[Peetwo]

ToARE: 1988 till - ?? 

Given the proud pronouncement from St Commode that after 31 years the RRP is officially over (see here:  https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...7#pid10897 &/or http://www.australianflying.com.au/lates...s3kJLCK.99 ), this week on the AP we will look back on where it all began because over the next 12 months we approach some more infamous, industry demoralising, milestones. For example the 30 year failed model of turning the CAA into a Government Business Enterprise and a quarter of a century since the "S" was added to CAsA; combined with ATC officially being divorced from the regulator...

To begin my RRP review (or ToARE - timeline of aviation regulatory embuggerance) here is a rather lengthy 2009 philosophy Doctorate thesis from Carol Durkin; that provides a fairly concise summary/review of most of the period in question i.e 1988 to now: https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu...m/PDF/view (refer from 

Now let's refer back to the LMH and associated article where St Commode makes the bollocks statement that the RRP is finally over...  

Hitch with last LMH for the year..etc. - 

First after the CASA Iron Ring deckchair announcement above there was this proclamation from St Commode:

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 CASA completes Aviation Regulation Reform Program
16 December 2019


    

Late last week, the Governor-General signed three pieces of aviation regulation that signified the end of a 31-year reform program.

The three parts–103, 105 and 131–complete the regulation reform started in 1988 to migrate the Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) and other instruments into the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR).

CASA CEO and Director of Aviation Safety Shane Carmody said he was pleased the reform program was finally complete and praised industry representatives that assisted with the program.

"Two years ago we had 10 regulations to complete the CASR suite. I made a commitment to industry that we'd get them done and today I am pleased we have finally got there," he said.

“I would like to thank everyone who has contributed to the regulation development program, particularly the Aviation Safety Advisory Panel and associated Technical Working Groups in the past couple of years. It is testament to the willingness of the aviation industry to get behind our commitment to streamline the aviation safety regulations.

“Now a significant part of CASA’s focus turns to continuing to consult on the detail of some of the supporting standards and transition arrangements and preparation of guidance material to ensure the aviation community has the support they need."

The final three parts were:

• CASR Part 103 – Sport and Recreational Aviation Operations
  
  
• CASR Part 105 – Sport and Recreational Parachuting
  
  
• CASR Part 141 – Manned Free Balloon Operations
  

The length of the reform program has been seen as a plague on the industry, with many changes increasing costs and regulatory burden. Some regulations, such as CASR Part 61, are under heavy post-implementation scrutiny, which may see more change in the future to make them more workable.

Read more at http://www.australianflying.com.au/lates...s3kJLCK.99

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Finally Hitch wraps it all up with his final LMH for the year...  

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The Last Minute Hitch: 16 December 2019

16 December 2019

– Steve Hitchen

Several of the CASR Parts were ill-informed and rushed into law

Yes! After 31 years of embarrassing regulation reform the project looks to be finally done. With CASA announcing the last three CASRs signed into law, they can put their quills back into their ink wells. That's the theory anyway. The reality is that although we're sticking out the "Mission Accomplished" sign like George W Bush, there is still a lot of work to do. Several of the CASR Parts were ill-informed and rushed into law without regard to whether or not they were actually functional. The boxes were ticked, but the products need a lot of re-work. There has been plenty said about Part 61, but there is still a lot to come to the surface over the next year and that will mean we'll all have to take up our pens once again. In the case of Part 61, the issue of flight training (also handed to Stakeholder Engagement) has become the paramount issue. To put it as basically as possible: we're running out of them and Part 61 makes it hard to get more. So there's still plenty to do on regulation. Consider also that some CASRs never existed as CARs (for example, Part 149) and are still effectively under construction. It seems there's still so much that needs to be done that it will never feel like the mission has indeed been accomplished ... just like George W Bush.

...May your gauges always be in the green,

Hitch

Read more at http://www.australianflying.com.au/the-l...FcmftWe.99

Plus some comments in reply...

Grant McHerron • 2 days ago
Sure, they're signed into law but the details & coverage of these laws are in their MOS and (for Part 131 at least) those don't exist, not to mention many of the aspects they were supposed to cover aren't included in the regs yet.

This is like saying the building is ready to use when all you have is a shaky frame but no walls, windows, doors or interior systems.

I guess they'll get around to all that eventually but without Carmody pressing them to deadlines (& based on "progress" over the last 20 years), I guess we'll be trying to get everything tidied up for the rest of this century

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Richard RUDD • 3 days ago

Regulatory reform program at an end And it isnt even April Fools Day.

Try a pull on the other one.

I posit this pre Xmas "gift" to the aviation nation is a direct result of the announcement of the 2020 RRAT Senate Inquiry.

After the disgusting waste of $ billions over 31 years !!!, CASA can now say its all done and dusted and all is right in the GA world. Rubbish !!

So now any submitter to RRAT cant talk about CAsA's unfinished symphony..although we do get the 'phony'' bit.

And as for 'stakeholder group' uptake of more coverage and a bigger badge, from this little acorn a great oak ( ie empire ) will grow. Another head for the CAsA Hydra.

Its the bureaucratic way.
Happy Xmas, GA !! 

In typical RR style, Rudders nails it -     



Okay scene set, let's begin with what I think were three pivotal historical moments on the aviation regulatory embuggerance timeline;

Reference links: Hansard 16 May 1990 

1) 1989 Pilot strike: The reasons the pilot strike was important in the ToARE;

a) led to a mass exodus of nearly a whole generation of experienced, seasoned pilots to ex-pat jobs overseas; or becoming dispirited and leaving the industry totally;

b) due to the subsequent economic downturn within the industry the regulator's coffers also shrunk leading to layoffs of essential frontline staff and purges within executive and middle management;

Quote from Mr Jull (Hansard link above):

...In the Estimates committees last night we learned that the CAA in fact had lost something like $60m in charges during that particular dispute and that the Federal Airports Corporation was facing the prospect of some very large losses this year as a result of the pilots dispute...

  
2) Civil Aviation Amendment Bill 1990  (16 May 1990): As Sandy continuously reiterates the making of the then CAA into a GBE is clearly a failed form of governance of any number of Federal govt agencies but none more so than the aviation safety regulator: see PDF link Hansard HERE (from page  for that particular infamous historical moment in time:

(PDF page 30)

...In line with the philosophy of moving from oversight of day to day operations to an emphasis on results and Board accountability, the Bill removes a range of day to day controls exercised by government, including controls over the terms and conditions of individual borrowings, the approval of individual contracts, the purchase of shares and the establishment of subsidiaries and partnerships. These are now appropriately the responsibility of the Board.

Other provisions in the Bill relating to appointment and dismissal of Board members, conduct of Board meetings and the appointment and powers of the chief executive officer reflect more clearly the respective roles of the Minister and the Board and clarify issues of administration of the Authority. Although the CAA currently pays a range of Commonwealth and State taxes and duties, it is exempt from payment of Commonwealth income tax. This Bill removes that exemption and provides for the CAA to be fully subject to Commonwealth income tax with effect from 1 July 1991.

As I indicated earlier, other provisions in the Bill, unrelated to the reform measures outlined above, include measures to implement, as far as practicable, the recommendations of the Air Safety Regulation Review Task Force first report that the cost to industry of proposed standards of aviation safety should be taken into account by the Authority, and that significant offences in the regulations relating to crucial areas of air safety should be included in the Act...

 
3) The 1995 Plane Safe inquiry report (refer page 83 of the Carol Durkin thesis); and in particular Chapter 10 (pg 105) dealing with the 'Terrell report':

The Terrell Report

10.6 The Terrell study group was appointed in February 1993 by
the CAA board to report on, as interpreted by the committee, the
effectiveness of the operations of the Safety Regulation and
Standards (SR&S) Division. The inquiry was short and the report
brief. The 11 page report included an outline of the major issues,
themes raised and a proposed course of action.

10.7 The committee points out that the report did not contain any
recommendations. The proposed course of action can be divided into
three parts, namely, subject matter, mechanisms for further
examination of subject matter including implementation timetables
and responsibility for oversight.

10.8 The report said, that of highest priority is the need to address
the future funding of DASR. The other tasks identified were a
strategic plan for the management of safety, regulatory changes,
information systems, human resources management plan,
surveillance plan, control and monitoring, operations, administration
and documentation.

10.9 The mechanism for developing these projects (other than
funding) were task forces of experts drawn from industry, unions and
the CAA. Task forces would report action plans including
implementation timetables. Responsibility for oversight lay with a
committee including the chief executive officer appointed by the CAA
board.

Adequacy of the CAA response to the findings of the Terell Report

10.10 The report was completed on 12 March 1993 and presented
at the board meeting on 31 March 1993. A steering committee and
three working groups were established to implement the report. The
working groups were an organisation and management group, an
operational group and a financial and charges group. The
membership of the working groups consisted of CAA, union and
industry representatives.

10.11 In June 1993 the steering committee presented its Action
Plans, detailing its responses to the matters raised in the Terrell
Report. That committee made 59 recommendations. All except one
were accepted, by the CAA board. The board rejected the
recommendation that a directorate of aviation safety regulation be
established within the authority.

10.12 An examination of the adequacy of the CAA board's response
to the Terrell, report can be made by ascertaining whether there is a
link between the recommendations of the steering committee and the
major issues identified in the Terrell report. Table 9 on page 105
shows the relationship between the areas of the Terrell report and
the recommendations of the steering committee.

10.13 The 1993-94 CAA annual report said that 40 of the steeringcommittee
recommendations had been implemented. These included
a restructure of the directorate and the preparation of a long-term
funding strategy to cover the cost of safety regulation in Australia.
In a later part of this report there was reference to a project team
which, with the assistance of Anderson Consulting, prepared a
detailed report outlining arguments which identified the ultimate
beneficiaries of safety regulation.

10.14 As at September 1995 forty seven of the fifty eight
recommendations had been implemented. CASA gave the committee
details of the implementation status of the remaining
11 recommendations (submission 246, submissions pages 2489-2493).

Conclusions

10.15 An examination of the Terrell Report reveals little evidence
of any attempt by the study group to critically analyse the issues
outlined in the report. While this may have been a consequence of
the brevity of the study, section two in the main body of the Terrell
report, 'major issues and themes', merely amounts to a collation of
the various opinions expressed to the study group in the course of its
investigation. Referring to the Terrell Report and its
implementation, the 1992-93 annual report of the CAA said the
'process resulted in identification of a number of changes needed to
redress perceptions that safety standards may have been
compromised by the pace and extent of reform in the safety
regulation area'.

10.16 Despite raising a wide range of issues and calling for
immediate action by the CAA to overcome the problems, the Terrell
Report failed to provide specific recommendations that would
directly address any of them. The proposals left significant scope for
interpreting the issues and hence determining the appropriate
remedies.

10.17 It is apparent from looking at the distribution of the steeringcommittee
recommendations that the issues targeted in the Terrell
proposals have been covered, some more thoroughly than others. The
committee is satisfied that the CAA has provided adequate responses
to the proposals for change in the Terrell report.

10.18 This conclusion accords with the findings of the
Vincent/Harrison report (1993) which was established to review the
action plan of the steering committee. The Vincent/Harrison report
concluded that the action plan adequately addressed the principal
issues raised by the study group and that it was sound and
consistent with current day management trends. Further, the
Terrell/Ward report has an interview record with Alan Terrell who
credits Roser with developing the recommendations in the Terrell
Report.

Alan Terrell had no concerns with the way the report was
proposed to be implemented.

That chapter of Plane Safe inquiry report finished with this rather prophetic statement from the committee:

10.19 Perception and prejudice, mistrust and misinterpretation -
this has been the currency of aviation safety regulation. The question
that has to be asked is has anything changed for the better.

My question is; Q/ Was the 'Terrell Report' the start of the Iron Ring 'Law unto itself', authoritarian,  push back to any form of serious Parliamentary scrutiny of the regulator's (now officially sanctioned) function to enforce aviation safety above all other considerations, including the economic viability of the industry while trying to comply with the slowly evolving (31 year 19th Century RRP) draconian aviation safety rule-set ?

Much MTF...P2 

Ps Here are the 2 CASA AQON for Sen Sterle QON 389 and 391...

Senator Glenn Sterle asked:

 How many Flying Operations Inspectors are employed at CASA?
 On average how many hours of flying currency training was completed by Flying Operations Inspectors last year?
 How many applications for flying currency training put forward by staff have been rejected by CASA in the last year? On what grounds?
 Are CASA meeting the ICAO requirements to maintain the skills and currency of their staff to the same level held by industry?
 How many Flying Operations Inspectors are ‘not current’ (ie training not up to date) on the aircraft types they are required to oversight?

Answer:
 70. Note that not all these staff will be required to, or undertake, operational flying as part of their duties within CASA.
 The total flying currency training hours for 2018-19 was 888.98. Providing an average of these hours is not a true reflection of hours for each Flying Operations Inspector due to their varied operational requirements.
 In 2018-19, 6.3 per cent of applications were declined because the request was inconsistent with CASA’s operational capability needs at that time, an insufficient level of training or currency request or not meeting procurement requirements.
 Yes, however the ICAO’s requirements for Flying Operations Inspectors relate to currency in support of the taskings they accomplish rather than ‘the same level held by industry’.
 Nil.

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Senator Glenn Sterle asked:

 Does CASA agree that there are serious issues with workplace culture?
 What steps is CASA taking to improve workplace culture?
 How many vacant positions exist in the technical workforce?
 What is the impact on industry and aviation safety of these positions being unfilled?
 When does CASA plan on filling these vacancies?
 CASA’s corporate plan recognises that staff lacking skill or not having the capacity to perform their role is a risk to aviation safety, why has CASA allowed so many vacancies to remain in the technical workforce?

Answer:
1. CASA’s findings from the 2019 APS Employee Census show that employee engagement remains strong at 72 per cent.
2. The CASA Workforce Plan 2019-2023 includes a wide range of initiatives that will further improve CASA’s positive workplace culture, including:
a. implementing a new Work Health and Safety Strategy to foster CASA’s safety culture;
b. refreshing the CASA Award Scheme to continue the promotion of a high-performance culture; and
c. reviewing CASA’s performance and communication scheme to foster employee development and performance.
3. As at 31 October 2019, there were 41 vacancies of the 381 technical roles in CASA.
4. CASA continues to meet industry oversight obligations. Planned surveillance for FY 2018/19 consisted of around 1100 planned safety audits with the current year achievement rate running at 93 per cent.
5. CASA continues to recruit to technical roles with three offers under consideration. If accepted, this will reduce the current technical vacancies to 38 noting additional offers will be made.
6. The industry from which CASA recruits its technical staff is highly competitive which makes it challenging to recruit and retain staff with technical skills who are in demand across the industry.
CASA manages vacancies by having in place a longitudinal recruitment program, rolling induction and training modules and by implementing programs to make best use of all the staffing resources available.

Obviously MTF on those typically obfuscated AQON -