[Kharon]

The case of the disappearing QoN.

Perhaps the solution to this 'unusual' baffling mystery may be explained by an analysis of the following three questions.   Essentially, the same question is posed to three departments, all under the same governance and maybe, just perhaps, Xenophon has the answers.  That would create a need for the reissue of the TBA notice; give 'em all time to decide who is slotted for a BOHICA event. 

ASA p 62 – Q 156.

Cirrus #ATS-0125061 states that the ML TAC received coordination from Essendon Tower that it was unable to separate its Runway 26 aircraft from Melbourne’s departures but the ML TAC did not subsequently pass the coordination to the Melbourne approach controller. LOA_3263 para 4.5.3 (as provided in answer to QoN 237) indicates that a number of parties have responsibilities when Melbourne is using Runway 16 for departures and Essendon Tower is unable to separate its Runway 26 instrument approach from the Melbourne departures: 

1. What is the “MPL” and what relationship does it have to the ML TAC? 

2. What is the “MLC” and what relationship does it have to the ML TAC? 

3. What is the “MAE” and what relationship does it have to the ML TAC? 

ATSB p 66 – Q 166.

1. At the time ATSB reviewed Airservices Cirrus report #ATS-0125061 was it aware that approximately 3 hours had elapsed between the time the reported breakdown of communication occurred and the time it was detected and corrected? 

2. At the time ATSB reviewed REPCON AR201300090 relating to Cirrus report #ATS-0125061 was it aware approximately 3 hours had elapsed between the time the reported breakdown of communication occurred and the time it was detected and corrected? 

3. When and how did ATSB become aware of the three hour time delay between the error referred to in Cirrus #ATS-0125061 occurring and its subsequent detection and correction? 

4. Can ATSB provide a copy of the request it sent to Airservices for the radar tapes relating to Cirrus #ATS-0125061? 

5. When did ATSB seek the radar tapes relating to Cirrus #ATS-0125061 – after the CIRRUS report was received or after the REPCON report was received? 

6. When did ATSB review the radar tapes – after the CIRRUS report was received or after the REPCON report was received? 

7. What period of time did the radar tapes provided by Airservices Australia cover? 

8. Can ATSB provide a copy of the radar tapes it reviewed? 

CASA p 70 - Q174.

1. At the time CASA reviewed Airservices Cirrus report #ATS-0125061 was it aware that approximately 3 hours had elapsed between the time the reported breakdown of communication occurred and the time it was detected and corrected? 

2. At the time CASA received ATSB’s advice that no loss of separation or separation assurance had occurred as suggested in REPCON AR201300090 was it aware that approximately 3 hours had elapsed between the time the reported breakdown of communication occurred and the time it was detected and corrected? 

3. When and how did CASA become aware of the three hour time delay between the error referred to in Cirrus #ATS-0125061 occurring and its subsequent detection and correction? 

4. Did CASA independently review the Cirrus #ATS-0125061/REPCON AR201300090 radar tapes or did it rely on the advice of Airservices and ATSB that no loss of separation or separation assurance had occurred over the three hour period? 

5. CASA’s response to ATSB with regards to REPCON AR201300089 states 

All passing strange - Toot toot.....