[Peetwo]

And the YMEN DFO accident fairy tale grows - 

HVH and the ATSB are now under the false premise that they have effectively killed/whitewashed the MSM and public interest in the YMEN DFO accident and investigation with the standard "..nothing to see here - the pilot did it..". 

So in the interest of joining the dots and getting back to ToRs on what exactly Hoody's topcover agency is attempting to whitewash in their bollocks YMEN DFO accident report - AO-2017-024:  https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2017-024/

Dot 1

Bulla Road Precinct – Retail Outlet Centre approval process

Although there were exceedances identified with the Essendon Airport overall obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS), ZCR did not collide with the sections of the outlet centre which breached the OLS. In addition, the outlet centre did not impinge on the required obstacle clearance zones for a departure from runway 17.

It was unlikely that the outlet centre had an influence on the severity of the accident. In the absence of the Retail Outlet Centre buildings, the aircraft’s trajectory would likely have resulted in the aircraft colliding with the Tullamarine freeway, east of the Bulla Road overpass. Dashboard camera footage provided to the ATSB indicated that there was a significant amount of traffic on the Tullamarine Freeway at the time, with potential for casualties on the ground.

The reasons for the OLS breaches were complex and related to the airport operator’s obligation to establish an OLS in accordance with applicable standards and CASA advice to, and oversight of, the airport operator. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to adequately examine the issues found with the outlet centre building approval processes. Consequently, the ATSB has initiated a separate investigation, AI-2018-010. That investigation will examine the building approval process from an aviation safety perspective, including any airspace issues associated with the development, to determine the transport safety impact of the development on aviation operations at Essendon Airport.

 
And ref: AI-2018-010

On 21 February 2017, a building that is part of the Essendon Airport Bulla Road Precinct retail centre was struck by a Beechcraft King Air B200 (VH-ZCR). The ATSB’s preliminary report for this accident was published in March 2017. This preliminary report stated that the approval process for this building would be a matter for further investigation.

The building was part of the Bulla Road Precinct Retail Outlet Centre development, which was proposed by the lessee of Essendon Airport in 2003 and approved by the Federal Government in 2004.

Due to the specialist nature of the approval process and airspace issues attached to the retail centre development, and not to delay the final report into the accident from February 2017, the ATSB has decided to investigate this matter separately.

The investigation will examine the building approval process from an aviation safety perspective, including any airspace issues associated with the development, to determine the transport safety impact of the development on aviation operations at Essendon Airport.

A final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, relevant parties will be immediately notified so that appropriate safety action can be taken.

Dot 2

Somewhat ironically, given his past association and ongoing support for the Iron Ring led Big R-regulator, the following reference comes from one Ironbar's (Ron Bartsch) AvLaw blog...  

Ref: https://avlaw.com.au/atsb-report-no-safety-management/

ATSB Finds No Safety Management Principles in Department Decision-Making

A recent ATSB investigation highlights the importance of safety management-based approaches in assessing applications for buildings that may affect air safety.

In May 2018, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) released its Final Report (ref: https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5774258/ai...-final.pdf ) entitled Building approval process for structures in the vicinity of Australian airports. The Report found that the requirements contained in the Airports Act 1996 (Cth), the prime legislation that governs the planning framework for federally-leased airports, may not provide the proper safety management approach that it was intended to provide.

Application giving rise to report

In October 2009, Hume City Council applied to operators at Essendon Airport to build a radio mast on top of the council office building in Broadmeadows, Victoria. Pictured below shows existing antennas (circled in red) and the proposed radio mast (indicated by a blue arrow).[/url]

[img=468x0]https://avlaw.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HCC-building.png[/img]

Source: ATSB Report AI-2013-102 page 1 © Commonwealth of Australia 2018

[size=undefined]
The application identified that the building and masts had not been approved under the relevant regulations, the Airports (Protection of Airspace) Regulations 1996 (Cth). These regulations required that any proposed construction breaching protected airspace around certain airports be approved by the Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure and Transport (now known as the Department of Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities).  This particular application was for a mast that intruded into protected airspace, which included airspace defined by the airport’s ‘obstacle limitation surfaces’ (OLS). The Secretary was required to approve this proposal unless it would have an unacceptable effect on the safety (ref: http://unacceptable%20effect%20on%20the%20safety%20of%20existing%20or%20future%20air%20transport%20operations/ ) of existing or future air transport operations.

The initial response from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) was that the building and masts were hazardous to aircraft and therefore should be marked and lit. The proposed radio was simply a further hazard. The Department considered this advice to be inadequate and instructed CASA to find that either the application for the mast had an unacceptable effect on safety or it did not. CASA ultimately found in the negative but advised on lighting and marking requirements.

ATSB finds no application of safety principles

The ATSB carried out an investigation four years later in 2013 into the procedures of these decision-making processes. This was done as a response to a REPCON report received in September 2012 (P2 comment - bizarrely the ATSB REPCON database doesn't appear to go back to 2012??) expressing concerns a proper safety case was not conducted on the proposal. The ATSB’s Final Report concluded that whilst the procedure was compliant with the Airports Act 1996 and the Regulations, it “did not require the application of risk management principles to the Department’s consideration”. This was highlighted as a safety issue.

The Department instead adopted a prescriptive rather than a safety management-based approach in its decision-making. This meant that the process required an answer to the question of whether the obstacle was either acceptable or unacceptable. This was a simple binary approach and did not involve the application of safety management principles. The Department did not even have the necessary expertise or resources to make such an assessment. Because of this, they relied on CASA’s advice. The Department weighted CASA’s opinion above all others and there was nothing to suggest CASA was provided with all relevant safety information.

Such an approach was contrary to the risk-based approach advocated by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). ICAO had required member States in 2006 to establish a State Safety Programme, which the Department adopted in 2011. Australia’s program identified certain laws relevant to the oversight of safety in aviation. That legislation included the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and several other regulations. Interestingly, the Airports Act 1996 and its Regulations were not included. (P2 comment - UDB???)

What has been done

The Department has now advised that it will confer with key stakeholders in the process in relation to risk management practices. It released a Public Consultation Paper (ref: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/airspace_protection/Airspace-Protection.pdf ) in December 2016 entitled Modernising Airspace Protection. It has also initiated public consultation. AvLaw Consulting is [url=https://avlaw.com.au/submissions-close-modernising-airspace-protection-consultation-paper/]pleased to have contributed to this consultation. You can see our submission here: AvLaw – Modernising Airspace Protection – 28 Feb 17 – FINAL (ref: https://avlaw.com.au/wp-content/uploads/...-FINAL.pdf.

This case demonstrates the importance of safety management approaches within our government institutions. ICAO considers the safety management approach ‘best practice’ and has been adopted by numerous countries around the world. If you need any advice on safety for a building application, do not hesitate to consult our aviation and construction experts at AvLaw Consulting.[/size]

Hmm...so I wonder why the ATSB feels the need to do basically a repeat of their July 2013 initiated investigation?? https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2018-010/

On 21 February 2017, a building that is part of the Essendon Airport Bulla Road Precinct retail centre was struck by a Beechcraft King Air B200 (VH-ZCR). The ATSB’s preliminary report for this accident was published in March 2017. This preliminary report stated that the approval process for this building would be a matter for further investigation.

The building was part of the Bulla Road Precinct Retail Outlet Centre development, which was proposed by the lessee of Essendon Airport in 2003 and approved by the Federal Government in 2004.

Due to the specialist nature of the approval process and airspace issues attached to the retail centre development, and not to delay the final report into the accident from February 2017, the ATSB has decided to investigate this matter separately.

The investigation will examine the building approval process from an aviation safety perspective, including any airspace issues associated with the development, to determine the transport safety impact of the development on aviation operations at Essendon Airport.

A final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, relevant parties will be immediately notified so that appropriate safety action can be taken.

  
Dot 3

Although it took nearly 5 years to complete (P2 -   ) (ref: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2013-102/ ) the ATSB did manage to identify a significant hole in the cheese:

The use of risk management principles when considering an application under the Airports (Protected Airspace) Regulations
The Department of Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities adopted a prescriptive approach to the Hume City Council building application within the obstacle limitation area of Essendon Airport, which was in accordance with the process prescribed under the Airports (Protection of Airspace) Regulations 1996, but did not require the application of risk management principles to the department’s consideration.
Safety issue details Issue number:
AI-2013-102-SI-01
Who it affects:
Airports managing protected airspace associated with their runways
Status:
Safety action pending

The question there is when was this significant safety issue 1st identified? Another question is - why wasn't the 2013 investigation and final report referred to in either the YMEN DFO accident final report; or in the (AI-2018-010) above summary?? 

MTF? Yes lots...P2