐ Right sized the corporate centre  
☐ 2016/17 financial performance³:  
  • 15.2% reduction in expenses  
  • $59m underlying net profit after tax  
  • 9% drop in total cost per IFR flight hour |
| All corporate centre functions and activities were reviewed against a set of criteria to determine the core corporate support required for each Group and inform the design. This included consideration of duplicated functions and spans of control. The Safety PIR concluded that “The Stability Assessment that was conducted to support the transition to the new operating model was a novel way to assess and demonstrate the ability of the organisation to continue to acquit its safety accountabilities despite a significant restructure. |

³ Airservices Annual Report 2016-17
### Objective - Empower ARFF with financial responsibility to operate the group to commercial benchmarks

| Met: Yes |

#### Analysis

The Gate 3 Review reported that there was no financial and non-financial benefits realised for this initiative as part of the Accelerate Program outside of those delivered as part of the Airservices capability review. ARFFS baselined performance and KPI’s are included in the ARFFS Service Plan 2017-2022 and Roadmap which sets out the key strategies we will implement to work towards achieving the ARFFS goals – including to “Secure ARFFS financial future through efficient delivery of safe and effective services that are valued by our customers.”

#### Achievements

- ARFFS Service Plan 2017-2022
- ARFFS Transformation Roadmap 2017-2020

### Objective - Develop capability in key strategic procurement areas to enable sustainable benefits and subject to contestability, outsource defined non-core activities

| Met: Yes |

#### Analysis

The Procurement Cost Out initiative encompassed:

1. The Rapid cost out of select contracts resulted in, for the 16/17 FY, annualised savings of $12.2M against an original target of $3M.
2. The implementation of a new procurement governance framework.
3. Development of Procurement and Contract Management Capability across the organisation
4. The establishment of a 2-3 year procurement roadmap across the organisation to enable capability and capacity planning activities to be undertaken.

#### Achievements

- Supplier Relationship Management (SRM) Governance Framework published
- Forward strategic procurement plans developed for each Group
- 15 contracts renegotiated with fee reductions
- The infrastructure as a service (IAAS) procurement activity being progressed is a significant activity which requires new ways of working in relation to IT service delivery and new financial and governance models.
### Objective - Align workforce planning to the new operating model and resourcing levels, and improve roster efficiency based on best commercial rostering practices in Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both ANS and ARFF centralised rostering capability and standardised approaches to rostering through clarifying accountability and responsibilities, reviewing application of Enterprise Agreements, and reducing varying interpretations of custom and practice. An annual review of rosters, to ensure they are aligned to demand to maximise efficiencies, was also introduced. Technology requirements for a workforce optimisation and predictive analytic capability including reporting and forecasting and rostering have been defined. System changes were integrated between SAP and Qintiq to provide more accurate leave planning and acquittal and prevent leave leakage. Both ARFF and ANS reviewed their workforce plans and reviewed rosters and identified opportunities for further efficiency gains.</td>
<td>☐ Technology requirements for workforce planning and rostering defined. ☐ Updated ANS and ARFFS workforce plans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objective - Establish a program for future Enterprise Agreements (EA) reform including remuneration and conditions to align with modern commercial and aviation industry standards and practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A strategy, which aligns with modern workforce practices, was developed for negotiating the next Corporate EA. The strategy and principles will also inform future ATC EAs. Strategies are being applied to the current ARFFS EA negotiations and will be the foundation for further incremental reform in future negotiations.</td>
<td>☐ EA reform strategy developed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Objective - Build information management capability to enable future growth, including data strategy, governance, architecture, access, security, and use, and examine the potential to use strategic partners to manage and store data.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The Information Management (IM) initiative was scoped to:  
- Formulate an IM Strategy that would propose and map out how Airservices could build its future business more centred on Information  
- Review Airservices IM capability shortfalls in terms of people, process and technology and produce a plan for how to best uplift those capabilities so that we can execute that strategy. |  
- Hired new IM and technology capability  
- Information Management roadmap - a report providing clear identification of the Airservices IM people, process and technology gaps and the basis of an Investment Proposal to carry out a program of work to uplift those capabilities.  
- A report detailing a set of identified IM-based opportunities that Airservices can further use as part of its corporate strategy in re-forming itself an IM focussed business.  
- A renovated set of corporate IM policy and framework documentation. |
### Objective - Create an effective asset management framework across Airservices

| Met: Yes |

#### Analysis

- The Enterprise Asset Management Framework (C-FMK0020), based on ISO 55000:2014 “Asset management—Overview, principles and terminology”, was implemented on 30 June 2017. Asset Policy is reflected in the Board approved Risk Appetite Statement.
- The framework integrates Services Plans, performance objectives, total cost of ownership, asset lifecycle management and Portfolio Optimisation function (P3M) to provide rigour and governance on asset investment to ensure the right investments are being made and delivered by the most efficient method and within organisational constraints.
- Key governance roles (Asset Owner, Manager, Asset Service Provider) have been defined which allocate clear accountabilities and responsibilities for asset management decision making.

#### Achievements

- Enterprise Asset Management Framework published
- Technology Management Manual published
- Asset and Project Refocus principles aligned with the operating model principles
- The Lessons identified in Section 4 of this report highlight opportunities to further embed and mature asset management processes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective - Utilise a Portfolio, Program and Project Management approach to ensure portfolio outcomes are met and projects are delivered efficiently and effectiveness</th>
<th>Met: Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Achievements</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Portfolio, Program and Project Management principles are integrated into the Asset Management Framework. P3M Standards are published. Governance Control meetings are in place and operating:  
- Program Control Groups – OneSKY, four IMT Programs  
- ANS and ARFFS Portfolio Investment Committee meetings  
- OneSKY Steering Committee  
- Enterprise Investment Committee (first meeting in Feb 2017). |  
- P3M Framework developed and Standards published  
- Governance control groups and committees in place  
- Enhanced project reporting  
- The Lessons identified in Section 4 of this report highlight opportunities to further embed and mature P3M processes. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective - Develop a plan to strategically manage the property portfolio with a commercial focus</th>
<th>Met: Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Achievements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall savings of $0.2M confirmed, and $4m pending confirmation of negotiated lease savings for the Alan Woods Building (AWB) in Canberra.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Property functions streamlined and embedded in ANS and ARFFS  
- AWB consolidation planned and surrender of lease for floors 1-3 to building owner in 2017/18. |
## Objective - Simplify and standardise the corporate technology platform environment to automate workflow, reduce manual activity, improve timeliness of service delivery and enable transition to new operating model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CBT initiative delivered against the approved Charter as follows:</td>
<td>☐ Approved technology roadmap for the rollout of technology capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Finalised the detailed design and requirements to implement the</td>
<td>☐ Automation in SAP enhanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supporting business processes</td>
<td>☐ Workflow and new online forms implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sourced a partner to design and execute the CBT initiative</td>
<td>☐ New delivery model focussed on minimal viable product and continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Updated the Enterprise Architecture to reflect the target technology</td>
<td>improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environment as shaped by CBT initiative</td>
<td>☐ All of the CBT initiative streams have transitioned to 2017/18 and are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identified bespoke / point solutions that will be decommissioned /</td>
<td>being managed per the approved roadmap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retired due to leveraging of best-practice processes from SAP platform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Completed an assessment of paper-based forms and developed priority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for digitisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implemented technology support to embed the business processes and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demonstrate the effective new ways of working such as redesign of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intranet site.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 3 – Benefits realisation

The Airservices Accelerate Transition Plan identified the financial and non-financial benefits to be achieved. An analysis of benefits achieved is summarised below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial benefits</th>
<th>Benefit realised: YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annualised savings of approximately $155m by July 2017 and an additional $22m annualised benefits delivered after 30 June.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Accelerate Program underpinned Airservices turnaround in financial performance in 2016-17. By the end of 2017-18 the program will have delivered annualised expenditure savings of $177m, whilst some of the program cost savings have funded the delivery of new capabilities and investment required to enable improved ways of working.

At the end of 2016-17, $157m in annualised savings had been realised; $141m in staff costs through the implementation of a new operating model with aligned business structures and changes to asset management practices. These activities lead to a reduction in the number of staff by approximately 870 FTE. $16m in supplier cost savings have also been achieved through the review of major supplier contracts and a review of enterprise training delivery activities.

By the end of 2017-18, the ongoing implementation of the operating model will have delivered a further reductions of approximately $20m per annum; approximately $15m in staff costs is a result of the full implementation of the asset management refocus. The remaining $5m in supplier cost savings will largely be driven by reductions in the AWB accommodation requirements.

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4 Airservices Accelerate Program Transition Plan – February 2016
Non financial benefits

New and improved ways of working  Benefit realised: YES

The phrase *new ways of working* has resonated with staff and there are many examples of this being effected in practice. The Lessons identified in Section 4 of this report highlight an opportunity to adopt the Accelerate principles, as the new way in which we work, to focus on momentum of continuous improvement and streamlining of processes to achieve efficiencies.

An internal audit on new ways of working conducted in Oct/Nov 2017 focussed on two processes (recruitment and manual forms) to assess the level of performance culture adopted to support new ways of working. The audit concluded the following:

- Post Accelerate and with the decentralisation of the recruitment process, hiring managers have taken accountability for the recruitment process. However, due to the varying capability and capacity of those responsible managers this has resulted in inconsistent practices across Airservices. The recruitment servicing model is due to be finalised in Q3 2018.

- From a review of 140 forms on Document Centre, we identified that the level of sign off on forms is appropriate for supporting an accountable performance culture whilst also ensuring expenditure is efficient, effective, economical and ethical as stipulated by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act).

Greater focus on strategic outcomes and customer needs  Benefit realised: YES

Our new operating model is based on two customer-oriented services lines – ANS and ARFFS, with a right sized corporate centre.

The 2017/18 Corporate Plan details our performance outcomes, key performance metrics and five year operating and performance projections.

The performance level of service delivery is also agreed with and reported to customers in accordance with the Airservices Services Charter.
### Increased management capability

**Benefit realised: YES**

The Accelerate Program brought an increase in management capability through clarifying functions, activities and required capability to deliver the benefits from the new operating model. The senior leadership team was reduced from 61 to 35 and 300 plus people have been recruited, injecting new capability across the organisation.

Activities scheduled for 2017/18 will ensure there is strong focus on management capability:

- Finalisation of the Airservices Workforce Plan 2017-2022
- Refresh of leadership development and enterprise corporate training
- Execution of end to end leadership succession management process
- Finalisation of the recruitment servicing model.

### A performance based culture with clear accountabilities and responsibilities

**Benefit realised: YES**

The new operating model has clarified accountabilities and responsibilities. A performance based framework is aligned with delegations and our risk acceptance criteria and risk appetite statement.

Processes will continue to mature and evolve in 2017/18 and therefore accountabilities and responsibilities will evolve and change to meet our new ways of working.

### Optimised asset management and performance

**Benefit realised: YES**

The Asset Management Framework and P3M Framework have been implemented and will be subject to continuous improvement in 2017/18, assets will be managed in accordance with the Risk Appetite Statement and corporate return on assets KPI.

The 2016/17 Annual Report identifies that Airservices achieved 5.6% return on assets which was significantly higher than the target of 3.9% and the previous year’s result of -6.4%. The Lessons identified in Section 4 of this report highlight opportunities to streamline and embed the new asset and project processes.

### Preparedness for digitisation and automation

**Benefit realised: YES**

The Information Management Strategy is approved.

The CBT road map business case was approved and sets the foundation for renovation of corporate business process including to hire to retire, travel and procurement processes in 2017/18.
Section 4 – Lessons learnt

Lessons learnt were collected from a broad range of internal stakeholders including: Board Directors, Chief Executive Officer and Executive General Managers, PricewaterhouseCoopers leads, business change managers, other program leads, and senior leadership team.

1. Design, governance and implementation principles

“The secret to the whole program was being open…we didn’t have all the answers but we gave commitments to find out and delivered on that.”

“Accelerate provided a singular focus for the organisation – this was very powerful.”

Accelerate pulled the organisation together to achieve a common goal which was clearly articulated. We delivered on the promise and the program ended 30 June 2017. Clear deadlines and a short implementation timeframe provided focus and momentum.

Flexible, agile, fast (risk informed) decision making drove performance. The program design was a simple, best practice approach (what other organisations do) which addressed the problems identified in the Business Diagnostic and Efficiency Review. The case for change was clearly established and reinforced consistently.

The engagement of PwC, who brought significant expertise and capability in large scale organisational transformation, was essential and ensured the Program’s success. Airservices lacked the change / transformation capability in-house. PwC advised that the achievements of the Airservices Accelerate Program exceeded many other transformation programs they have been engaged in. It was identified that the PwC and PMO resources could have been better utilised as the Program progressed, in particular more direct contact with OLRs and DREs for coaching and support.

The governance, design and implementation principles were effective to maintain focus. The principles were vital to achieve alignment – there was continual referral back to them especially when focus waivered or for making decisions and determining trade-offs. There was universal feedback that the principles need to be enshrined in our ways of working.

The Accelerate principles can be applied to other large programs. A focus on having the right capability to drive changes and instil urgency and rhythm to get things done is essential. It was suggested, that with the benefit of hindsight, the OneSKY Program would have benefited from being included in the Accelerate Program.
The approach taken to engage with and report to the Board was assessed as highly effective. Gate reviews worked well and forced rigour and accountability.

**Lessons**

1. A simple process driven design is best: what is the burning platform? Be outcomes focussed and aim big – without aiming big, we wouldn’t have achieved as much.
2. Single-minded focus on the outcome is vital.
3. Making decisions, owning them and moving forward – focus on 80/20 and the plan to move forward. Consider the trade-offs and compromises. Execute swiftly to create momentum.
4. How can we keep the implementation principles front to mind and part of our new ways of working? There is a need to assess and develop Airservices capability to continue the change / continuous improvement momentum as the new norm, and in particular for the OneSKY Program.

**2. Leader-led change**

“There was absolute focus on maintaining service continuity and it was vitally important for the Program to be leader-led.”

The Program was led by the CEO and the Executive team with support from PwC, taking a risk based approach with effective governance mechanisms. The CEO led from top – he was visible and engaged and the Executive was aligned and took ownership of issues. There was a commitment to always attending the scheduled meetings including the weekly Executive Steering Committee meetings which helped to achieve alignment and directed agile decision making. The Executive team’s understanding of the business and knowing which levers to pull was identified as a key strength.

The business change manager (BCM) approach worked well to support the Executive and Business Groups. The BCM approach, which was a new concept for Airservices, provided expertise and assured that consistent processes were applied across Business Groups.

The Other Leadership Roles (OLRs) were given the ability to design their own unit structures after an assessment of key functions, activities and capability requirements in line with the operating model principles. Final team design consultation processes were led by the OLRs. This has been identified as a significant leadership opportunity, in which OLRs, many of whom were new managers, performed well. In general, a more cohesive and performance focussed leadership team comprising DREs and OLRs has been a key outcome. Leaders are working across the business to continue the news ways of working.
Lessons

1. **Focus on the vision and don’t get bogged down in detail and perfection. Never lack confidence that we can do it.**

2. **Executive alignment and focus on outcomes. Strong leadership is a key success factor for large change programs. Leaders need to be willing to make the hard calls.**

Design of the new operating model

“The foundation is set….but we need to maintain momentum.”

There was consensus that the new operating model design and roll out worked well and has set a good foundation. Continued focus and challenging is required in 2017/18 and beyond. Asset management, procurement and market testing are big pieces of work and require longer to effect real change.

The VR program was a very successful activity to remove people who wanted to leave and this resulted in costs being able to be taken out of the business quickly. This enabled us to deliver on what we said we would do. Positive feedback was generally received regarding the VR process. In particular, it was acknowledged that the VR team provided timely advice and support to managers. There was also a perception that some Industrial Relations (IR) advice needed to be clearer and there was some uncertainty around the status of “potentially surplus employees” and their rights to ongoing employment opportunities. No days were lost to industrial dispute and this demonstrates the thoroughness of processes like the VR program and IR strategy overall.

OneSKY was not included in the new operating model design. It has been suggested that this was to the detriment of OneSKY in that the full weight and momentum of Accelerate is hard to replicate.

The resilience of our people, both past and current, was a highlight. Staff handled themselves with dignity and integrity. Support such as the employee assistance program (EAP) and career transition counselling service was in place.

The challenge will be for the organisation to focus on continuous improvement and not to grow back numerically. A focus on key performance indicators to understand cost drivers is important. Costs such as overtime / absences due to sick leave still remain a risk and must be addressed to demonstrate a positive performance culture.
Lessons

1. There is a need to constantly challenge, maintain momentum and refine the operating model to ensure right sizing and focus on new ways of working (streamlining and automating processes and systems, performance metrics) to identify and maximise new opportunities, and achieve operating efficiencies each year.

2. Understanding of Enterprise Agreements detail, business impacts and clarity of IR strategy can reap benefits by challenging long standing practices.

3. Some comments were received regarding the need to enhance handover and knowledge retention activities, given the technical nature of our activities and SME’s specific knowledge sets.

Communications and stakeholder management

“Messaging was consistent and timely, the Program was built around the drivers for change identified in the diagnostic.”

Communication strategies and activities were assessed to be effective. Messaging was consistent and timely. The communications across the leadership team at both DRE and OLR level was more open and frequent than it had been in the past. And it appears that the standards set during Accelerate have continued. Communications at lower levels was sometimes inconsistent. Avnet pages, FAQs and communications including the weekly communiques from the PMO Director worked well. The cascading down of some messages was variable but this was attributed to individual managers and their ability to communicate directly with staff.

The OneSKY Program was not included in the Accelerate Program and they retained a level of segregation from the rest of the organisation. This resulted in some communication issues in and out of the OneSKY Program, particularly as stakeholders and business processes changed around them.

There was a heavy reliance on the PwC Communications team. When that support slowed in early 2017, Airservices staff needed to step up; therefore communications during this time could have been better. This demonstrates the importance of having the right internal capability to maintain rhythm and consistency of messaging and communications.

Stakeholder management processes were assessed as reasonably effective. Airservices received positive feedback from Airlines. As a result of realigning accountabilities for stakeholder engagement under the new operating model, there were some perceptions that the
Program had been the cause of Airservices ceasing support for some corporate activities like participation in Community aviation Consultation Groups (CAGS), pilot information nights, and attendance at Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committees (RAPAC).

Some long term relationships between Airservices staff and airport staff could have been better managed. It was identified that some Airservices Airport Relations staff who were not part of the new operating model, sometimes sent the wrong messages.

The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development provided feedback that overall there appears less capability post-Accelerate for Airservices to engage as well with community stakeholders and a reduction in Airservices timeliness and provision of information related to environmental matters. Feedback relating to CAGS is consistent with other feedback obtained. Specific examples provided are being reviewed by management as part of continuous improvement.

Lesson

1. Structured, consistent and timely leader-led messaging is essential for success – the weekly leader updates from the PMO provided timely information for managers. It’s critical that Airservices has the right internal communications capability to ensure a whole of business communications strategy.

2. Stakeholder management activities require review to ensure the right capability is in place to implement the stakeholder activities including community consultation.

Asset and project refocus

“Asset management was a huge challenge and big targets were set.”

The asset management refocus was complex, involving the realignment of culture, service models and accountabilities along with recruitment and integrating new capability.

Comments were received in relation to needing to commence the asset and project refocus work earlier and although the objective was achieved, the organisation struggled with execution in a twelve month program. Foundations have been set for work to continue in 2017/18. There was insufficient planning compared to the operating model component and we needed to better understand the challenges. Communications for the asset work was not as effective as the prior work; it was suggested due to this work commencing towards the end of the Program.

The engagement of a consultancy firm outside of PwC was a distraction that didn’t work and delayed the work. With hindsight, it may have been more effective to utilise PwC.

A separate Safety PIR for the Asset and Project Refocus has been completed and identifies five lessons, summarised below.
Lesson

1. It’s important to set stretch targets. Major change is a cultural journey and we need to revisit continually. Communication strategies may need to be adjusted for complex changes, to enhance awareness and engagement.

Lessons identified in the Asset and Project Refocus Safety PIR

1. Establishing clear requirements for change process: Introduction of the asset management framework at the practical level required the updating of work practices and accountabilities through the amendment of the formal change processes (the System Management Manual). While the requirement for formal documented change processes and accountabilities was established early, acceptance was not well recognised. Independent review, staff engagement and training helped to generate confidence and acceptance of the revised change processes. Seeking support from a Subject Matter Expert to develop the Technology Management System (TMS) assisted with aligning the guidance in the TMS with desired work-practises and further building confidence in the end-product. Starting with a clean slate i.e. moving away from existing roles (titles) such as Chief Engineer, Chief Operating Authority etc. assisted with replacing the existing processes with fit-for-purpose processes.

2. Training and capability development: While the TMS provides for the management of technical competencies there is an ongoing need to mature training and capability development practices to ensure we maintain the right people with the right skills to achieve required performance outcomes.

3. Timely staff engagement and training in new ways: The extent of the Asset and Project Refocus change was sufficient to warrant a Safety Acceptance Report (SAR) however the time afforded the Assets and Project Refocus Initiative was truncated due early program delays. Early assessment of the relative changes required across all initiatives may have established a greater priority for Asset and Project Refocus changes.

4. Assets and/or projects: There was a reluctance to accept that the Asset Management Framework and associated change processes afforded to managing assets were in fact those that could be used for any change whether or not asset related. The Asset Management Framework and P3M governance were deliberately integrated to ensure an efficient business model.

5. Hand-over of deliverables from the asset management (AM) initiative: The hand-over was supported by transition of initiative members into AM roles in the business.
A clear understanding of residual benefits to be realised by the business would have further assisted with shaping the work to be done by the teams post AP&R closure.

Sustainability of benefits

“We needed to change and I am glad we did.”

“Sustainability of benefits is now key.”

The VR program was very successful in achieving the financial benefits. Sustainability is the key to ensure that non financial benefits are embedded into how we do business. Whilst there was an acknowledged need for the organisation to “catch its breath” post 30 June 2017, there is consensus that there is a need to re-energise and ensure that old ways of working don’t creep back in. Metrics should identify any negative movements in organisational design principles and assure that full time equivalent (FTE) growth is appearing in areas where it is required, and not in corporate support areas. A formalised approach to monitor, measure and track that objectives are being sustained is required.

Ongoing work is required to simplify and standardise processes and to utilise new capability to automate processes to effect new ways of working which are aligned with our accountability model. Consistent feedback was received in relation to processes not keeping pace with the change. Examples provided included: delays in updating org. structure changes in the HR system and impact on budgets; delegations not amended which created bottlenecks for approvals, IT systems to manage change weren’t amended to align with timing of changes; inefficient procurement and recruitment processes; and inconsistent role sizing of like roles across groups.

A source of frustration was voiced around budget allocation to ensure that the required process streamlining and digitisation continues.

Lessons

1. Mechanisms must be in place to ensure the Accelerate principles and objectives are sustained.

Consider the use of mechanisms to continuously improve and standardise processes and operations such as Lean Six Sigma. Processes need to be aligned to the operating model. If we don’t renovate our processes, we won’t enable new ways of working – people will just continue doing the same things more inefficiently.

Technology enablement
"New information management and technology capability is driving new ways of working and technology."

"The elevation of technology to the Executive is a positive step."

The pace of change within the information management and technology space has been fast and has necessitated new ways of thinking and new delivery models. The merging of OT and IT, will take time to stabilise especially as cultures and processes merge and develop and the impacts of our new "customer" oriented service model needs to be better understood across the Business Groups.

For the Information Management and Technology Business Group, there are significant impacts from moving from a capital model of funding to a service model e.g. infrastructure as a service. OPEX and CAPEX assumptions will impact on asset management and customer pricing etc.

The distinction between external resources for projects, labour hires, contracted service providers and contactors needs to be clearer and SAP modified to ensure FTE figures are not inflated. Strategic procurement is still taking too long. An example was provided in which it took six months to establish a panel for project management specialists.

The people, process, and technology integration needs to be carefully managed as there is still a lack of trust, from some areas, in the capability and credentials of new IT staff.

Expectations were placed on the Information Management and Technology Business Group to fix legacy issues and also undertake a large volume of recruitment of new capability, which took much longer than anticipated.

In relation to the Corporate and Business Technology initiative, there was insufficient understanding of the drivers for change and visibility of the plan particularly in relation to impacts from the new service model and impact on business cases to justify investment decisions. It took too long to get the business case to the Board for approval. Key activities like hire to retire, travel and procurement renovation has been transferred to 2017/18 which has created issues associated with business engagement and BAU budgets.

Business process owners need to redesign processes – they need to be simplified and standardised. To effect technology enablement, the momentum of process change and continuous improvement needs to increase. Ground work is set and changes such as “infrastructure as a service” are underway. The Information Management (IM) Strategy and has provided a baseline to move forward.

Lessons
1. It is difficult to build new capability and drive change at the same time.

2. Airservices must focus on simplifying and standardising processes - changing to how most business do things, rather than customising IT systems to Airservices ways.

3. Process simplification and automation approaches should be considered for strategic rub points like FTE management, financial models, strategic procurement etc.

4. Monitor and manage the People (culture), process, and technology integration risks to support the advancement of technology enablement.

5. Business cases need to evolve to better articulate opportunity costs associated with uplift in IT capability and longer term benefits.

Risk and Safety Management

“The whole Program was a risk management activity – to determine where we could get the biggest change.”

“Safety didn’t just focus on process and documentation…it involved conversations and decisions.”

Our Risk Appetite Statement was applied to achieve an acceptable level of risk and drive outcomes. In particular, the Risk Appetite Statement articulated a conservative risk appetite for operational impact – and this was a key focus of the Program. This demonstrates a real maturing of the organisation, a focus on opportunities and positive risk management and focus on core mission.

Program risks (summarised at Appendix C) were managed in accordance with the Airservices Risk Management Standard and the Safety Management System:

1. Enterprise level - two Accelerate Program related risks were included on the Enterprise Risk Profile:
   a) The Accelerate Program was the key treatment to mitigate risk S1 – Airservices fails to meet our promises and value proposition to customers, industry, the public and government.
   b) Risk T1 – Reduced focus on core service delivery during Accelerate Program was managed in accordance with the Accelerate Program Safety Plan.

   Reporting was provided to the Board Audit and Risk Committee per the existing Enterprise risk reporting mechanism.

2. Program Risk management – Five Program level risks were managed by the Program Management Office:
   a) Leadership Misalignment during rollout of the Accelerate Program
   b) Ineffectual leadership capability across the organisation to manage the change
c) Inadequate skills and capability within the program to deliver the benefits

d) Lack of stakeholder awareness of the Accelerate Program

e) Accelerate Program fails to effectively manage the contract with PwC and deliver value for money.

The documented controls for risk – *Lack of stakeholder awareness of the Accelerate Program* were not effective to mitigate and address the concerns raised by some stakeholders.

3. **Business Group risks** – Business Group related risks were managed via Business Group risk management plans, in accordance with our Risk Management Standard.

4. **Safety risks** – Safety related risks have been reviewed in the Safety PIR. In summary, there were no significant risk consequences or issues associated with Accelerate and evidence exists to support that the Airservices operational safety risk profile has not changed. Executive Steering Group meeting occurred weekly and maintained focus on the Program level risks to distil real or perceived risks and focussed on opportunities.

The Safety PIR (refer Attachment 1) reports separately on our safety performance but in summary there were no safety incidents attributable to the Accelerate Program.

5. **Internal Audits** - Analysis of audits conducted and associated findings for 2016/17 by the Chief Auditor identified:

a) Seven audits were conducted on Accelerate Program activities. No findings were raised.

b) No audit findings were raised in other audits which had a direct link to activities of the Accelerate Program (failure of controls during the Program).

c) Three audits identified findings which will be addressed by the new P3M framework which will provide more effective project governance and management controls:

i. **Audit AA16-17-02a: Public Works Committee Act requirements** – Inconsistencies between internal and external guidance created confusion on reporting requirements, and there is no mechanism to monitor status of ongoing major and medium works to identify instances that require PWC notification.

ii. **Audit AA1617-45: Holistic project report** - Reporting functionality of Project Server is not designed for holistic reporting and analysis.

iii. **Audit AA1617-47 - Inaccurate project status reporting** - Inaccuracies identified in the reporting of projects as provided to Executive and Board, including project schedules, risks and issues, and financial data.

d) Two audits have been conducted in 2017/18:

i. **New ways of working**: The outcome of this audit is reported in Section 3.

ii. **Recruitment audit**: This audit had not been completed at the time of publishing this report.
Lesson

1. Maintain a strong risk management focus at the Program level – see and understand the big picture. Focus on material risks and controls. Apply our Risk Appetite Statement to mitigate risks and make agile, dynamic decisions.

Lessons identified in the Accelerate Program Safety PIR

1. **Early planning and establishment of a program level Safety Plan** provided structure, consistency and clear expectation around how the program would comply with the SMS as it evolved.

2. **Mandated SCARDs for all initiatives**: The requirement for each Initiative to complete a SCARD, even when scope did not actually meet the SMS requirement for a SCARD to be conducted, provided positive confirmation that an assessment against the SCARD criteria had been completed.

3. **Safety by design**: The ‘safety by design philosophy’ which was adopted from the outset of the Accelerate Program contributed to producing a safe outcome and maintaining our safety performance through a significant organisation transformation.

4. **Key safety requirements** were established very early, for example excluding frontline operational and rostered staff from the change program, establishing clear assessment criteria for granting of VRs, requiring explicit acknowledgement of acceptance of new safety accountabilities via new Safety Accountabilities Statements and ensuring all Initiatives could provide evidence of compliance with the SMS.

5. **Project Management Office (PMO)**: For a large program of work with individual workstreams, it is essential to maintain a central tracking system and ensure that SMS compliance is visible and can be positively assured.

6. **Safety accountabilities**: The development of Safety Accountability Statements for managers with key safety accountabilities, along with the one on one induction with the Standards and Systems Manager was seen as a positive and assisted managers in understanding and acknowledging their accountabilities.

7. **Stability assessment**: The Stability Assessment that was conducted to support the transition to the new operating model provided assurance that all frontline operational staff remained under the senior leadership of experienced managers and that key areas that supported our regulated functions maintained a high degree of stability in their management structures.

8. **Stakeholder perceptions**: In hindsight a more proactive stakeholder management to allay concerns of some stakeholders was required.

9. **Engaging with the safety Regulator** early and often was a way to build trust.
10. **Alignment:** Additionally, due to the level of interest in the Accelerate Program in the media and in Government forums, a degree of ‘oversharing’ was beneficial for both Airservices and for CASA to assure alignment on key points.

11. **Cyber security:** There has been a need to expand thinking on ‘safety by design’ to incorporate ‘security by design’. Ensuring our regulated systems are built and maintained with a “secure by design” approach is challenging traditional engineering and ATC methods.

12. **Merging Operational Tech (Engineering) and Information and Communications Tech (ICT):** The merging of teams into a single operation model and organisation structure is complete but the process and cultural differences are significant. There is a program in place to both lift maturity across the board in the ICT areas and integrate the best of the Engineering systems and processes. The TMS is the beginning of this transformation. Integrating these two cultures is key to achieving safe and efficient operations and industry alignment.

13. **Sustaining safety after change:** There is a common acknowledgement that during periods of intense change there is a heightened focus on safety and safety performance is maintained or even improved. Once the pace of delivering change drops off, a different type of ‘heavy lifting’ commences as we continue to bed down new processes while managing general business. Achieving the right balance is essential to managing safety and efficiency and our established assurance practices can serve to assist in maintaining this.

14. **Culture:** The most significant finding from a safety perspective, as evidenced during surveillance activities and by our safety performance during this significant period of change, is that culture and attitude play a fundamental role in maintaining safety.

15. **Just Culture:** The expectation under the new target operating model is that staff who are accountable for safety change management are aware of their accountabilities, are aware of the support mechanisms available to assist the acquittal of those accountabilities, and can identify if the implementation is beyond their capability and request assistance.
## Appendix A – Accelerate Program Structure

### Accelerate Program Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerate Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diagnostic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Accelerate Safety Plan (15 June)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Completion of safety assessment for the Accelerate Program (29 Feb)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design of Organisational Leadership Structure and Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operating model and leadership safety statement (30 June)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety assessment for leadership structure and operating model (27 June)</td>
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<td>New operating model and Leadership structure introduced (1 July)</td>
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<td>Voluntary Redundancy (VR) Program</td>
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<td>Completion of VR Program Safety Assessment (20 Jun)</td>
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<td>Departures Process Commence (early Aug)</td>
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<td>VR Expression of Interest Open (14-30 Jun)</td>
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<td>Completion of individual risk assessments (21 July)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design and Transition to Target Operating Model</td>
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<td>Safety assessment for transition to new model (30 Aug)</td>
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<td>Transition and team structure safety statement (21 Oct)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Team design consultation commences (2 Sep)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive safety assurance statement completed (21 Oct)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Team designs finalised and transition commenced (24 Oct)</td>
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Appendix B – Methods used to gather PIR information

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<tr>
<th>Information gathering method</th>
<th>Name / Position</th>
<th>Interest or role in Program</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interviews with Board Directors</td>
<td>Board Directors - Fiona Balfour, Tim Rothwell, David Marchant</td>
<td>Corporate governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive interviews</td>
<td>Jason Harfield – Chief Executive Offer Paul Logan – Chief Financial Officer Stephen Angus - Executive General Manager Air Navigation Services (ANS) Michelle Bennetts - Executive General Manager Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS) Chris Seller – Chief Information Officer Rob Weaver - Executive General Manager Safety &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Governance oversight &amp; leadership</td>
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<td>Written feedback</td>
<td>Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development</td>
<td>Corporate Governance</td>
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<td>Survey:</td>
<td>Number of survey responses received: BCM’s – 4 Initiative leads – 9 Phase 1 &amp; 2 Diagnostic team members - 6</td>
<td>Strategic change support for business groups and initiative leads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Email to DRE and OLRs requesting feedback on lessons learnt</td>
<td>Number of survey responses received: 19</td>
<td>Senior leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety PIR</td>
<td>Donna Benecke - Safety Assurance Manager</td>
<td>Safety assurance</td>
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<td>Asset &amp; Project Refocus Safety PIR</td>
<td>Craig Oakley – Pillar Lead</td>
<td>Safety assurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview with PwC Australia</td>
<td>Neil Plumridge – Partner Paul Miles – Engagement Lead</td>
<td>Change consultants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Audit outcomes</td>
<td>Bronwyn Davies – Chief Auditor</td>
<td>Independent assurance</td>
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</table>
Appendix C – Accelerate Program Risk Management Structure

Accelerate Program
Nick King (Program Director)

Enterprise Risks

S1: Airservices fails to meet its promise and value proposition to customers, industry, the public and government.

T2: Failure to negotiate and establish the Airservices fixed 2016-2021 Long Term Pricing Agreement.

T1: Reduced focus on core service delivery during the delivery of the Accelerate Program.

Accelerate Program Risks

- Leadership Misalignment during rollout of the Accelerate Program
- Ineffectual leadership capability across the organisation to manage the change
- Inadequate skills and capability within the program to deliver the benefits
- Lack of stakeholder awareness of the Accelerate Program
- Accelerate Program fails to effectively manage the contract with PwC and deliver value for money

Accelerate Safety Risks

- Safety accountabilities and responsibilities not appropriately discharged during or after transition to the Accelerate Program
- Insufficient suitably qualified and experienced staff retained in required roles to support ongoing SRT0/CASR compliance during or after transition to the Accelerate Program

Accelerate Initiatives

- ANS Accelerate Initiatives
- ANS Risk Management Plan
- ARFFS Accelerate Initiatives
- ARFFS Risk Management Plan
- Finance Accelerate Initiatives
- Finance Risk Management Plan
- Corporate Services Accelerate Initiatives
- Corporate Services Risk Management Plan
- S&A Accelerate Initiatives
- S&A Risk Management Plan
- IM&T Accelerate Initiatives
- IM&T Risk Management Plan

Accelerate Program causes distraction resulting in disruption to service performance, loss of focus on IBAU activities or failure to manage current active safety issues during transition to the new structure.

Loss of records/maintenance of records/inadequate data entry during or after transition to the Accelerate Program.
## Change summary

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<th>Change description</th>
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<td>25/10/17</td>
<td>Draft report issued for comment</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>6/11/17</td>
<td>OLR/DRE Stakeholder feedback incorporated</td>
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## Report distribution

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<td>Jason Harfield</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rob Weaver</td>
<td>Executive General Manager Safety and Assurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claire Marrison</td>
<td>Standards and Systems Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tracey Lawrance</td>
<td>Governance &amp; Security Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Angus</td>
<td>Executive General Manager Air Navigation Services</td>
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<td>Craig Charker</td>
<td>Operations Standards and Assurance Manager</td>
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<td>Doug Scott</td>
<td>Northern Operations Manager</td>
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<td>Steven Clarke</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matthew Booth</td>
<td>ANS Commercial and Business Performance Manager</td>
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<td>Rodney Sciortino</td>
<td>ATM Customer Value Manager</td>
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<td>Claire Roberts</td>
<td>ANS People Capability Manager</td>
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<td>Paulino Mendiola</td>
<td>Enterprise PMO Manager</td>
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<td>Michelle Bennetts</td>
<td>Executive General Manager Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting Services</td>
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<td>Glenn Wood</td>
<td>Chief Fire Officer</td>
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<td>Kashmir Nahl</td>
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<td>Craig Oakley</td>
<td>Customer Value and Business Performance Manager</td>
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<td>Chris Seller</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Hind</td>
<td>Service Delivery and Design Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paddy Goodall</td>
<td>ATM Network Services Manager</td>
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1 Executive Summary

1.1 Background, purpose and scope

A Safety Post Implementation Review (PIR) has been conducted to assess and evaluate the changes implemented under the Accelerate Program and the safety performance of Airservices during and after the Accelerate Program.

1.2 Summary of process

The approach taken in conducting the Safety PIR was to scrutinise a variety of safety performance data and information and conduct data driven safety performance analysis largely independent of those involved in implementing changes under the Accelerate Program.

Relevant safety performance data and analysis outputs were mapped against Accelerate Program hazards to identify whether there was any evidence to indicate that the undesirable outcome of the identified hazards has been realised.

This analysis was then reviewed by key stakeholders to verify the findings, capture any actions and ongoing safety performance monitoring requirements, and identify lessons learnt that may benefit other programs.

1.3 Key findings

There was a planned and consistent approach to the application of the Safety Management System (SMS) across the scope of changes implemented under the Accelerate Program. Appropriate consideration of safety was evident from concept phase through to the close of the Program and operational safety risks were identified, assessed, managed to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and accepted.

CASA surveillance activities throughout the Program did not identify any significant safety concerns and there were no regulatory non-compliances as a result of any changes made under Accelerate.

There were nine internal audits conducted relating to the Accelerate Program and there were no safety issues identified.

Analysis of a large variety of safety performance data and information confirmed that there were no operational safety occurrences or negative impacts on operational service delivery as a result of changes made under the Accelerate Program (Attachment 1).

Airservices maintained an acceptable level of safety performance during and after Accelerate was implemented.

1.4 Conclusions

As planned at the commencement of the Accelerate Program, the major impact of changes occurred in the corporate and business support areas with operational service delivery and frontline operational and rostered staff effectively protected from any significant impact.
The application of the SMS at program and initiative level was effective in managing operational safety risk and producing key evidence items of compliance. There is evidence to show that safety risk management was embedded into program management processes from concept, through planning and execution and into the closing phase of the program.

As a result, analysis has confirmed that there were no occurrences that affected the safety of operational service delivery due to changes made under the Accelerate Program and Airservices’ safety performance has been maintained or improved in line with longer term trends.

1.5 **Recommendation**

There is consensus that Airservices must remain vigilant in monitoring safety performance after this period of significant change.

A number of lessons learnt have been identified and will be disseminated so that the organisation can learn from them. Additionally actions arising out of this safety PIR will be tracked to completion in the Corporate Integrated Reporting and Risk Information System (CIRRIS).

An increased focus on monitoring newly developed key risk indicators and key performance indicators, taking advantage of both lead and lag metrics will allow us to focus our risk based assurance programs.

We must continue to promote the principles of Just Culture, which is a key element of the positive safety culture that was central to us maintaining our safety performance throughout Accelerate, and will be key to the safety of our operational service delivery going forward.
2 **Purpose**

In accordance with the Accelerate Program Safety Plan (REF 1), a program level Safety Post Implementation Review (PIR) has been conducted to assess and evaluate the changes implemented during the Program relating to safety management to identify any lessons learnt that may benefit other programs. This report documents the outcomes of the Safety PIR.

3 **Background**

The Accelerate Program was designed to rapidly improve capability, eliminate unnecessary cost and deliver value to our customers now and into the future. Improvement themes were grouped into three Accelerate Program pillars:

**A New Operating Model** - Organising ourselves to work in a different way, with a simpler operating model based on customer needs, with less bureaucracy and more accountability.

**Assets & Projects Refocus** - Managing our assets and projects with more discipline to ensure we apply commercial standards

**Technology** - Making better use of our systems so people can get things done more easily and clearly see who’s accountable for what.

A number of discrete initiatives were identified to deliver the required changes under a three-phase implementation program coordinated by the Accelerate Program Management Office (PMO) from March 2016 through to June 2017:

2. Build the foundations: Jun – Dec 2016

4 **Scope**

The scope of the Safety PIR covered the safety aspects of changes implemented during the Accelerate Program, including operational safety and the Work Health and Safety (WHS) as it impacts the safety of operational service delivery.

5 **Key Stakeholders**

The Safety PIR was led by the Safety Assurance Manager, with input from the following key internal stakeholders across Safety & Assurance, Air Navigation Services, Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting Services, Information Management & Technology and the Office of the Chief Executive Officer:

- Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
- Executive General Managers Safety & Assurance (S&A), Air Navigation Services (ANS), Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS), Information Management and Technology (IM&T)
- Independent Safety Performance Analysis:
  - Chief Auditor
  - Safety Performance Analysis Manager
For Official Use Only

Accelerate Program Safety Post Implementation Review

- Safety Surveillance Manager
- Regulatory Performance Manager
- Security Manager
- Risk and Assurance Advisor
- Governance & Security (G&S) Manager
- Standards & Systems Manager
- Safety & Quality Systems Manager
- People and Leadership Strategy Manager
- ANS Commercial & Business Performance Manager
- ARFFS Customer Value & Business Performance Manager
- IM&T Service Design & Delivery Manager
- IM&T Air Traffic Management (ATM) Network Services Manager
- Commercial & Business Performance Manager
- Chief Fire Officer
- Operations Standards & Assurance Manager
- Northern Operations Manager
- Southern Operations Manager

CASA will be presented the findings of the Safety PIR at the next scheduled Triannual meeting hosted by Regulatory Performance to be held in November 2017. This meeting is attended by CASA managers, team leaders and inspectors from the Air Navigation, Airspace and Aerodromes Branch.

6 Method

6.1 Activities

The following activities were undertaken to assess safety performance during and after the Accelerate Program:

- Review of safety performance data and information from multiple sources including:
  - the occurrence, actions and risk data recorded in Corporate Integrated Reporting and Risk Information System (CIRRIS)
  - the workers compensation claims data from the Comcare Customer Information System (CIS)
  - the system defects and severity level data recorded in Airservices System Issues Database (ASID)
  - ATM systems performance analysis as reported to the Board Information and Technology Committee (BTIC)
  - Aviation Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS) safety performance data sourced from ARFFS Group
  - the data on controllers’ performance factors from Performance Assessment Module (PAM)
  - confidential reports (i.e. Reported Concerns (REPCONs) reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and internal Confidential Reports)
o the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) utilisation data sourced from People and Leadership Strategy
o security incident reports
o Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems security incident reports
o outcomes of Safety Surveillance activities
o internal and external audit findings.

- Review the Accelerate Program Hazlog Register 1258

The following activities were then undertaken with input from key stakeholders listed in Section 5 who were not involved in the independent safety performance analysis:

- Review the Hazlog register and verify safety performance analysis findings
- Confirm any changes to Operational Risk Assessments (ORAs) have been made if required and review Enterprise and group level risk registers to confirm any ongoing risks will continue to be managed
- Identify any new/emerging safety concerns resulting from the change
- Identify any ongoing safety performance monitoring requirements
- Identify any safety lessons learnt.

6.2 Procedure

The approach taken in conducting the Safety PIR was to scrutinise a variety of safety performance data and information and conduct analysis largely independent of those involved in implementing changes under the Accelerate Program.

The safety data analysis was conducted using the following method:

- assessing the longer-term safety performance trend for the period of 1 July 2013 to 30 September 2017, using a number of metrics such as the number, severity and risk outcome of occurrences, competency related issues, safety reporting culture and international benchmarking results
- reviewing the available hazards, occurrences or incident data for the period of 1 July 2016 to 30 September 2017 to identify any reports that could be argued to be associated with the Accelerate Program
- reviewing the hazard/risk information as recorded in the Accelerate Program Hazlog register 1258, and using the relevant safety performance data or analysis to identify whether there is any evidence to indicate that the undesirable outcome of the identified hazards has been realised.

Once this analysis had been completed, a number of interviews and workshops were conducted with the key stakeholders to review the safety performance analysis against the Accelerate Program Hazlog register to verify the findings, capture any actions and ongoing safety performance monitoring requirements, and identify lessons learnt that may benefit other programs.
7 Findings

7.1 Independent analysis of safety performance data and information

7.1.1 External Audit findings

A review of all CASA findings during and since Accelerate was conducted to identify any Non-Compliance Notices (NCNs) or Observations that made reference to Accelerate. In summary there were 11 Observations and one NCN identified.

The NCN related to a perceived lack of safety documentation regarding ARFFS structural changes as part of the implementation of the new Operating Model. The NCN was subsequently acquitted based on evidence provided by Airservices confirming that appropriate safety documentation was available and appropriate safety change management activities were undertaken and no non-compliance was identified.

Of the 11 Observations:

- Seven (7) were CASA seeking assurance regarding the application of appropriate change management. There was no evidence of a deficiency, and ongoing discussions with CASA were occurring at the time of these findings.
- One (1) related to a change management activity that was incorrectly perceived by CASA to be part of the Accelerate Program.
- One (1) related to document misalignment however it was determined to be unrelated to the Accelerate Program.
- One (1) related to CASA recommending a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) analysis form part of the Accelerate Program Workforce Planning and Rostering Initiative.
- One (1) was determined to be a technical error resulting from a latent condition unrelated to Accelerate.

The following CASA surveillance findings were also reviewed and it has been confirmed that the root causes of the findings related to processes established prior to Accelerate and therefore were not the direct result of the Accelerate Program.

- A Safety Alert was issued under Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Part 175 in September 2017 relating to errors in aeronautical publications that were not identified by the Quality Management System. The root cause of the finding was attributed to the underdeveloped quality management procedures for aeronautical data processing. These had been established prior to Accelerate. It was also confirmed that the number of staff performing the functions within ATM Data Services that were the subject of the Safety Alert were not reduced during Accelerate and as such there was no causal relationship. Additionally, the repoint of AIM functions from ANS to IM&T group as part transitioning to the new operating model was reviewed. The move was executed by keeping the team intact and under the same senior manager for stability and as such Accelerate was considered not to have had a material impact on the issues identified in the Safety Alert.
- One NCN issued under Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Part 175 in August 2017 stated that the number of operational staff delivering Aeronautical
Information Services is less than required to meet Airservices obligations of the Part 175 exposition. The root cause analysis identified that the NCN was the result of Airservices and other related parties needing time to develop a full understanding of the quantum of work required in what is a relatively new CASR Part. It is also deemed to be a reflection of Airservices efforts to improve the quality and integrity of information from Data Originators, rather than solely an indicator of Airservices regulatory compliance. The NCN was considered not to be related to Accelerate. Further, it has been confirmed that there has been an increase in the number of staff delivering Aeronautical Information Services post-Accelerate.

In conclusion, no regulatory non-compliances occurred as a result of the changes made under the Accelerate Program. Additionally, based on the review of CASA findings, it is reasonable to conclude that CASA’s oversight has not identified any significant safety concerns relating to the Accelerate Program. This assertion was confirmed in statements by Mr Shane Carmody, CASA’s Chief Executive Officer and Director of Aviation Safety, including:

“This principal concern is the possible long-term effects of Accelerate over time, because at the moment, in the last eight months since Accelerate began, we have no evidence of any safety-related issues that are directly related to the Accelerate Program.”

“…we have undertaken 78 surveillance events at Airservices since May 2016—around six per month. This includes 35 of aerodrome rescue and firefighting services, four of the aerodrome rescue and firefighting services training college, seven of the aviation and rescue firefighters engineering, 11 of the air traffic control engineering and 21 of air traffic control services. While the number of noncompliances and observations have been recorded, no findings have been attributed to the Accelerate Program.”

CASA’s primary focus appears to have been on gaining assurance regarding the ongoing application of appropriate safety change management processes and in monitoring Airservices’ ongoing safety performance to make sure that there is no slow degradation of capability. In addition to scheduled CASA surveillance activities, we engaged with CASA on these focus areas across numerous discussions and updates, primarily at the Airservices/CASA management level, the sharing of safety artefacts, and via quarterly Question and Answer workshops and briefing sessions offered to CASA inspectors and managers throughout the Accelerate Program.

### 7.1.2 Internal Audit findings

A review of completed audits of Accelerate topics and safety topics covered during the period of Accelerate identified no safety issues and two safety-related observations.

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<th>Audit Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA1617-04b</td>
<td>Program Management – Safety &amp; Environment Integration</td>
<td>Nil issues or observations raised</td>
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1 Australia, Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 2017, Estimates, 27 February, pp.119
2 Australia, Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 2017, Estimates, 23 May, pp.67
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<td>Program Management – Market Testing Initiative</td>
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<td>AA1617-06</td>
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<td>AA1617-44a</td>
<td>Application of the Safety Management System – Safety Change Management</td>
<td>Yes - observation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AA1617-44b</td>
<td>Application of the Safety Management System – Safety Surveillance</td>
<td>Audit not related to Accelerate</td>
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<td>AA1516-35</td>
<td>Governance of Accelerate Program</td>
<td>Nil safety related issues or observations raised</td>
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### Audit No  AA1617-06

**Observation (no action raised)**

**Initiative closure report – acceptance of risk profile**

Initiative Closure Report template does not provide a section to confirm that risks have been transferred from, and accepted by, an Accelerate initiative into business as usual.

**Recommendation:** CIRRIS Risk Id be recorded on the Initiative Closure Report.

### Audit No  AA1617-44a

**Observation (no action raised)**

Staff impacted by the target operating model perceive a lack of effective support. The change required by the new target operating model has forced adaptation in how we work, with the previous reliance on dedicated safety specialists having to be “unlearned”. Adoption of the change and openness to the change was inconsistent within groups across the organisation.

Leadership across Airservices needs to be open to and prepared for the unexpected outcomes of change that can result from local cultures and existing work habits.

In regard to the recommendation relating to the Initiative Closure Report template, the Gate 3 template guidance provided by the Accelerate PMO required that active risks and ongoing responsibility for them should be included in each Initiative Transition Plan and the responsible manager was to advise Hazlog Register Number, CIRRIS reference or Business Unit risk log.

The observation regarding local cultures and existing work habits needing to be unlearned with regard to previous reliance on dedicated safety specialists was acknowledged by senior managers. The issue of differing levels of acceptance of new ways of working, and acknowledgement of individual accountabilities, which had not actually changed under Accelerate, had previously been identified as part of a Safety Surveillance review (see Section 7.1.3) as an emerging concern and actions to address were already underway at the time of the Audit.

From a safety perspective, the Audit observation reinforced that local culture can have a significant impact on the uptake of new ways of working and acceptance of accountability. In some cases, the local culture resulted in staff embracing the challenge of finding new ways to work, including upskilling and taking on new...
responsibilities. In other cases, the local culture resulted in staff being less likely to take ownership of finding new ways to acquit their accountability and this showed in a reluctance to acknowledge and utilise what support was available.

7.1.3 **Key Safety Surveillance outcomes**

**Voluntary Redundancy (VR) Program Assurance Review:** The VR program established risk controls at the earliest opportunity (during completion of the SCARD) and embedded these into the change process. This included the development of key eligibility criteria which eliminated the risk of impact to frontline operational safety or operational service delivery. As evidenced by an independent assurance review conducted by Safety Assurance, an individual assessment process was established early in the program and applied consistently to ensure that managers considered the service delivery and safety impact of granting VRs. Finally, a manager declaration was added to the VR Clearance Notices which required a final confirmation from managers that the staff member could be released and required functions and accountabilities could still be met.

Overall, the controls implemented were considered very effective in managing any potential risk. In reviewing the VR program as part of the Safety PIR for Accelerate it was noted that a key factor contributing to the success of the VR program was that managers were held to account for decisions made. This promoted careful consideration of the risk and ownership of decisions once made, noting there was a degree of judgement involved.

**Design process:** A consistent approach to designing, reviewing, approving and implementing team structures was applied across all business groups (see diagram below). This included requirements for branch level risk assessments to be provided to each EGM in support of unit level designs. EGMs reviewed and endorsed branch assessments prior to presenting an assurance memo to the CEO to support approval to implement. Assurance memos and risk assessments were also reviewed by Safety & Assurance to provide a level of independence.
Accelerate Safety Plan compliance: All Initiatives were confirmed to have complied with the requirement to complete an initial SCARD. The operational safety reporting requirements of each SCARD were confirmed to have been completed as required.

Safety change management compliance in projects: A review of >$2million CAPEX projects with regard to required safety artefacts identified that of the 40 projects reviewed, two projects were found to have incomplete safety artefacts. Intervention ensured there was no resulting impact on compliance, service delivery or operational safety. Both project managers were provided with a one on one refresher on SMS compliance requirements and they subsequently worked to address the shortfall. At the time of the review, it was noted that a number of higher complexity projects had retained the support of a dedicated safety resource as a transitional arrangement to the new operating model and therefore, from a safety perspective, safety change and safety risk management was being managed effectively. For the remainder of lower risk projects, project managers were now required to maintain and continue to execute safety programs that had been previously developed by safety specialists. Additionally for new projects, there was a concern regarding project managers’ capability to conduct initial safety assessments and safety planning without support until capability increased.

Broader discussions as part of this assurance activity highlighted the following:

- Safety accountabilities for managers of change had not actually altered as a result of the Accelerate Program however the availability of dedicated safety specialists in previous years had resulted in many managers deferring full responsibility for SMS compliance to project safety specialists.
- This, combined with limited practical safety change management and safety risk management training undertaken by managers of change in recent years, resulted a capability gap being exposed when project safety specialists were removed.
- There was a pervading incorrect perception that safety resources could not be procured because the Professional Services Panel was under review, and that there was little safety support available, despite dedicated safety resources being retained as an interim measure while the outsourcing model became fully embedded. This was a reflection of the local culture that the Safety Change Management Audit (referenced in Section 7.1.2) identified.

In response to these findings, managers across ANS, ARFFS and S&A worked together to reinforce awareness of points of contact in the business where assistance could be sought in relation SMS application, and to highlight available training with a particular focus on ANS project delivery staff. Additionally, staff were reminded of the existing procurement paths available to obtain external safety resources if required.

Increased safety surveillance and assurance activities were subsequently planned over the following six months. These are in train to more closely monitor and evaluate safety capability to effectively apply the SMS to change.

Recently ANS has established an additional permanent safety specialist role to support project managers.

Operational Risk and Assurance (OR&A) and Standards & Systems (S&S) have been providing safety advice, guidance, coaching and practical support to address the needs of projects where additional specialist safety support is deemed necessary.
It should be noted that not all changes/projects require a dedicated safety specialist and the degree of learned reliance within project delivery has potentially overinflated the demand for safety resources above what is actually deemed necessary.

An ongoing action arising from the Safety Integration Initiative is the development of the Safety Capability Framework, tracked via existing CIRRIS ACT-0013500, following which there will be a review of safety training requirements. Also, work continues to establish a Safety Management Services Panel and it is recommended that a CIRRIS action be raised to track its implementation. Completion of these actions will further support staff in adopting new ways of working and acquitting their safety accountabilities under the new operating model.

**National Operations Centre (NOC) Change Assurance Review:** There was one instance where a staff member raised concerns about staffing levels within the NOC, now known as the National Coordination Centre (NCC). The staff email was subsequently referred to in media allegedly linking Accelerate Program changes in the NOC to a reduction in safety. The information obtained by the ABC and other correspondence was deemed to be a Public Interest Disclosure (PID) made by Airservices employees. A Change Assurance Review (SR-2017-001) was conducted to provide assurance of the changes made to the NOC, as part of the implementation of the new Operating Model under the Accelerate Program, to assess whether it was acceptably safe. The review concluded that the changes made to the NOC followed the Airservices SMS and produced repeatable and defensible outcomes and were acceptably safe.

### 7.1.4 Safety Performance Analysis

Attachment 1 presents the analysis of longer-term safety performance trends for the period of 1 July 2013 to 30 September 2017 using a range of metrics.

The analysis confirms that Airservices maintained an acceptable level of safety performance when Accelerate was implemented compared to the longer-term trend. A summary is provided below.

- **Operational safety performance**
  - During Accelerate the frontline operational and rostered staff and their associated operating procedures, processes and functions remained unaffected. There was a slight decrease in the trend of staff competency factors identified in ATS attributed occurrences. There was no evidence that Accelerate adversely impacted on the performance of frontline staff.
  - There were no significant ATS attributable safety occurrences (which is defined as any Loss of Separation (LOS) or Runway Incursion (RI) occurrence where the Risk Assessment Tool (RAT) severity rating is Category A³).
  - The LOS and RI rate for ATS and pilot attributed occurrences remained consistent with longer-term trend. LOS and RI occurrence rates remained well below international benchmarks.

3. RAT provides a method for consistent identification of risk elements in ATS attributed LOS and Runway Incursion occurrences. It is used to inform Airservices of the severity and repeatability of such occurrences and enables the benchmarking against other ANSPs who use RAT.

Category A is the highest rating for severity within RAT.
The proportion of high risk-bearing occurrences was decreasing (based on the severity and overall risk exposure assessment outcomes using RAT).

There were no ATS attributable Instrument Flight Rule (IFR)-IFR LOS occurrences with significant breakdown of separation (i.e. no IFR-IFR ATS attributed LOS occurrences with less than 25 per cent separation standard remaining).

The Safety Severity Index (SSI) of all occurrence types remained consistent with longer-term trend for all types of occurrences.

The number of facility issue occurrences (including those with severity 1 and 2 ASIDs) remained consistent with longer-term trend.

The key systems supporting ATS continued to meet availability targets.

The overall Service Restoration Time (SRT) continued to meet targets.

There was a slight decrease in the trend of overdue actions arising from ATS occurrences, audits or risks.

There were no significant ARFFS attributable safety occurrences (which is defined as any occurrence in which the response to an aircraft incident to the end of each runway did not meet the regulated response time directive of three minutes).

ARFFS maintained fleet availability above targets throughout Accelerate. With the exception of December 2016, ARFFS maintained services at required categories above targets. In December 2016, Canberra and Sydney ARFFS reduced category as a result of short-notice staff sick leave. The situations were managed as part of the standard process for temporary changes to categories which was not impacted by Accelerate.

There was a significant reduction in non-compliance findings while CASA maintained an active surveillance program.

There was a slight decrease in the trend of overdue actions during Accelerate, indicating the ongoing focus on issues and actions management compliance.

• Reporting culture

The safety reporting culture remained strong as shown by the level of voluntary and mandatory reporting for operational safety occurrences, and reported WHS hazards compared to occurrences. In addition, IM&T have commenced use of CIRRIS for reporting of occurrences that could have an operational safety impact, improving the consistency and governance of occurrence management across the organisation.

• WHS performance relating to mental health

There were no WHS occurrences that resulted in an impact on service delivery or operational safety.

There was one (1) reported WHS occurrence and 1 accepted Comcare claim involving mental stress which directly related to Accelerate.

While there was an increasing utilisation of employee assistance program (EAP) during Accelerate (as shown by peaks in EAP utilisation in Q3 – Q4 of 2016 for all EAP streams), no such trend was observed in WHS reports.

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4. SSI is used to categorise occurrences based on the source of error identification and response (with SSI 1 and 2 being associated with internal sources, and SSI 3 and 4 being associated with external sources)
or Comcare cases. This indicates that the EAP has been effective in preventing occurrences relating to mental health.

- There was one (1) concern logged via Confidential Word regarding provision of coaching and help for staff to deal with mental stress during Accelerate.

In conclusion, based on the relevant safety performance data, there is evidence to support the argument that changes made under Accelerate did not result in any negative impact on the safety of operational service delivery or the realisation of any operational safety risk.

### 7.2 Hazlog register and safety performance review

Once outcomes of the independent analysis of safety performance had been completed, workshops were conducted to review and verify the findings against each hazard in the Accelerate Program Hazlog Register 1258. In doing so the following was noted:

- Hazards 1 – 15 and 27 – 38 had previously been reviewed with Initiative leads and Business Change Managers and closed via workshops held by the Accelerate PMO at the conclusion of the Accelerate Program.

- Hazards 16 – 26 were reviewed as part of the Asset & Project Refocus Initiative Safety PIR, which determined that all hazards could be closed.

All hazards and control statuses were subsequently reviewed by representatives of ANS, ARFFS, IM&T and S&A and the safety performance analysis findings verified against each hazard. All analysis results as outlined in Section 7.1.4 were accepted by workshop attendees.

During the review, the following was identified:

- **Hazard 5, Change in delivery model/outsourcing of non-differentiated functions**, listed three controls that were safety requirements. These controls were shown as being met by their inclusion in the publication of an end to end market testing guide and template. Both the template and guide effectively incorporated the safety requirements however PIR participants agreed that it is not effective to have a safety requirement for a hazard met by a guide which is not compulsory. It is therefore recommended that the market testing guide be changed to a Procedure to provide a head of power and the procedure be linked to the procurement process. This change has been agreed and will be tracked in CIRRIS.

- **Hazard 24 – Asset & Project Refocus – Ineffective implementation**, listed Revised Technical Competency Framework as a Safety Requirement however at the time of conducting the Safety PIR, the action had been transferred to Operations Standards and Assurance as part of the Asset and Project Refocus Safety PIR and is being tracked via existing CIRRIS ACT-0015033. It is recommended that the risk associated with this action remaining outstanding be reviewed to determine if additional controls are required or if the finalisation of the framework should be expedited.

There were no other actions arising out of the Hazlog register review and it was agreed the Hazlog register should be archived on 30 November 2017.
8 ORA impact and ongoing risk management

A review of the Hazlog register confirmed that no changes are required to any Operational Risk Assessments.

All hazards, with the exception of transitional hazards that ceased to exist on implementation, were confirmed to map to an existing Enterprise or group level risk which continue to be monitored and reviewed in accordance with the Airservices Risk Management Standard AA-NOS-RISK-0001.

9 Ongoing safety performance monitoring

9.1 Actions resulting from safety performance monitoring to date

The following areas have been identified for further focus as a result of the safety performance monitoring activities to date:

- The level of WHS support available within OneSKY, OneSKY dependent projects and IM&T requires review. Requests are being received by ANS WHS specialists who are unable to meet the unplanned demand. Under the new operating model, WHS support for business as usual activities and managing the health and safety of staff in corporate business groups, including OneSKY is provided by S&A. WHS support to projects is the responsibility of the change manager to establish via outsourcing or utilisation of a suitable project resource. OneSKY have recently taken steps to secure a temporary WHS resource for project support until a permanent solution is confirmed. With regard to corporate WHS support, S&A have already identified that the level of support that Safety and Quality Management Systems (SQMS) provide to corporate areas should be reviewed to ensure they have sufficient capacity to meet demand.

  - **Action:** OneSKY to review WHS requirements to ensure they can acquit their WHS accountabilities for OneSKY and OneSKY dependent projects.
  - **Action:** S&A SQMS to review level of support required to be provided to corporate business groups and IM&T and delivery models and ensure they have sufficient capacity to support.

- There is a need to improve visibility of how accountabilities and responsibilities are being enacted under the new Technical Management System (TMS). There is a particular interest in ensuring that appropriate mechanisms are available between IM&T, ANS and ARFFS to monitor and provide assurance that systems are being maintained in a way that duly considers operational input into assessing system criticality to service delivery and potential flow on effects to operational safety.

  - **Action:** OR&A to consider development of a RACI table to include in the Technical Management Manual which can be used to establish clearer understanding and expectations of the required interactions between key roles within the Asset Management Framework

- It was noted that there has been an influx of new capability from a variety of industries as part of establishing the new operating model, particularly within IM&T. It was considered important that new staff are suitably inducted into the
requirements of Airservices’ SMS in regard to practical application of safety change and safety risk management practices. Concern was expressed regarding availability of internal safety training courses. It is noted that work is in train to finalise the Safety Capability Framework and update of the Safety Training Program Requirements is dependent on its completion.

- **Action:** IM&T to liaise with S&A to identify and address any interim safety training requirements.

- It was broadly agreed that the revised Assurance Guide which clarified expectations around the three lines of defence was an improvement and was key to realising the benefits of the new operating model and the Safety Integration Initiative with regard to embedding capability and accountability for safety into the business. While new organisational structures were designed with this objective in mind, it was acknowledged that it has taken some time to unlearn previous ways of working and take ownership of the newly clarified accountabilities for assurance. It is anticipated that the revision of assurance maps will further solidify the new accountabilities and how each line of assurance is enacted in practice.

- **Action:** Assurance map owners to expedite revision of assurance maps.

### 9.2 Ongoing safety performance monitoring

The following focused safety assurance activities are currently in train as part of the ongoing monitoring of safety performance during and after Accelerate:

- **Safety Change Management System Assurance Review (SA)** – to assess the effectiveness of safety change management across Airservices
- **Investigations Outputs System Assurance Review (SA)** – to provide assurance that the conduct of operational safety investigations across Airservices is effective in meeting SMS objectives
- **Aeronautical Information Management (AIM) System Assurance Review (SA)** – to review AIM functions to determine whether the provision and management of Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) is acceptably safe.
- **Operational Risk & Assurance Unit PIR (OR&A)** – to review the functions of OR&A unit and recommend changes (if required) to functions, processes and/or structure as part of a PIR.
- **Post-activation Incident Reviews (multiple) (G&S)** - to confirm business contingency, continuity and incident response and recovery measures continue to be fit for purpose and ensure safety of operational service delivery.

In addition to maintaining established safety performance monitoring and reporting systems, we are trialling a new range of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) / Key risk Indicators (KRIs), which are incorporated into the Executive Committee Meeting Business Performance Measures (BPM) report.

We have also introduced a new Executive Safety Brief to allow EGM S&A to bring into clear focus any emerging safety issues for discussion with the Executive.
10 Lessons learnt

**Early planning:** There was general agreement that establishing a program level Safety Plan, at a time when the discrete initiatives were not fully scoped, was considered a sensible way to put some structure, consistency and clear expectation around how the program would comply with the SMS as it evolved.

**Mandated SCARDs for all Initiatives:** The requirement for each Initiative to complete a SCARD had benefits and workload implications. It created workload for Initiatives whose scope did not actually meet the SMS requirement for a SCARD to be conducted. However the benefit of this requirement was that there was positive confirmation and evidence that an assessment against the SCARD criteria had been completed.

**Safety by design:** The ‘safety by design philosophy’ which was adopted from the outset of the Accelerate Program contributed to producing a safe outcome and maintaining our safety performance through a significant organisation transformation. Key safety requirements were established very early, for example excluding frontline operational and rostered staff from the change program, establishing clear assessment criteria for granting of VRs, requiring explicit acknowledgement of acceptance of new safety accountabilities via new Safety Accountabilities Statements and ensuring all Initiatives could provide evidence of compliance with the SMS, reinforced the non-negotiable application of our SMS and the requirement for personal accountability for safety related decisions by all managers when implementing changes under the Accelerate Program.

**PMO:** For a large program of work with individual work streams, it is essential to maintain a central tracking system and ensure that SMS compliance is visible and can be positively assured, particularly as the assessment of change by completing a SCARD is an offline process that is not visible to the business. This is also key in proactively assessing cumulative risk and deconflicting and sequencing dependent changes to manage any safety risk. The Accelerate PMO was generally effective in performing this function although it was noted that for Framework owners, there was a requirement to have multiple frameworks revised concurrently and this increased complexity where frameworks needed to align. Additionally, it was noted that the implementation of the Asset Management Framework was done quite late in the overall program of change under Accelerate. There was a view that earlier implementation would have been beneficial however it was also acknowledged that the large scale changes in senior management structure, business support and corporate areas needed to be bedded down and it was not considered viable to also add major changes to the Asset Management Framework into the mix.

**Safety Accountabilities:** The development of Safety Accountability Statements for managers with key safety accountabilities, along with the one on one induction with the Standards and Systems Manager was seen as a positive and assisted managers in understanding and acknowledging their accountabilities. The Statements were also considered a useful tool in business planning and Work Performance Agreement development.

**Stability Assessment:** The Stability Assessment that was conducted to support the transition to the new operating model was a novel way to assess and demonstrate the ability of the organisation to continue to acquit its safety accountabilities despite a significant restructure. Through this assessment it was able to be demonstrated that all frontline operational staff remained under the senior leadership of experienced managers. It also provided assurance that key
areas that supported our regulated functions maintained a high degree of stability in their management structures.

**Stakeholder perceptions:** As a result of realigning accountabilities for stakeholder engagement under the new operating model, there was a perception from a small number of people that Accelerate had been the cause of Airservices ceasing support for some activities (e.g. pilot information nights, attendance at RAPAC). This was not the case however there was a hiatus while new unit structures were finalised and functions reassigned. In hindsight this required more proactive stakeholder management to allay concerns.

**Engaging with the Regulator** early and often was a way to build trust. At each key stage of Accelerate, briefings were provided to CASA management in advance of changes being made, including provision of copies of material released to staff during each consultation. This was often followed up with briefings to CASA managers and inspectors in a joint briefing to ensure clear and consistent messaging and alignment at all levels. Quarterly briefings and Q&A sessions were scheduled and these were beneficial in allowing CASA to have any specific areas of interest addressed with relevant specialists.

**Alignment:** Additionally, due to the level of interest in the Accelerate Program in the media and in Government forums, a degree of ‘oversharing’ was beneficial for both Airservices and for CASA. CASA was then able to more confidently confirm that they were aware of what changes were being made and they were being appropriately consulted where it was required. The alignment between Airservices and CASA on key points in public forums was evidence of successful engagement.

**Cyber Security:** There has been a need to expand thinking on ‘safety by design’ to incorporate ‘security by design’. Ensuring our regulated systems are built and maintained with a “secure by design” approach is challenging traditional engineering and ATC methods. Due to the open and collaborative nature of global aviation, the ANSP industry has found itself well behind the commercial world in terms of Cyber security and it needs to be acknowledged that ‘if you are not secure, you may not be safe’.

**Merging Operational Tech (Engineering) and Information and Communications Tech (ICT):** Post Asset Management implementation, IM&T has merged these teams into a single operation model and organisation structure. The process and cultural differences are significant. There is a program in place to both lift maturity across the board in the ICT areas and integrate the best of the Engineering systems and processes. The TMS is the beginning of this transformation. However this has created process challenges for the Engineering teams who use different language, processes and methods to ensure safety and compliance, and the ICT teams who are used to more industry standard way of operating. Integrating these two cultures is key to achieving safe and efficient operations and industry alignment.

**Sustaining safety after change:** There is a common acknowledgement that during periods of intense change there is a heightened focus on safety and safety performance is maintained or even improved. Once the pace of delivering change drops off, a different type of ‘heavy lifting’ commences as we continue to bed down new processes while managing general business. New managers, team leaders and technical resources need guidance, time and practice to adjust to the new ways of working. This presents a challenge as senior leaders have to drop into the detail of the business to ensure new or modified ways of work are actually working, while addressing weaknesses in past practices. It is important to find the right balance between maintaining a listening watch and doing a deep dive into the
detail to gain assurance that things are running as they should be. Achieving the right balance is essential to managing safety and efficiency and our established assurance practices can serve to assist in maintaining this.

**Culture**: The most significant finding from a safety perspective, as evidenced during surveillance activities and by our safety performance during this significant period of change, is that culture and attitude play a fundamental role in maintaining safety.

**Just Culture**: Going forward, Just Culture, which is a key element of our broadly positive safety culture, is particularly important. The expectation under the new target operating model is that staff who are accountable for safety change management are aware of their accountabilities, are aware of the support mechanisms available to assist the acquittal of those accountabilities, and can identify if the implementation is beyond their capability and request assistance. In scenarios where staff perceive a lack of effective support, it is important that the principles of Airservices’ three tiered approach to Just Culture are applied consistently and transparently to ensure just and safe outcomes. Just Culture can play a key role in driving a healthy accountable performance culture for staff of all levels which will enable us to safely deliver improved ways of working while still continuing to regard safety of air navigation as our most important consideration.

### Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title (Safety issue identified in PIR)</th>
<th>Existing/New Actions</th>
<th>Action Owner</th>
<th>Action Assigned to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Safety Capability Framework needs to be finalised to allow safety training requirements to be reviewed</td>
<td>Finalise Safety Capability Framework (Existing CIRRIS ACT-0013500)</td>
<td>Claire Marrison</td>
<td>Anthony Acfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Safety Management Services Panel needs to be established</td>
<td>Establish Safety Management Services Panel</td>
<td>Claire Marrison</td>
<td>Anthony Acfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hazard 5 – Safety Requirements cannot be considered met via promulgation in a Guide as there is no requirement to follow the Guide.</td>
<td>Amend the document type from Guide to Procedure and link to the Procurement Process</td>
<td>Ian Cassidy</td>
<td>Jan Wojna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hazard 24 – Revised Competency Framework was listed as a Safety Requirement and was not Met at implementation.</td>
<td>Expedite finalisation of Technical Competency Framework (Existing CIRRIS ACT-0015033) Asses risk associated with this action remaining outstanding to determine if additional controls are required</td>
<td>Craig Charker</td>
<td>Ken Morris</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 New Actions will be entered into CIRRIS by 30 November 2017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title (Safety issue identified in PIR)</th>
<th>Existing/New Actions</th>
<th>Action Owner</th>
<th>Action Assigned to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>WHS Support to OneSKY and OneSKY dependent projects is insufficient to meet demand</td>
<td>OneSKY to review WHS requirements to ensure WHS regulatory requirements and SMS change management and risk management requirements can be met for OneSKY and OneSKY dependent projects.</td>
<td>Phil Mulhall</td>
<td>Lawrance Bowman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>WHS Support to IM&amp;T insufficient.</td>
<td>S&amp;A to review requirements and capacity provide increased support to IM&amp;T.</td>
<td>Claire Marrison</td>
<td>Anthony Acfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Technology Management Manual RACI</td>
<td>OR&amp;A to consider development of a RACI table to include in the Technical Management Manual which can be used to establish clearer understanding and expectations of the required interactions between key roles within the Asset Management Framework</td>
<td>Craig Charker</td>
<td>Ken Morris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>IM&amp;T Safety Training</td>
<td>IM&amp;T to liaise with S&amp;A to assess any interim safety training requirements in relation to safety by design, safety change and safety risk management</td>
<td>Chris Seller</td>
<td>Mark Hind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paddy Goodall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marie Gearman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>David Hyland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Assurance Map review</td>
<td>Assurance Map owners to expedite revision of assurance maps</td>
<td>Craig Charker (171, 172, 173)</td>
<td>Ken Morris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Robyn Leece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obrad Puskarica</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kash Nahl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Louise Alberts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anthony Acfield</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12 Conclusion

As planned at the commencement of the Accelerate Program, the major impact of changes occurred in the corporate and business support areas with operational service delivery and frontline operational and rostered staff effectively protected from any significant impact.

The application of the SMS at program and initiative level was effective in managing operational safety risk and producing key evidence items of compliance. There is evidence to show that safety risk management was embedded into program management processes from concept, through planning and execution and into the closing phase of the Program.

As a result, analysis confirms that there were no occurrences that affected the safety of operational service delivery due to changes made under the Accelerate Program and Airservices’ safety performance has been maintained or improved in line with longer term trends.

Some valuable lessons have been learnt and will be shared with the organisation, and actions arising out of this PIR will be tracked to completion in CIRRIS.

There is consensus that Airservices must remain vigilant in monitoring safety performance after such a long period of sustained change and as we move towards implementation of OneSKY.

We will do this through continuing to develop meaningful KPIs and KRI, taking advantage of both lead and lag metrics to focus our risk based assurance programs across all three lines of assurance.

Finally, we must continue to promote the principles of Just Culture, which is a key element of the positive safety culture that was central to us maintaining our safety performance throughout Accelerate, and will be key to the safety of our operational service delivery going forward.

13 Attachments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title and version</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Accelerate Safety Performance Analysis as at 30 September 2017</td>
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14 References

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<th>Title and version</th>
<th>Number / Link</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Accelerate Program Safety Plan</td>
<td>SAF-SP-16022</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Risk Management Standard</td>
<td>AA-NOS-RISK-0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NOC Change Assurance Review</td>
<td>SR-2017-001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SAFETY & ASSURANCE GROUP

SAFETY ASSURANCE

Accelerate Program
Safety Post-Implementation Review (PIR)

Safety Performance Analysis
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<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A – ACCELERATE SAFETY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **PURPOSE**

This report presents the safety data analysis to verify that Airservices maintained an acceptable level of safety performance during the Accelerate Program when compared to the longer-term trend. Based on the safety performance outcomes, the report also supports the argument that none of the undesirable outcomes associated with the program safety hazards has been realised.

The results of the analysis are intended to support the Accelerate Program Safety Post Implementation Review (PIR).

2. **SOURCES OF SAFETY DATA / INFORMATION**

The safety data and information used for the analysis presented in this report includes:

- the occurrence, actions and risk data recorded in Corporate Integrated Reporting and Risk Information System (CIRRIS)
- the workers compensation claims data from the Comcare Customer Information System (CIS)
- the system defects and severity level data recorded in Airservices System Issues Database (ASID)
- air traffic management (ATM) systems performance analysis as reported to the Board Information and Technology Committee (BTIC)
- Aviation Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS) safety performance data sourced from ARFF Group
- the data on controllers’ performance factors from Performance Assessment Module (PAM)
- confidential reports (i.e. Reported Concerns (REPCONs) reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and internal Confidential Reports)
- the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) utilisation data sourced from People and Leadership Strategy
- security incident reports
- Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems security incident reports
- outcomes of Safety Surveillance activities
- internal and external audit findings.

3. **METHOD**

The safety data analysis was conducted using the following method:

- assessing the longer-term safety performance trend for the period of 1 July 2013 to 30 September 2017, using a number of metrics such as the number, severity and risk outcome of occurrences, competency related issues, safety reporting culture and international benchmarking results
- reviewing the available hazards, occurrences or incident data for the period of 1 July 2016 to 30 September 2017 to identify any reports which could be argued to be associated with the Accelerate Program
- reviewing the hazard/risk information as recorded in the Accelerate Program Hazlog register 1258, and using the relevant safety performance data or analysis to identify
whether there is any evidence to indicate that the undesirable outcome of the identified hazards has been realised.

4. ANALYSIS

Appendix A presents the analysis of longer-term safety performance trends for the period of 1 July 2013 to 30 September 2017 using a range of metrics.

The analysis confirms that Airservices maintained an acceptable level of safety performance when Accelerate was implemented (i.e. FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17) compared to longer-term trend. A summary is provided below.

- Operational safety performance
  - During Accelerate the frontline operational and rostered staff and their associated procedures, processes and functions remained largely unaffected. There was a slight decrease in the trend of staff competency factors identified in ATS attributed occurrences. There was no evidence that Accelerate adversely impacted on the performance of frontline staff.
  - There was no significant ATS attributable safety occurrence (which is defined as any loss of separation (LOS) or runway incursion (RI) occurrence where the Risk Assessment Tool (RAT) severity rating is Category A1).
  - The LOS and RI rate for ATS and pilot attributed occurrences remained consistent with longer-term trend. LOS and RI occurrence rate remained well below international benchmark.
  - The proportion of high risk-bearing occurrences was decreasing (based on the severity and overall risk exposure assessment outcomes using RAT).
  - There was no ATS attributable Instrument Flight Rule (IFR)-IFR LOS occurrences with significant breakdown of separation (i.e. no IFR-IFR ATS attributed LOS occurrences with less than 25 per cent separation standard remaining).
  - The Safety Severity Index (SSI)
  - The number of facility issue occurrences (including those with severity 1 and 2 ASIDs) remained consistent with longer-term trend.
  - The key systems supporting ATS continued to meet availability targets.
  - The overall Service Restoration Time (SRT) continued to meet targets.
  - There was a slight decrease in the trend of overdue actions arising from ATS occurrences, audits or risks.
  - There was no significant ARFFS attributable safety occurrence (which is defined as any occurrence in which the response to an aircraft incident to the end of each runway did not meet the regulated response time directive of three minutes).
  - ARFFS maintained fleet availability above targets throughout Accelerate. With the exception of December 2016, ARFFS maintained services at required categories above targets. In December 2016, Canberra and Sydney ARFFS

---

1. RAT provides a method for consistent identification of risk elements in ATS attributed LOS and Runway Incursion occurrences. It is used to inform Airservices of the severity and repeatability of such occurrences and enables the benchmarking against other ANSPs who use RAT. Category A is the highest rating for severity within RAT.
2. SSI is used to categorise occurrences based on the source of error identification and response (with SSI 1 and 2 being associated with internal sources, and SSI 3 and 4 being associated with external sources).
Accelerate Safety Performance Analysis

reduced category as a result of short-notice staff sick leave. The situations were managed as part of the standard process for temporary changes to categories which was not impacted by Accelerate.

- There was a significant reduction in non-compliance findings while CASA maintained an active surveillance program.
- There was a slight decrease in the trend of overdue actions during Accelerate, indicating the ongoing focus on issues and actions management compliance.
- There was one occurrence where a staff member raised concerns about staffing levels within the National Operations Centre (‘NOC’, now known as the National Coordination Centre). The staff concern which was deemed as Public Interest Disclosure (PID) was subject to some media coverage. A Change Assurance Review was conducted by Safety Assurance to independently assess whether the changes made to the NOC, as part of the implementation of the new Operating Model under the Accelerate Program, were acceptably safe. The review concluded that the changes made to the NOC followed the Airservices Safety Management System (SMS) which produced repeatable and defensible outcomes and were acceptably safe.

- Reporting culture
  - The safety reporting culture remained strong as shown by the level of voluntary and mandatory reporting for operational safety occurrences, and WHS hazards compared to occurrences. In addition, there has been an increased use of CIRRIS for reporting of occurrences involving IM&T.

- WHS performance relating to mental health:
  - There was one (1) reported WHS occurrence and 1 accepted Comcare claim involving mental stress which directly related to Accelerate.
  - While there was an increasing utilisation of employee assistance program (EAP) during Accelerate (as shown by the peaks in EAP utilisation in Q3 – Q4 of 2016 for all EAP streams), no such trend was observed in WHS reports or Comcare cases. This indicates that the EAP has been effective in preventing occurrences relating to mental health.
  - There was one (1) Confidential Word regarding the need for coaching and help for staff to deal with mental stress during Accelerate.

5. Conclusion

Based on the relevant safety performance data, Table 1 can be used to support the argument that changes made under Accelerate did not result in any negative impact on the safety of operational service delivery.

Table 1. Review of Accelerate Implementation Safety Hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Failure to manage staff health and wellbeing for those affected by the Accelerate Program (both separated staff and those who remain within the new organisation) resulting in negative impact on service delivery and safety of operations. Stress resulting in anxiety.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>During the period of 1 July 2016 to 30 September 2017, there was 1 reported WHS occurrence (Occ-6473) and 1 accepted Comcare claim (Occ-6596) involving mental stress which directly related to Accelerate. None of these occurrences related to staff responsible for ATS and ARFFS service delivery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hazard Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>depression, fatigue and/or impacting thinking and memory, which impacts the mental and/or physical health of those affected by the changes implemented by the A&amp;PR.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>There was one Confidential Word regarding the suggestion for coaching and help for staff to deal with mental stress during Accelerate. While there has been an increasing utilisation of EAP (an identified control for Hazard 1 and 1) during Accelerate (as shown by the peaks in Q3 – Q4 of 2016 for all EAP streams), there was no such spike observed in WHS reports or Comcare cases. There were two mental stress occurrences (Occ-6229 and Occ-6954) which could not be directly linked to Accelerate but may be linked to the organisational environment at that time. None of the reported occurrences resulted in an impact to service delivery or safety of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Failure to manage security of Airservices people, systems and property results in potential for malicious damage included trusted insider/internal sabotage resulting in damage to systems, data, removal of data, leaking of confidential/restricted/sensitive information.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There were no security occurrences resulted in an impact to the integrity of airways information or operational safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ineffective management of people, property and information security results in sabotage, destruction, modification or leaking of information which impacts the integrity of airways information and operational safety.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Airservices maintained its safety performance during the Accelerate Program using a number of metrics. There is no evidence that Accelerate caused disruption to service performance. There was a slight decrease in the trend of overdue actions during Accelerate, indicating the ongoing focus on issues and actions management compliance. There was no evidence that changes made under Accelerate caused failure to manage current active safety issues (based on the actions tracked via CIRRIS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Accelerate Program causes distraction resulting in disruption to service performance, loss of focus on BAU activities or failure to manage current active issues (Safety, Enviro (inc noise and PFOS), WHS (asbestos), Security (IT and cyber) during transition to the new structure.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Airservices maintained its safety performance during the Accelerate Program using a number of metrics. There is no evidence that Accelerate caused disruption to service performance. There was a slight decrease in the trend of overdue actions during Accelerate, indicating the ongoing focus on issues and actions management compliance. There was no evidence that changes made under Accelerate caused failure to manage current active safety issues (based on the actions tracked via CIRRIS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Accelerate Program causes distraction resulting in disruption to service performance, loss of focus on BAU activities or failure to manage current active safety issues during transition to the new structure.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Airservices maintained its safety performance during the Accelerate Program using a number of metrics. There is no evidence that Accelerate caused disruption to service performance. There was a slight decrease in the trend of overdue actions during Accelerate, indicating the ongoing focus on issues and actions management compliance. There was no evidence that changes made under Accelerate caused failure to manage current active safety issues (based on the actions tracked via CIRRIS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Distraction or fatigue resulting in disruption to service performance, loss of focus on core business activities, loss of information integrity, loss of safety accountabilities or failure to manage current active issues impacting operational safety of airways services.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>There was no operational safety or WHS occurrence which was a direct result of inappropriate discharge of safety accountabilities and responsibilities during or after transition to the new Operating Model resulting in adverse impact on service delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 6</td>
<td>Safety accountabilities and responsibilities not appropriately discharged during or after transition to the new Operating Model resulting in adverse impact on service delivery.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There was no operational safety or WHS occurrence which was a direct result of inappropriate discharge of safety accountabilities and responsibilities during or after transition to the new Operating Model resulting in adverse impact on service delivery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hazard # | Hazard Description | Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised? | Rationale based on safety performance outcomes
--- | --- | --- | ---
12 | and safety. Where a role is deemed redundant, failure to identify key safety accountabilities and transfer to new role | No | 
24 | Ineffective alignment of capability and role requirements and/or role accountabilities lost during transition impacting the safe delivery of operational services. | No | 
29 | Lack of understanding of staff SMS accountabilities and responsibilities | No | 

### 5 Change in delivery model/outsourcing of non-core functions results in delay to or reduction in quality of service delivery with potential flow on effects to operational safety during and after transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Change in delivery model/outsourcing of non-core functions results in delay to or reduction in quality of service delivery with potential flow on effects to operational safety during and after transition.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There was no operational safety occurrences relating to change in service delivery model or outsourcing of non-core functions delivered under the Accelerate Program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10 Inability to provide sufficient resources to meet operational service delivery requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Inability to provide sufficient resources to meet operational service delivery requirements</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>During Accelerate the frontline operational and rostered staff and their associated procedures, processes and functions remained largely unaffected. The main exposure to change was as a result of changes to senior management structure and corporate support areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11 Inability to provide sufficient resources to maintain systems as required due maintainers of systems being granted VRs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Inability to provide sufficient resources to maintain systems as required due maintainers of systems being granted VRs.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>During Accelerate the frontline operational and rostered staff and their associated procedures, processes and functions remained largely unaffected. The main exposure to change was as a result of changes to senior management structure and corporate support areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 20 Insufficient competent staff impacting support to safety critical air traffic management or ARFF services and/or WHS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Insufficient competent staff impacting support to safety critical air traffic management or ARFF services and/or WHS.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>During Accelerate the frontline operational and rostered staff and their associated procedures, processes and functions remained largely unaffected. The main exposure to change was as a result of changes to senior management structure and corporate support areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 27 Insufficient qualified staff to fill ATC operational positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Insufficient qualified staff to fill ATC operational positions.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>During Accelerate the frontline operational and rostered staff and their associated procedures, processes and functions remained largely unaffected. The main exposure to change was as a result of changes to senior management structure and corporate support areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 28 Insufficient qualified staff to fill Technical Services positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Insufficient qualified staff to fill Technical Services positions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>During Accelerate the frontline operational and rostered staff and their associated procedures, processes and functions remained largely unaffected. The main exposure to change was as a result of changes to senior management structure and corporate support areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard #</td>
<td>Hazard Description</td>
<td>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</td>
<td>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>factors from occurrences with a score less than 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SRT targets continued to be met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The number of non-compliance notices (NCNs) significantly reduced during Accelerate compared to the previous two years, while CASA maintained an active surveillance schedule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>There was one instance where a staff member raised concerns about staffing levels within the NOC, now known as the National Coordination Centre (NCC). The staff email was subsequently referred to in media allegedly linking Accelerate Program changes in the NOC to a reduction in safety. The information obtained by the ABC and other correspondence was deemed to be a Public Interest Disclosure (PID) made by Airservices employees. A Change Assurance Review was conducted by Safety Assurance to provide independent assurance of the changes made to the NOC, as part of the implementation of the new Operating Model under the Accelerate Program, to assess whether it was acceptably safe. The review concluded that the changes made to the NOC followed the Airservices SMS which produced repeatable and defensible outcomes and were acceptably safe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>There was one CASA non-compliance notice (NCN) issued under Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Part 175 in August 2017 that the number of operational staff delivering Aeronautical Information Services is less than required to meet Airservices obligations of the exposition. The root cause analysis identified that the NCN was the result of Airservices and other related parties continuing to develop an understanding of the quantum of work required in what can be considered as a relatively new CASR Part. It is also a reflection of Airservices efforts to improve the quality and integrity of information from Data Originators, rather than solely an indicator of Airservices regulatory compliance. The NCN was not related to Accelerate. Further, it has been confirmed that there has been an increased number of staff delivering Aeronautical Information Services post Accelerate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARFFS maintained fleet availability above targets throughout Accelerate. With the exception of December 2016, ARFFS maintained services at required categories above targets. In December 2016, Canberra and Sydney ARFFS reduced category as a result of short-notice staff sick leave. The situations were managed as part of the standard process for temporary changes to categories which was not impacted by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard #</td>
<td>Hazard Description</td>
<td>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</td>
<td>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Learning Academy loss of records/ maintenance of records/ inadequate data entry</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>During Accelerate there was no compliance issue relating to loss or maintenance of records or inadequate data entry under CASR or SRTO accreditation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ARFFS decommission and withdraw from service the three command vehicles currently located at Hobart, Canberra and Sydney ARFFS.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Command Vehicles at Sydney, Hobart and Canberra ARFFS have all been removed from operational service and decommissioned. These vehicles were non-regulated, did not form part of the required ARFFS category and had all reached the end of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>ARFFS Check &amp; Standardisation revised operating model.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The number of actual site visits conducted as part of ARFFS assurance activities remained the same with the addition of remote offsite checks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 19      | Loss of asset management accountabilities, loss of WHS accountabilities such as controls for managing exposure to hazardous materials (asbestos, legionella, gas in confined spaces), energy (flammable substances, pressure vessels, heights), loss of design integrity and/or staff competencies: results in underperforming assets impacting operational safety or impacts to workers health and safety. | No                                          | The number of facility issue occurrences (including those with severity 1 and 2 ASIDs) was within the longer-term trend.  
Key systems supporting air traffic services continued to meet availability targets.  
SRT targets continued to be met.  
There was one (1) LOS occurrence in FY 2016-17 which had an associated facility issue as additional occurrence type (where the ADS-B was not available in an adjoining foreign flight information region (FIR), and another LOS occurrence with an associated facility issue in FY 2017-18 YTD (involving headset failure). The occurrences were not related to any changes implemented in Accelerate. |
| 21      | Inaccurate or missing information results in incorrect decisions impacting safe operational services. | No                                          | Airservices maintained safety performance during the Accelerate Program based on a number of metrics.  
There is no evidence that inaccurate or missing information resulting from changes under Accelerate caused incorrect decisions impacting safe operational services. |
| 22      | Delay in implementing projects results in unreliable ATM and/or ARFF services impacting operational safety. | No                                          | Airservices maintained safety performance during the Accelerate Program based on a number of metrics.  
There is no evidence that changes associated with Accelerate have caused delay in implementing projects causing unreliable ATM/or ARFF services impacting operational safety. |
| 23      | Asset management framework not fit-for-purpose results in ineffective decision making, assets not being suitably maintained and potential inappropriate investment in assets impacting operational safety. | No                                          | There is no evidence that implementation of the Asset Management Framework has resulted in an impact to operational safety. |
| 26      | Non-compliance with regulations results in loss of safety critical services.         | No                                          | The number of non-compliance notices (NCNs) significantly reduced during Accelerate compared to the previous two years, while CASA maintained an active surveillance schedule. |
## APPENDIX A – ACCELERATE SAFETY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard #</th>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Was undesirable outcome of hazard realised?</th>
<th>Rationale based on safety performance outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Degraded skills and capabilities in ARFF operational personnel due to amended PUA programs.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There were no non-compliances with regulations which resulted in loss of safety critical services related to Accelerate changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Insufficient qualified staff to fill ARFFS Station positions and Training Officer roles.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There were no CASA surveillance findings during Accelerate which related to the Public Safety Training Program or insufficient number of qualified staff to fill ARFFS Station positions and Training Officer roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Industrial action associated with changes to rostering practices has the potential for service interruptions.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No industrial action during Accelerate and therefore no service interruptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Quintiq modifications (leave integration and inclusion of other workforces) result in system slow down or failure.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There was no operational safety occurrence related to Quintiq modifications as a result of Accelerate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Business IT system consolidation, integration and/or improvement result in system slow down or failure.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There was no operational safety occurrence related to Business IT system changes as a result of Accelerate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Safety-related changes are not acceptably-safe due to failure to establish a correct, complete or sufficient SMS framework (AA-NOS-SAF-0002)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There were no operational safety occurrences related to changes made under the Safety &amp; Environment Integration Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Safety-related changes are not acceptably-safe DUE TO failure to establish correct, complete or sufficient safety-change management requirements</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There were no operational safety occurrences related to changes made under the Safety &amp; Environment Integration Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Safety-related changes are not acceptably-safe DUE TO failure to establish correct, complete or sufficient SCM processes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There were no operational safety occurrences related to changes made under the Safety &amp; Environment Integration Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Safety-related changes are not acceptably-safe DUE TO failure to perform established SCM processes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There were no operational safety occurrences related to changes made under the Safety &amp; Environment Integration Initiative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall Air Traffic System Safety Performance

LOS and RI rates (for ATS and pilot attributed occurrences) remained consistent.
Risk Severity of Occurrences

*The Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) is a Eurocontrol tool endorsed by the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO) to assess the risk exposure of occurrences.

The RAT Severity Category measures the consequence of an occurrence on the safety of flight operations, with A being the highest severity category.
Safety Severity Index (SSI)*

*Safety Severity Index (SSI) is used to categorise occurrences based on the source of error identification and response

Level 1&2  External source
Level 3&4  Internal source
Reporting Culture

- High level of reporting
- Total number of reports submitted have remained consistent
- One of the most detailed occurrence reporting systems amongst CANSO members
- Validation exercise provided confidence that all Loss of Separation occurrences were reported
Regulatory Compliance

Significant reduction in non-compliance findings while CASA maintains active surveillance program.
Change at Pace – Successful & Safe

Accelerate strengthened organisational barriers to set the foundation for safety enhancement in the long term

- More collaborative, accountable & agile culture
- Aligned leadership team
- Upskilled leaders in change

People create safety

- Less complex organisation
- Simplified delegation to the right level
- New Asset Management Framework to ensure strategic planning and sustainability of assets
- New combined Technology Management System to enhance and integrate technology management

Tailored systems and processes to optimise outcomes

- Information management strategy in place
- Investment in technology aligned with strategy

Enhance safety intelligence enabled by technology to support informed decision making
International Benchmarking

CANSO compares IFR-IFR LOS and RI for all participating ANSPs.

2015 published comparison is shown. While 2016 results will be published in November 2017, data available for assessment to date shows Airservices performance is in line with 2015 results.
Risk Outcome of Occurrences

Proportion of ATS Attributed Occurrences in Unrecovered States (i.e. LOS, RI or Ground Proximity)
1 July 2013 – 30 September 2017

Trend of ATS Attributed Occurrences in Unrecovered State remained consistent
Accelerate Safety Performance Analysis

Staff Competency Factors Identified in ATS Attributed Occurrences

Slight decrease in the competency issues involved in ATS attributed occurrences
Facility / System Performance

Facility issue occurrences remained consistent.
Facility / System Performance

Service Restoration Times continue to meet targets
ARFF Safety Performance

0
Significant ARFF Attributable Safety Occurrences for FY15-16, FY 16-17 and FY 17-18 YTD

Maintained ARFF Incident Responses
Accelerate Safety Performance Analysis

ARFF Safety Performance

Maintained ARFF service and fleet availability
Management of Safety / Audit / Risk Actions

Continued focus on actions/issues management compliance
Supporting Staff Mental Health through Change

EAP utilisation has been effective in preventing mental health occurrences

0 WHS occurrences which impacted service delivery or operational safety

Utilisation of Employee Assistance Program (EAP)
Senator Glenn Sterle asked:

1. Is it correct that under the new harmonised, automated civil and military air traffic control system (CMATS) under OneSky, the idea would be that an air traffic controller in Brisbane Airport could take over operations in Tullamarine Airport?
   - Are there plans for situations such as this to be a regular occurrence, or only used as a backup in exceptional circumstances (e.g. network equipment failures or local incidents)?
   - In those circumstances, is there a risk of human error, should an air traffic controller monitoring the air space of half the continent to be able to identify a potential localised event in the other half?
   - Is it realistic to expect this system to be effective, with so much responsibility concentrated in one place?

2. With the centralisation of air traffic control operations in one tower, could such circumstances have an impact to either the aviation industry or aviation safety?

3. With this remote tower technology, is there a planned reduction of staff in air traffic control towers across the country?

Answer:

1. Airservices Australia currently provides air traffic control services from multiple locations, including two air traffic services centres in Brisbane and Melbourne. This will not change when CMATS is introduced. CMATS will provide greater flexibility in how airspace is managed, removing current geographic-based restrictions. This flexibility has significant safety and business continuity benefits for Australia’s aviation network and the travelling public. Any changes introduced as part of the transition to CMATS will be carefully managed in accordance with Airservices’ safety management system.

2. Airservices is not centralising air traffic control services into one tower.

3. No.
Senator Glenn Sterle asked:

a. How much has the Chief Executive Officer received in bonuses since his appointment to the position in 2016?

b. In each financial year, what were those bonuses tied to?

Answer:

a. Details of short-term incentive payments received by the Chief Executive Officer are publicly available in the annual remuneration reports published on Airservices website at: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/.

b. Bonuses are based on Airservices’ performance in key outcomes linked to the Corporate Plan. Details of annual scorecards are publicly available in the annual remuneration reports published on Airservices website at: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/.
Senator Glenn Sterle asked:


2. Please provide all Reports from 1 January 2016 to 8 November 2019 and answer the following questions:
   a. What process does AirServices Australia follow for selecting permanent noise monitoring sites for Australian airports?
   b. What process does AirServices Australia follow for reviewing permanent noise monitoring sites for Australian airports?
   c. Where are permanent noise monitoring sites located (as at 8 November 2019)?
   d. Has AirServices Australia removed any permanent noise monitoring sites since 1 January 2016?
   e. If so, where and why?
   f. What process does AirServices Australia follow for selecting temporary noise monitoring sites for Australian airports?
   g. What process does AirServices Australia follow for reviewing temporary noise monitoring sites for Australian airports?
   h. Provide a list of all temporary noise monitoring sites since 1 January 2016, including whether the site was made permanent or closed and reasons.

Answer:

1. The webpage has a new address: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/noise-reports/noise-monitoring-network-reviews/. The fact sheet was updated in September 2019 and correctly links to the new webpage address.

   a. Having regard to the location of flight paths and proximity to the airport, the key considerations when selecting permanent noise monitoring sites at Australian airports are:
      - Compliance with the international standard ISO20906:2009 - Acoustics - Unattended monitoring of aircraft sound in the vicinity of airports (ISO20906).
      - Background noise representative of overall community noise.
      - Physical requirements including security, mobile data coverage and access to power, and good radar coverage for accurate aircraft tracking.
      - Long-term site availability.
b. The effectiveness of each permanent noise monitor is reviewed annually by a contractor as part of standard quality assurance processes. A noise monitoring network review may also be undertaken to evaluate the overall function and balance of all existing permanent aircraft noise monitoring sites around a major airport. These reviews are usually conducted after significant changes to flight procedures and consider ISO20906 compliance and the effectiveness of the noise monitor to achieve the monitoring objectives. The review generally includes an assessment of the number and frequency of aircraft operations, aircraft altitudes, captured aircraft noise events, population statistics, and other social or environmental factors.

c. Airservices currently has 43 permanent aircraft noise monitoring sites around major airports in Australia as at 8 November 2019, as shown at Attachment A.

d. Airservices has removed one permanent aircraft noise monitoring site since 1 January 2016.

e. A review of the noise monitoring network in Melbourne in August 2012 identified that the permanent noise monitor located at Bonfield Street in Keilor Village was not compliant with ISO20906:2009. Arrival aircraft at a relatively low altitude combined with the noise monitor’s position (to the side of the arrival paths, rather than directly underneath them) resulted in a very low angle of incidence between the noise monitor and the overflying aircraft, and a high degree of uncertainty regarding the data being captured.

Based on community feedback, the Keilor Village noise monitor was left in place until March 2016. Between 2012 and when the monitor was removed in March 2016, Airservices discussed the need to relocate the noise monitor with the community, both through the Melbourne Airport Community Aviation Consultation Group (CACG), and directly with interested individuals from the Keilor Village community and Brimbank Council.

Airservices conducted a short-term noise monitoring program at two locations in the Keilor area in 2016-17 to find another suitable location for a permanent noise monitor. The first short-term location was at Horseshoe Bend Road, in Keilor Village. The results of short-term monitoring confirmed this site was also unsuitable for a permanent noise monitoring site for the same reason as the previous site.

The second location was a site at Norwood Drive in Keilor East. The results of this short-term monitoring confirmed that this area was suitable for a permanent noise monitoring site, and an appropriate permanent site was selected nearby at Prospect Drive in Keilor East. This site became a permanent aircraft noise monitoring site in September 2017.

f. Requests for short-term noise monitoring are generally made to Airservices through the local CACGs. Airservices applies the same considerations as outlined in the response to question 2(a). Short-term sites may also be selected for internal studies to validate Airservices noise modelling metrics.

g. The data collected by short-term monitors is cross-checked and validated by Airservices’ acoustics contractor through an extensive and well-established quality assurance program, to ensure data accurately corresponds to actual aircraft overflights (as captured by Airservices radar data). Subject to validation, a temporary site monitor remains in place for the time that it was planned for.

h. Since 1 January 2016, Airservices has carried out short-term noise monitoring at the sites listed in Attachment B.

Attachments
- A: Airservices current permanent aircraft noise monitoring sites
- B: Airservices short term aircraft noise monitoring sites
Table 1: Airservices current permanent aircraft noise monitoring sites near major airports in Australia (as at 8 November 2019).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Permanent Noise Monitoring Site</th>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Street and Suburb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn Park</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Press Road, Brooklyn Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medindie</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Avenel Gardens Road, Medindie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netley</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Comet Avenue, Netley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenelg</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Military Road, Glenelg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Beach</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Foreman Street, West Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tingalpa</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Wynnnum Road, Tingalpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nudgee Beach</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Chaseley St, Nudgee Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulimba</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Baldwin St, Bulimba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedron</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Turner Rd, Kedron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon Hill</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Princess St. Cannon Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annerley</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Ipswich Rd, Annerley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Chalfont St, Salisbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Blair Dr, St Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holloways Beach</td>
<td>Cairns</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Walnut St, Holloways Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairns North</td>
<td>Cairns</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Rutherford Street, North Cairns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkeys Knob</td>
<td>Cairns</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Tee Street, Yorkeys Knob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerrabomberra</td>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>NSW*</td>
<td>Coral Drive, Jerrabomberra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugun</td>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>Kaleena Street, Tugun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banora Point</td>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>NSW*</td>
<td>Pioneer Parade, Banora Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulla</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>St Johns Rd, Bulla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essendon</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Kerferd St, Essendon North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coolaroo</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Stockdale Ave, Coolaroo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keilor Downs</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Prospect Drive, Keilor East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keilor East</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Rachelle Road, Keilor East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomastown</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Barry Road, Thomastown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannington</td>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Gibbs St, East Cannington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens Park</td>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Treasure Road, Queens Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Permanent Noise Monitoring Site</td>
<td>Airport</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Street and Suburb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

* Although the airports at these locations are in one state/territory, the noise monitoring locations are in an adjoining state/territory, due to the proximity of the airport to state/territory boundaries.
### Table 2: List of sites where Airservices has carried out temporary (short-term) aircraft noise monitoring around near major airports in Australia, since 1 January 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Short Term Noise Monitoring Site</th>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Street and Suburb</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
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<td>Name of Short Term Noise Monitoring Site</td>
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<td>State</td>
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</table>

* Although the airports at these locations are in one state/territory, the noise monitoring locations are in an adjoining state/territory, due to the proximity of the airport to state/territory boundaries.
Committee Question Number: 370
Departmental Question Number: SQ19-000592

Program: n/a
Division/Agency: Airservices Australia
Topic: Parliament House no-fly zone
Proof Hansard Page: Written (8 November 2019)

Senator Rice asked:

1. Did Airservices Australia have any role in issuing a no-fly zone over Parliament House in relation to the recent balloon flight?
2. Has Airservices Australia been involved in any decision making in relation to restricting flights over Parliament House?
3. Given the prolific use of balloons in Canberra at events like the Balloon Spectacular, will this be an ongoing restriction?
4. Given that this no fly zone is freshly issued, if it isn’t made a permanent fixture why was it used in this instance?
5. What genuine safety risk was posed by the balloon?

Answer:

1. No, this authority rests with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).
2. No.
3-5. Please see response to Committee Question Number 395 provided by Australia’s airspace regulator, CASA.
Senator McKim asked:

Many months after making inquiries to the Airport Noise Ombudsman (7-plus), community members are now being sent a Quarterly Report (January-March 2019) instead of responses to their question.

a. Why is the ANO sending quarterly reports instead of responses to inquiries?
   
b. Is the ANO inadequately resourced to fulfil its duties in a reasonable manner?

Answer:

a. The Aircraft Noise Ombudsman (ANO) does not send Quarterly Reports instead of responses to inquiries or complaints. There has been one instance when the ANO sent a copy of its January-March 2019 Quarterly Report to an individual attached to an interim response to an inquiry to demonstrate that some of the issues of concern had already been raised with Airservices Australia. The interim response made clear that the issues raised were still to be examined; that the Quarterly Report was provided for information; and that the ANO would provide a final response to follow up the interim response as soon as practicable.

b. The ANO is adequately resourced to fulfil its duties.