[Peetwo]

BJ's airport conundrums: All woes lead to CASA -

Via the Oz:

Planes delayed at busy Hobart


12:00amMATTHEW DENHOLM
Flights and passengers are being delayed at an increasingly busy Hobart airport.

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Planes waiting up to ‘half an hour’ to park at Hobart Airport



Flights and passengers are being delayed at an increasingly busy Hobart airport, and the cost of compliance with regulation is blamed by some for holding up a simple fix.

Aviation sources told The Australian that during peak periods aircraft were waiting up to 30 minutes for access to parking bays at Hobart Airport, costing airlines in extra fuel and compounding schedule delays.

The problem is linked to Hobart having only five aircraft parking bays. Sources said a simple solution — using push-back tug vehicles to push the planes out of parking bays — was stymied by costly Civil Aviation Safety Authority regulation.

Push-back tugs, commonly used at other major and regional airports, remove the need for pilots to manoeuvre aircraft out of parking bays, freeing up space. At Hobart, it is estimated this would allow three more parking days.

Push-back tugs would also reduce the risk of planes clipping each other when leaving parking bays.

This occurred in Hobart in December 2016, when one Virgin Australia plane clipped the wings of another, which was boarding passengers at the time.

However, sources said any change to the parking apron would trigger CASA regulations and require multi-million upgrades to meet international standards, costs that could drive up landing fees and airfares.

Hobart Airport operations manager Matt Cocker said the current five parking bays were sufficient to deal with daily peak periods — morning, midday and late afternoon — if aircraft kept to the schedule.

However, this schedule was disrupted when planes arrived late. “From time to time, due to scheduling changes or delays inbound, there may be some times when some aircraft may have to wait before moving into a bay,” he said.

Hobart airport has seen a 34 per cent increase in passenger numbers during the past five years, fuelled by Tasmania’s tourism boom.

Mr Cocker said the airport planned to work with airlines to solve the problem. “We’ll work closely with those airlines that come into Hobart in developing options for increased parking positions into the future,” he said.

CASA regulations meant any solution would require approval and investment. “Even line-markings are subject to regulations under the CASA,” he said.

Push-back tugs were one option being discussed.

A CASA spokeswoman said international standards must be met but that cost was considered in making regulatory decisions. - Really

“Apron design, line-marking and lighting are covered by CASA regulations and are aligned with international standards,” she said.

“When performing our regulatory functions, we take into account all relevant considerations, including cost, with safety as our most important consideration.” blahblahblahblah - the old CAA section 9A motherhood statement...  Refer here:  Why does CASA allow twin engine ETOPS operation at all? #1

It is understood the issue is complicated by Hobart Airport’s plans — subject to sufficient demand — to offer access for wide-bodied planes capable of flying international routes.

Those plans would also require an upgrade of the apron.

#1 - Another Chocfrog post from LB off the UP :

..The reality is that affordable safety is everywhere, and is unavoidably everywhere.


The problem in aviation regulation - particularly in Australia - is that the estimation of the probabilities of things happening - like a double engine failure on a 777 or an engine failure in a C208 or PC12 - are almost invariably grossly overestimated. The required mitigations are, accordingly, almost invariably a gross overreaction. It’s across the regulatory spectrum, from air operator certification to medical certification. The proposal for 20nm CTAF procedures is a specific, recent example.

The reason for this is completely uncontroversial and well-understood. The contemplation of awful consequences - like a double engine failure in a twin jet at 35,000’ over the ocean or a mid-air near a CTAF - results in a natural overestimation of the probabilities of it happening.

Dick’s aeronautical engineer - if he exists - is merely being what’s known as ‘human’. He intuitively ‘knows’ that a four engined-aircraft ‘must’ be safer than a two engined-aircraft. His knowledge and experience and objectivity go out the figurative window when he intuitively ‘knows’ the comparative risks.

‘Everyone’ intuitively ‘knows’ that pilots with CVD ‘must’ not be able to meet the same competence standards as pilots without CVD, and therefore pilots without CVD ‘must’ be riskier than pilots without CVD.

Of course, as a matter of objective fact, the intuition is bollocks. But it is natural (and, purely coincidentally, very lucrative for those who make their living out of safety bureaucracy).

Manifestations of this are everywhere. Look at the component overhaul and replacement periodicities in most GA aircraft designed in the 50s/60s/70s. My favourite is the flap flex drive shafts on Beechcraft. There are aircraft with 10,000 hours, plus, flying around with the original shafts. There are thousands of aircraft with multiple thousands of hours on original shafts. What do you reckon the maintenance manual says about the ‘life’ of those shafts?

And then I think of the poor bastard LAME whom CASA crushed for not having replaced vacuum pumps on a Cessna 310 at 500 hours. The pumps were still going strong after 500 hours, one by a further 886.9 hours and the other by a further 1,599.6 hours. But he had to be crushed because someone had plucked 500 out of his arse to put in a maintenance manual 40 years ago, and the number thus became holy writ the breach of which was a safety heresy. The objective evidence of millions of hours of vacuum pump operation and the collective wisdom of what causes vacuum pump failure were irrelevant. That’s aviation ‘safety’ for ya...

While on the UP - plus very much related to CASA's seemingly absconded airport oversight responsibilities (refer Senate thread post: Beware the Bureaucrat's spin) - and in the lead up to the anniversary of the tragic Essendon DFO B200 accident; I note that there is an interesting thread running with the title - Essendon RWY Strip Width discrepancy

717tech -Essendon RWY Strip Width discrepancy

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Interesting email today from the AFAP regarding Essendon RWY26/08.

It mentions that the strip must be at least 300M wide for Precision/ Non Precision Approaches. Due to the DFO and other structures, it’s only 230M.

My question is who’s responsible? Which of the many strict liability offences are we committing by accepting an ILS onto 26?

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fujii - ERSA says it’s 300.

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717tech - I believe that’s the issue. ERSA is supposedly incorrect and there’s no NOTAM.

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fujii - If that’s the case, it’s been wrong for 12 1/2 years or longer if you include construction time.

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Falling Leaf - Don't worry, CASA will just construct a 'safety case' and issue a waiver as everyone know's that the horse has well and truly bolted on this one.

Money talks - and the greed, back slapping and dodgy deals that allowed an aerodrome to be converted into a commercial retail district would make a great article.

Now today I note that thunderbird five has put up a very interesting link for the 20 November 2017 RAPAC Victoria meeting minutes: https://www.casa.gov.au/files/vic171120pdf

3.2 Essendon Runway 26 Runway Strip Width


The Convenor introduced the paper (attached) and advised that CASA had now responded in writing. The summary of CASA’s response is as follows:

 - The 180m strip width was consistent with the aerodrome standards that applied at the time when Essendon became a domestic airport following the opening of Melbourne (Tullamarine) Airport (circa early 1970s).
- It was also consistent with the Manual of Standards for Part 139 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (MOS Part 139) until November 2014, subject to landing minima adjustments.
- A landing minimum penalty applies on the Runway 26 instrument landing system procedures.
- Accordingly, based on the 180m wide runway strip and associated OLS in 2004, the DFO complex did not infringe the OLS.
- The November 2014 version of MOS Part 139 removed the provision for a lesser strip widths to be provided subject to landing minima adjustments.
- Subsequently, the strip width for RWY 08/26 was published with a 300m strip width which resulted in established buildings infringing the OLS.
- After considering a safety case submitted by the airport operator, CASA determined that the risk to aviation safety would be acceptable subject to mitigations including appropriate obstacle lighting and publication in AIP.
- An appropriate legal instrument was issued by CASA in 2015.
- These established buildings are now obstacle lit with low intensity steady red lights and AIPERSA publishes the presence of these buildings.

Some members remained concerned that information published about the runway strip width was not accurate given that there were obstacles within the strip. The Chair advised that based on the information reviewed by CASA, the developments around the runway were compliant with all relevant regulations at the time they were approved and constructed.

The Chair undertook to investigate the concerns raised by members and provide additional detail out of session.
  

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And for reference here is the YMEN ERSA link (refer pg 3):  https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip...v-2017.pdf

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PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
08/26 077 63a PCN 25 /F /C /1400 (203PSI) /T Grooved WID 45 RWS 300
17/35 166 49a PCN 29 /R /C /1400 (203PSI) /T WID 45 RWS 150
Braking SFC friction variable due no grooving on concrete SFC BTN TWY H and RWY 08 THR.

TICK TOCK Barnaby! -

MTF...P2