[ventus45]

http://imos.org.au/fileadmin/user_upload...ratchi.pdf

Figure 5 suggests that at the two year mark (ie NOW) we should be searching for debis along the coast of Australia, ie, the RED AREAS, ie, Central WA, Southern WA, SA, Vic and TAS.

So why has the ATSB and government said nothing ?

Figure_5.PNG Size: 291.2 KB  Downloads: 334

[Peetwo]

MH370: Proper AAI vs criminal negligence.
 

A Very Newbie Contribution
As someone who has closely followed efforts to find MH370 from the beginning, it is annoying to read that Martin Dolan continues to blow off his and ATSB’s collective negligence in a horribly botched search for the plane and its victims.

To be clear, no one knows where the plane is: I don’t know where it is; Martin Dolan doesn’t know where it is; the Pope doesn’t know where it is; PAIN doesn’t know where it is. But I know that a random kid working his first job at a fast-food drive-up window would have made consistently better decisions than Martin Dolan made. And on top of it, Dolan has the chutzpah to suggest he has a “diminishing level of confidence”. Such a pretentious shrug of the shoulders!

In a fair world Martin Dolan would be criminally charged for letting the same thing happen in MH370 that happened in Pel-Air. Did he learn anything at all from the Pel-Air fiasco? Yes! He learned how to be even more vague, evasive, and unaccountable. On a visceral level, Martin Dolan is offensive: 1) he deliberately hired a company that intended to use cheap, outdated, nearly blind sidescan sonar towfish; 2) he deliberately ignored SAR applicants with proven track records in the Air France Flight 447 recovery (because he preferred to save a few bucks); and, worst of all 3) after all ‘Ts’ were crossed and contracts signed, Martin Dolan never looked back; never considered that his strategy halfway to Penguin Land was hopelessly flawed. Instead, he pulled strings to have CSIRO and other Australia General Fund “troughers” contribute ridiculous assessments of the “correctness” of his poorly informed decisions...

The above quote off Mike Chillit's 1st AP post, poses an interesting question and a question that does not only hang over the soon to be former ATSB Chief Commissioner Martin Dolan.

The following article is by Christine Negroni (courtesy of Forbes) and relates once again to the many holes in the factual information and commentary provided by the Malaysians (the Malaysian induced MH370 information vacuum):

ID'ing Of New MH 370 Debris Is Meaningless -- Here's The Evidence Malaysian Authorities Should Release




Christine Negroni,  
Contributor

I write about the business of aviation and travel.

Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

I am an aviation and travel journalist whose work appears in The New York Times, Air & Space, Hearst Newspapers and other publications. I am an aviation safety consultant to ABC News and write two popular blogs, Flying Lessons and GoHow. My book, The Crash Detectives, soon to be published by Penguin, examines the disappearance of Malaysia Flight 370 and other aviation mysteries. My first book, Deadly Departure (HarperCollins 2000) was a New York Times Notable Book. I am a member of International Society of Air Safety Investigators.

The author is a Forbes contributor. The opinions expressed are those of the writer.

---

Maybe because it is the easy story, or maybe it is because Malaysian aviation officials are so good about confounding reporters, but the “news” this week that more debris has been identified as coming from Malaysia 370 is a big ho hum, and that’s frustrating for anyone who really cares about what happened two years ago to the flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing.

The world already knows that the airplane with the registration 9M-MRO flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on March 8, 2014, inexplicably went down far off course in the South Indian Ocean about 7 hours after takeoff.

Engineers at Inmarsat were able to determine the general direction of MH 370

This general location was established within a week of the disappearance based on satellite signals sent from the plane. It was confirmed 16 months later when the first debris, a part of the airplane’s wing was found on Reunion Island and confirmed again this week when more recovered wreckage including a piece of Rolls-Royce engine cowling was said to be from the missing jetliner by Malaysia’s Transport Minister Liow Tiong Lai.

The real question that has gone unanswered by Liow or anyone else in Malaysia is what else is new in the investigation?

The missing plane has given the Malaysian aviation authority a jumbo jet sized excuse for making no apparent progress in resolving one of the world’s most curious aviation mysteries. They insist they can’t do anything until the airplane is found, even though there’s evidence in abundance right there in Malaysia. Not everything disappeared with the airplane.

In writing my book The Crash Detectives, which includes my own theory about what happened to Malaysia 370, and which will be published by Penguin in September, I put many questions to officials at the Civil Aviation Bureau and the airline. I never received a reply. They’re not talking.

I am just one one of many who wonder what is being learned from the evidence on the ground. This includes the airplane’s maintenance history and cargo on the flight, whether any communication signals transmitted or received from the hundreds of cell phones on the plane provided any useful information. What has been learned about the curious first loss of power on the airplane which happened early on in the flight and ended sometime around 2:25 a.m. Malaysia time? We know that means the plane experienced a total loss of power and then regained it. Why?

I asked several people who have paid attention to the halting progress in this case, to make their own suggestions about what information the Malaysians should release so that we may get a step or two closer to understanding the mysterious flight of Malaysia 370.

Nearly a year after the first wreckage was discovered, former airline captain and safety consultant John Cox wonders about that flaperon found on Reunion Island. “What did metallurgical analysis of the fracture surfaces show? Could a determination of (its operating) position be made?” he wants to know.

Jeff Wise, a private pilot and freelance writer who proposed an alternative theory and wrote a book about it is also focused on the flaperon. What information is there he asks “about the species and distribution of barnacles, their length (and) results of oxygen isotope analysis?”

These men and several others think there has to be more information than what’s been released from the various radar zones through which the airplane passed before disappearing.

Only a few pieces of MH 370 have been found

“I’m curious that we haven’t seen any greater tracking by Malaysian military radar,” airline pilot and safety specialist, John Gadzinski said. “Assuming they kept recorded tapes of their radar it would have provided a pretty good picture of the event, at least until it travelled out to sea.”

And Victor Iannello a scientist and entrepreneur who has been part of a loose group of MH 370 citizen investigators is doubtful that the Malaysians have been rigorous about the accuracy of the information they used to track the plane across Malaysia.

“There are anomalies surrounding this radar data that need to be explained,” he wrote in an email.

Armchair investigators, experienced outsiders, alternative theorists and book authors, we all have our reasons for wanting to know more. But it is Sarah Bajc and the others who lost loved ones on Flight 370 who have the emotional investment. When asked what she wants the Malaysians to share about their probe, she does not limit her answer.

Radar, background on the flight crew, actions of the air controllers and the airline, cargo, discrepancies in the reports already issued by the authorities are some of the areas she wants information about.

“The list is endless,” she said.

Frustrated family members and members of the international air safety community may find the suggestion of Peter Fiegehen, an Australian air traffic control specialist and former accident investigator, worth considering. He believes the time has come to create an independent team of professional investigators to give the case fresh perspective.

“Considering the complexities, massive expenditure and possibility of group-think, peer or other pressure or false hypothesis,” Fiegehen says, a small team not previously connected to the investigation could be effective.

The silence of the Malaysians leads me to wonder if the officials there really don’t want to know what happened to the plane being operated by the government-owned airline. If the media would stop focusing on non-news as if it was big news that might be another question worth asking

I am not sure how to make it happen (perhaps talk to Al Akbar) but I am strongly in support of the Peter Fiegehen proposal for a fresh team of qualified AAI investigators. The trouble is until such time as the Malaysians complete their so called - IMO bogus - 'Annex 13 MH370 investigation' and publish a final report, such a team is not going to be able to establish any real lines of inquiry due to the restrictions imposed by the annex.

I suppose somewhat reliant on what such a team was able to uncover, through all the Malaysian & Beaker induced murky layers of spin & obfuscation, it could come to a point (much like the PelAir cover-up ) where evidence of deliberate subterfuge of an ICAO annex 13 aviation accident investigation could lead to suspicion of criminal negligence.

I am not sure of the international standpoint (international law) on such a case, perhaps MH17 will explore that before MH370; but it is worth noting that under Australian law there is S24 of the TSI Act (also still actively relevant to PelAir - http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ReOpen.pdf):

Reference - TSI Act.

http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C0...c393713891

24. Offence to hinder etc. an investigation


(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:


(a) the person engages in conduct; and


(b) the person is reckless as to whether the conduct will adversely affect an investigation:


(i) that is being conducted at that time; or


(ii) that could be conducted at a later time into an immediately reportable matter; and


© the conduct has the result of adversely affecting such an investigation (whether or not


the investigation had commenced at the time of the conduct); and


(d) the conduct is not authorised by the Chief Commissioner.


Penalty: Imprisonment for 12 months.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the conduct was necessary:

(a) to ensure the safety of persons, animals or property; or

(b) to remove deceased persons or animals from an accident site; or

© to move a transport vehicle, or the wreckage of a transport vehicle, to a safe place; or

(d) to protect the environment from significant damage or pollution.

Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (2). See

subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply if the conduct was:

a) the withdrawal of the person’s consent to the Chief Commissioner entering premises

under section 34; or

(b) the refusal to give any assistance to the Chief Commissioner (in relation to that entry)

after the withdrawal of that consent.

Note:A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (3). See

subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code.

(4) The Chief Commissioner must not unreasonably withhold an authorisation under

paragraph (1)(d).

(5) In this section:

conduct includes omission.

   
It is worth noting that Martin Dolan (and I can't find the direct reference or dates), not long before the ATSB taking over the MH370 search from AMSA, was reported as being sighted in KL and attending several formal meetings with Malaysian officials in charge of the MH370 investigation? Much like the question with Dolan appearing in French Toulouse at the time of the French BEA flaperon analysis, why the hell would Dolan personally need to meet with the Malaysians? Surely that was the function of the Minister in charge at the diplomatic level & the TSIs at the expert level???


MTF...P2

[ventus45]

Pilot the Hero Theory ?

Over on Jeff Wise  a post by Buyerninety.

buyerninety
Posted June 2, 2016 at 11:44 AM
@Erik

I understand your reasoning in (the incapacitation) scenario you are evaluating – but perhaps try to put yourself more fully in pilot Shah’s shoes.

IGARI to VPG or VAMPI (or just offset from VPG or from VAMPI) – this is understandable as overflight of the Malay/Thai border takes you over a hilly/mountainous region with a proportionally lower density of population (and delivers your aircraft near to an airport in case you fix ‘whatever the problem was’, whilst finally overflying water in case ‘the problem overcame you’.

In THAT case, you may have programmed the autopilot to then direct the aircraft along the Straits and out into Ocean (instead of ‘programming nothing’ after VPL or VAMPI which exposes the risk the autopilot will simply onfly the aircraft past nearby VPG or VAMPI and on to overfly heavily populated Indonesia).

If programming to fly along the Straits from vicinity VPL or VAMPI, wouldn’t you choose next Waypoint to be such that there is no ‘established linking corridor’ from VPL or VAMPI to it i.e. so there’s least likeihood of your aircraft encountering other aircraft. (Or, if next possible waypoints all had established linking corridors, could you easily program a parallel but offset flightpath to the vicinity of the next waypoint?).

Following on with this intention in mind, (although I don’t suggest the intermediate waypoint(s) ), I would suggest that the waypoint at the final turn south, must be a waypoint whereat, if the autopilot onflys from that waypoint (either onwards to another more southerly waypoint or on a definate programmed heading south), there must be thereafter no overflight of land.

Cheers

[P7_TOM]

I am not going to delete the post above. I am not going to delete the post above. I am not going to delete the post above. I am not going to delete the post above. I am not going to delete the post above. I am not going to delete the post above. I am not going to delete the post above. I am not going to delete the post above.

But Fark me, I can’t believe I read it.

[ventus45]

OK, P7, to get back "on track".

SANOB to ZWWW gone horribly wrong ?

An idea that that I have been playing with, (for some time), is the possibility that MH-370 may have been hijacked, with the intention of flying it to ZWWW, ie Urumqi-Diwopu-Airport, in China.
(https://skyvector.com/airport/ZWWW/Urumq...pu-Airport)

Now, if we assume that either ZWWW was not in the database in 9M-MRO, or, more likely, that the hijacker (planner) thought that it might not be, then the obvious thing to do would be to program a "direct to" final waypoint, in the immediate vircinity of the airport, that was simple, easy to remember.  The most obvious candidate is 44N 88E, which puts the aircraft within radio range of two VOR's, FUKANG (116.3 FKG 110) and URUMQI (115.7 URC 104), to navigate to a landing (in the dark at ETA), which puts him, with a left turn to 256 degrees, on a "straight in" 22 mile final to Runway 25.

The great circle track from SANOB (Lat: 6.586111N Lon: 95.669167E) to 44N 88E is only 2,275 nautical miles, which is well within 9M-MRO's fuel remaining range from SANOB, with reserves, and thus this destination is both sensible and realistic from a "planning" perspective.

Now, the theory goes, that a "simple mistake" was made by the hijacker when he input the coordinates for 44N 85E when approaching SANOB.

Instead of punching in 44N88E he accidentely entered 44S88E, IE, he punch in 44 South, instead of the intended 44 North.
Thus, 9M-MRO set off for the SIO.

Now, you would expect that even a hijacker (presumably "basically" trained), would know the difference between heading north and heading south, and would have quickly detected the error. when the aircraft adopted a southerly heading, instead of the expected northerly heading.
Perhaps he did, or perhaps he did not.

Bobby Ulich produced a "multiple turns / holding" analysis for the FMT, that I think could possibly be interpreted as evidence of "confusion on the flight deck".

Now, the theory goes that our hijacker detected that "something is wrong", and tried to sort it out, perhaps multiple times.
But, as is typical of "unskilled operators", perhaps he made the "same error" multiple times, and did not realize it.  
Then, probably now totally confused, and having re-checked "his instructions", he decided "it must be correct", and let the aircraft fly on (south) beleiving "it must be correct".

The great circle track from SANOB to 44 South 88 East is 3,053.5 nautical miles, which is just beyond 9M-MRO's fuel remaining range from SANOB, which is exhausted when crossing the 7th arc, on that great circle track, 6.586111N 95.669167E TO 44S 88E.  The initial True Heading departing SANOB is 184 degrees (magnetic heading 185 degrees).

The track is shown on Richard Cole's chart as the green line extending from 28 South 91.09 East to 40 South 88.90 East.

The 7th arc crossing point is near 37.45 South 89.40 East.




Thoughts anyone ?

[ventus45]

https://mh370apilotperspective.blogspot....6549252878

[Peetwo]

MH370 - 'Counting down the clock'

A Victor Ianello reply post to Brock, off the most recent JW blog, nails down the problems an intelligent, thinking man has with the 'big picture' conundrum when trying to join the dots with MH370...

VictorI
Posted June 10, 2016 at 8:40 AM

@Brock McEwen: I first entertained the spoof scenario when there was no debris found from the plane, and I later considered a plant when there was only one piece (the flaperon). And the behavior of officials concerning the flaperon was bizarre–conflicting leaks, obvious false statements from officials, concealed conclusions, questions about provenance, buoyancy, barnacles, etc. Months later came the extraordinary find of Mr. Blaine Gibson, who was even personally offended when I asked questions about the circumstances of the find and the condition of the part. (In my mind, these were basic questions that any investigator would be asking, especially if there was any chance that there was tampering. As a lawyer, he should have understood this.)

I am now swayed towards believing that the pilot had a plan to divert the plane to the SIO. I based this on many things, including Richard Godfrey’s drift analysis, the large number of recent debris finds, a review of FBI leaks regarding flight paths found on the simulator, Blaine Gibson’s demonstration that there is a high probability of finding debris at “hot spots”, Ed Baker’s perspective as a pilot, and flight path possibilities that satisfy the BTO/BFO data, albeit not with the same assumptions that led to the current search area.

I cannot completely dismiss the possibility of very clever fabrication and tampering of evidence, and I regularly communicate with people that believe this scenario is most likely. I just don’t think this is as simple as other possibilities. I am always willing to reconsider it if we are presented with new evidence or a new interpretation.

Part of the problem is that Malaysia has not made any official statements regarding any clues from its criminal investigation. Perhaps they uncovered evidence which incriminated the pilot or MAS, and for political and/or financial reasons, chose to keep the information sealed.

 
The last bit in bold goes back to what I believe is the major roadblock, that is the deliberately manufactured information & disinformation vacuums. In bureaucratic speak it is called obfuscation rule 101 - 'wind down the clock'.  

With a couple of minor exceptions, to date this strategy has worked particularly well and besides the loyal MH370 followers on social media, the MSM and 'Joe Public' are losing interest in droves. The only re-ignition of interest comes from the now constant stream of further inconvenient discoveries of MH370 debris.

I think the Malaysians now desperately want the SIO search to be completed (preferably yesterday), so they can complete their obligations and publish the JIT ICAO Annex 13 Final Report. So the delays like bad weather in the SIO and further debris discoveries that need analysis and hence more time, would be extremely vexing to the Malaysians. 

A couple of indicators to my theory (above). If the Malaysians/ATSB's intentions were to exhaust all resources to finding MH370 in the SIO then...

Why didn't the ATSB direct the search vessels to the North while bobbing up & down for nearly a month burning diesel in un-scannable seas? This would seem to directly conflict with the recent Dolan statement...#350

 "If we don't find it in that area then it's in an adjacent area that we will find the aircraft, it's just that the adjacent area is large," Mr Dolan said.  

How hard would it have been to steam up the arc to calmer seas and scan some areas that now come into the frame due to debris findings leading to better defined drift analysis?


Rewind to 24 March 2016: 

KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia said on Thursday that a coastal search needs to be conducted around South Africa and Mozambique for potential debris from missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.

A piece of debris was found along the southern coast of South Africa on March 11, while another one was found off the coast of Mozambique this month.

"There is a need for us to search the South African coast to find more debris. Malaysia is sending a team there and we are currently awaiting approval from the South African authorities," said Malaysian Transport Minister Liow Tiong Lai on Thursday.

"The coastal search will be by a Malaysian team and focused around South Africa and Mozambique."

Liow, however, said the location for underwater search need not be changed.

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia...32752.html

So did this happen and if so is it still ongoing? If 'no' & 'no' then again the Malaysians are being deceptive and merely going through the motions -
MTF...P2

[ventus45]

Geek Alert !

A little video, (142 Mb file - 47 minutes)

https://ia800201.us.archive.org/11/items..._World.mp4
(Aviation relevance - Coms/Acars/Inmarsat/MH370 - fast forward to 10 minutes - (20 minutes) - through to the 30 minute mark)

For reference: A pdf file of his presentation is here. (47 Mb file).
http://spench.net/drupal/files/Balint_Se...n_2016.pdf

Thought provoking - no ?


And then,  a little "light" reading - to fill those idle times between debris discoveries, and Beaker Bollocks Bloopers.

https://ia601309.us.archive.org/0/items/...System.pdf

https://www.buesch.com/uploads/media/en_...070820.pdf

https://ia802600.us.archive.org/21/items...00faso.pdf

https://ia800300.us.archive.org/13/items...014856.pdf

https://ia800504.us.archive.org/11/items...007921.pdf

https://ia801309.us.archive.org/30/items...010672.pdf

[ventus45]

airlandseaman

Going back to the Inmarsat log, and your post #137.

Q1.  Why do you think the Malaysians were so careful to only release a "redacted set" of "one-way" communications from the AIRCRAFT TO THE GROUND STATION (i.e. AES to the GES) in the first place ?

Q2.  Why do you think they "SPECIFICALLY DID NOT" include the first two lines, which were later added in the "update" - after everyone "screamed for them" ?

Q3.  What do you think they were (or might have been, or still may be) trying to hide ?

Q4.  Do you think that there are actually (or may be) "more" AES to GES transmissions that "have not been published", and if so, what clues or thoughts do you have, that might lead you to surmise, that they may exist (if you do have thoughts along those or similar lines) ?

Q5.  In your opinion, given that we only have a "partial set" of "one-way" logs, (AES to GES) would (or could) the "complete" set, including the other half of the communications (i.e. from GES to AES), (so that we would then (supposedly) have the full "two-way" log) help with nailing down the system timeing (for which we NEED the "P" channel data).

Q6.  Why do you think they refused to release the P channel data ?

Q7.  Would having the P channel data assist your analysis at all ?

Q8.  Specifically, would having the P channel data assist your analysis of system latency timings etc, specifically, would it help nailing down the "bias" issue between the different channels (R & T) (given that the bias is integral to calculating the positions of the arcs) ?

Q9.  For the "handshake pings", and the 00:19's in particular, would the complete set of "two-way" communications help at all ?

[Peetwo]

Latest on the MH370 DOI series.

"V" not sure if you have received a response from airlandseaman or other IG members but I note this AM that Ianello has released another paper on the Duncan Steel website, that will (I fear) cause much scorn & derision from several other devoted MH370 follower camps...   

Possible Flight Path for MH370 Ending North of the Current Search Zone

Victor Iannello, ScD,
June 25, 2016

 

(See also the addendum at the end of this post.)

Introduction
The underwater search for debris from MH370 has been unsuccessful so far. The current search zone in the Southern Indian Ocean (SIO) consists of a total of 120,000 square kilometers of seabed, of which 105,000 square kilometers (88%) have been searched to date. There have been no announcements from Malaysian, Australian, or Chinese officials indicating that the search will continue after the scanning of the current search area is completed.
The definition of the current search zone, shown in Figure 1, is based on reconstructed flight paths that are derived from available radar data combined with an analytical interpretation of satellite communications data. In December 2015, a comprehensive study of reconstructed flight paths was completed by Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) [1]. The satellite data suggest that the aircraft continued to fly for nearly six hours after the last radar capture. As the satellite data are insufficient to determine the precise flight path of MH370, other constraints are imposed on possible flight paths that result in the definition of a more manageable search area. These constraints relate to performance of the B777-200ER aircraft as well as pilot inputs to flight controls. The ability to accurately define the search area is therefore limited by the accuracy of these constraints, and in particular, the accuracy of assumptions related to how the aircraft was flown by the pilots, including whether or not there were pilot inputs during the final hours of the flight.
In the past year, debris from MH370 that has drifted west across the Indian Ocean has been recovered from the shores of La Reunion, Mozambique, South Africa, Mauritius, and possibly Tanzania. Godfrey [2] and others have investigated the drift patterns of floating debris from various possible crash sites, and conclude that the crash site might have occurred outside and to the northeast of the current search zone shown in Figure 1. This could explain why no debris on the seabed has yet been found in the current search zone.
In this paper, we re-visit some of the assumptions that were used to define the current search zone and propose a possible flight path that ends northeast of the current search zone and is consistent with drift studies performed by Godfrey [2].
 
Definition of Current Search Zone 
After the last primary radar capture of MH370 at 18:22 UTC, the only data we have to reconstruct the flight path are the satellite data “pings”. The log-on sequences at 18:25 and 00:19 along with the handshakes at 19:41, 20:41, 21:41, 22:41, and 00:11 provide Burst Timing Offset (BTO) data and Burst Frequency Offset (BFO) data, while the failed telephone calls at 18:40 and 23:14 provide us with only BFO data.
We can use the BTO data to determine the distance between the aircraft and Inmarsat’s I3F1 satellite, which relayed two-way communications between the ground earth station (GES) in Perth, Australia, and the aircraft. This information can in turn be used to determine a “ping arc” of possible positions of the aircraft for each BTO data point. The BFO data, on the other hand, can be used to determine the approximate direction of the aircraft to discriminate, for example, between northerly and southerly trajectories. The details of these calculations have been presented elsewhere, such as Ashton et al. [3]. The last BTO value at 00:19 provides us with the best-estimate of possible locations for the crash, and this ping arc is known as the “7th arc” because it is the seventh BTO burst in the sequence of bursts starting at 18:25.
In addition to the speed and track, the value of the BFO is strongly influenced by the vertical speed of the aircraft, i.e., a climb and a northerly velocity for the aircraft both influence the BFO in a positive sense. If the vertical speed is not known, it becomes difficult to use the BFO to determine the direction of the aircraft. For instance, a particular value of BFO may indicate a trajectory to the south and level flight, or a trajectory to the north and descending flight. This ambiguity is removed if the flight is known to be level, for instance, at a particular time.
In an attempt to help define the search area, a detailed analysis of possible reconstructed flight paths was performed by the DSTG [1] using probabilistic methods. By assuming that random manoeuvers which change the speed and direction of the aircraft occur at randomly distributed intervals, and using previous commercial flight data to calibrate the stochastic model, a distribution of possible end points in the SIO was generated. Using the BFO data at 18:28 and 18:40, and assuming level flight, the DSTG analysis predicts that a turn to the south occurred at some time between 18:28 and 18:40. The probability distribution of the location of MH370 from this analysis is shown in Figure 1, which shows the highest probability at a position on the 7th arc near 38S latitude.

Figure 1. Probability distribution for location of MH370
from DSTG study [1].

Unfortunately, the search for debris on the seabed in the area defined by the DSTG analysis has been unsuccessful to date. Additionally, the timing and location of recovered debris from MH370 that has drifted across the Indian Ocean and landed in La Reunion, Mozambique, Mauritius, and South Africa suggest that MH370 might have crashed to the north of the current search area. For instance, Godfrey [2] performed drift studies of recently recovered debris which suggest a location along the 7th arc that is near 30S latitude. The failure to find the debris in the current search area combined with results from the drift studies provides a motivation to revisit the assumptions that were used in reconstructing possible flight paths.
Here, a possible flight path is proposed that terminates to the north of the current search area. The main differences in assumptions between the DSTG study and the present work are:

1. In the DSTG study, the aircraft was assumed to be flying nearly level at 18:40 and on a southerly course. In the current study, the aircraft was assumed to be descending at 18:40 and following a northerly course until about 18:58. The later turn to the south produces an end point to the north of the current search area.
   
2. At some time before 19:41, the aircraft began traveling along a path of constant magnetic heading and was slowly descending.
   
3. There were no pilot inputs after 19:41, i.e., the aircraft was on a path of constant magnetic heading, scheduled speed, and constant (negative) vertical speed.
   

 
Methodology to Reconstruct Flight Paths
The methodology to reconstruct the flight paths is similar to what has been presented by others, including the published work of Ashton et al. [3]. A BTO value defines an arc on the surface of the earth, and paths can be reconstructed that cross these arcs at the appropriate time by matching the satellite-aircraft range. (The exact position of the arc depends on the altitude of the aircraft. At higher altitudes, the arc is located further from the subsatellite position.) The paths were reconstructed by forward integrating in time and matching within a tolerance of 10 km the satellite-aircraft range at handshake times as derived from the BTO values and the satellite position. The model includes an accurate parameterization of the satellite position and velocity, meteorological data, and the earth’s ellipsoid geometry. The satellite position and velocity vectors are estimated using the PAR5 parameterization of Rydberg [4], which agrees well with the position and velocity vectors presented by Ashton [3]. The earth is modeled as an oblate spheroid using WGS84.
Meteorological data were included in the analysis in order to properly model the effect of temperature and wind on speed and direction. The meteorological data for March 8, 2014 at 00:00 UTC were extracted from the GDAS database by Barry Martin [5], where data are available with an altitude pressure resolution of 50 hPa and a surface resolution of 1 deg in latitude and longitude.
After flight paths were reconstructed using the BTO data, the predicted values of BFO were compared to the measured values to ensure that match was within an acceptable tolerance of 20 Hz.
 

Figure 2. Flight path ending north of the current search zone.

 
Possible Flight Path Ending North of the Current Search Zone
The particular flight path of interest is the solid line shown in Figure 2. After the last radar capture at 18:22, we assume the aircraft continued to fly northwest, roughly following airway N571 to waypoint LAGOG, which it reached around 18:58. (The BTO and BFO data sequence between 18:25 and 18:28 suggest there might have been a small, lateral, side-step manoeuver to the right, but this does not change the end point location in a significant way and will therefore not be discussed here.) At waypoint LAGOG, the aircraft turned southeast towards waypoint BEDAX. Upon reaching BEDAX at around 19:25, the aircraft turned towards a heading of 180° magnetic, and continued on this heading for the remainder of the flight.
If the aircraft flew a track in which its path after BEDAX was always exactly in the direction of 180° magnetic, it would follow the path shown as a dotted line in Figure 2. The reason why this path deviates from the path of constant heading (solid line) is because of the prevailing wind pattern, which was blowing towards the west for positions to the north of about 22S latitude and blowing towards the east for positions to the south of 22S latitude.
As the dotted line in Figure 2 shows, the track of constant magnetic direction curves to the east at lower latitudes. This is due to the increasing deviation along the path between the magnetic north pole and the true north pole. This deviation is known as magnetic declination. The consequence of this curving is that constraining the aircraft to cross the ping arcs at the appropriate times requires that the ground speed of the aircraft reduces as the aircraft travels south.
The possibility that the aircraft’s speed continuously changed along the path was not considered in the DSTG study [1]. Here we consider the possibility that at a time near 19:41, the aircraft was at an altitude of around 38,800 ft and on autopilot with the following settings:

• Roll mode: Heading Hold at 180° magnetic
  
• Thrust mode: Speed at M0.84 followed by 310 KIAS after descending past the cross-over altitude of 31,560 ft
  
• Pitch mode: Vertical Speed of -100 fpm (descending)
  

The descent rate of -100 fpm is the smallest rate of descent that is possible by setting a vertical speed. At this rate of descent, if fuel exhaustion had not occurred, the plane would have descended into the sea on March 8 at about 02:08 UTC, or a little under two hours after the estimated time of fuel exhaustion of 00:15. At 00:19, the aircraft is predicted to be in a steep descent of -4560 fpm.
Values for selected flight parameters is included in the following table:

Table 1. Flight parameters at selected points along path.

 
Conclusions
The present work revisits some of the assumptions used to reconstruct possible flight paths for MH370. In particular, by assuming the aircraft at 18:40 was traveling to the northwest and descending, a later turn to the south is predicted, resulting in an end point further to the northeast than the current search zone. By assuming the aircraft after 19:41 was on autopilot and in a constant state of slow descent, following a path of constant magnetic heading of 180°, a curved path was reconstructed that matches the satellite data and crosses the 7th arc near 31.5S latitude. This end point is consistent with drift studies that predict a possible crash point along the 7th arc at around 30S latitude, and should be considered for further investigation.
 
Acknowledgement
The author is grateful for comments and corrections provided by fellow Independent Group members: Brian Anderson, Duncan Steel, and Richard Godfrey.
 
References
[1] Davey, S., et al., “Bayesian Methods in the Search for MH370”, Defence Science and Technology Group, November 30, 2015, https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5733804/Ba...ec2015.pdf .
[2] Godfrey, R., “What the Nine Debris Finds May Tell Us about the MH370 End Point”, June 2, 2016, http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2652 .
[3] Ashton, C., et al., “The Search for MH370”, Journal of Navigation, October 7, 2014, http://journals.cambridge.org/download.p...894cced959 .
[4] Rydberg, H., http://bitmath.org/mh370/satellite-par5-ecef.txt.gz
[5] Martin, B., http://www.aqqa.org/MH370/models/NCEP/GD...800f00.txt
 
Addendum regarding the large debris item found in Tanzania:
A discussion of the photographic evidence for this being a part of the right outboard flap from a B777 has been conducted by Mike Exner and Don Thompson; it is available here. 

And via Planetalking:

Australia urged to change MH370 search zone by independent expert review
As more pieces of MH370 are found, the more the apparent failure of the sea floor search adds to pressure for a review


Ben Sandilands


It’s definitely from a large jet, but was it a 767, an A310 or a 777?

A very detailed review by the Independent Group of scientists has urged the Australian managed search for MH370 to shift its efforts much further to the north-east of the current priority zone on the floor of the south Indian Ocean.

The IG paper by Victor Iannello has been published online in the group’s archive on Duncan Steel’s site.

The Iannello paper comes as winter sea conditions have seriously delayed completion of the search of the current zone.

However after that zone has been declared fully sonar scanned Malaysia, China and Australia have long jointly agreed to abandon their efforts to find the sunk wreckage of the Malaysia Airlines 777-200ER which was carrying 239 people when it abruptly vanished over the Gulf of Thailand on its way from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on March 8, 2014.

The only reason for continuing the search into new territory would be a credible new lead. Victor Iannello’s paper may well provide such a lead.

Its publication coincides with Malaysia deciding it will examine what may be the largest chunk of the wreckage from MH370 yet to come to light which has been found on Pemba Island in Tanzania.

The provenance of what looks like a substantial piece of the wing of the missing 777 has not as yet been established from the photos, published on Tanzania’s Jamii Forums last week, and it has been found in an area where it may also have come from earlier crashes of a hijacked Boeing 767 and an Airbus A310.

Malaysia has however declared, without making its own physical examination, that items of clothing and luggage collected from the shores of Madagascar are not from MH370. None of the recovered items have been closely examined by the next of kin of the victims of the crash.

The ATSB has been contacted for a response to the latest IG paper.

1. OK - Tin hat donned - check
   
2. Tin foil anorak donned - check
   

Let the MH370 mud-slinging games begin...



MTF...err maybe? - P2

[ventus45]

Good morning (for me !)  P2.

Re a reply to my questions at #189, no, not yet, too soon to be fair.  

Mike, the IG, and others on JeffWiseNet have been very busy with the Tanzanian deris, which they have now positively determined to be the inboard section of the starboard outboard  flap, and a damn fine bit of very diligent work they have done too, and so quickly.

As for Victor's paper, to me, it is a ghost flight scenario, to support the case, for the search to move north on the arc, to where (some of) the drift models (and IG drift modelling) suggest.  

The trouble I have with that, is that there many drift models, and many conflicting opinions, not to mention the whole idea of a ghost flight to begin with.

I am sticking with my deliberate ditch theory.

That flap debris is the best evidence for it so far.

[ventus45]

For those who still believe in "the ghost flight" scenario, (and I still don't mind you), this new flap debris, and Victor's paper, has given me "a new thought", to "possibly" support the "ghost flight" idea.

I don't really believe it, but consider this, "what if".

If the "objective" was to minimize debris, then the obvious "end game" requirement for the "impact with the sea" would be:
(a) Minimum forward speed.
(b) Minimum vertical speed.
© Slight pitch up, say between 5 and 8 degree nose up.

Now, the only way to achieve all three un-piloted, would be to set the following conditions, some time after the final turn south:
(1) Descend to the highest altitude where you could actually set flap 20 and speed 120 knots IAS.
(2) Set Flap 20 (NOTE: NOT FULL LANDING FLAP)
(3) Set Speed 120 knots IAS (which is probably around 200 kn TAS / GS (ignore winds for the moment) at "the altitude", but reduces in TAS / GS terms during further descent, and becomes 120 kn IAS / TAS / GS at sea level).
(4) Set Minimum VS = -100 ft/min ROD.

Reasons:
(1) For the "softest possible" landing, the aircraft has to be configured for "best L/D "in ground effect" (you guys might remember some remarks I made about "hanger landings" some time ago).
(2) As far as I can determine from performance data on the net, for a 777 at light weight (fuel not yet exhausted), that would be flap 20, at about 120 KIAS, with about 5 or 6 degrees nose up.
(3) This would give an effective "fly it on" L/D of around 120 to one, just slightly nose up, which is perfect for a "belly landing" or "alighting" i.e. in this case, a "ditching".

So, let's suppose, that at some time after the final turn, say when well away from Sumatra, say around 19:41z, he terminates the high altitude cruise, and descends to say FL260, and "configures" as above.

He has that done by 20:00z, and "checks out" as it were.

So now the aircraft is "on its own".
All we have to do now, is determine the most plausible "start point" for the "ghost flight" from 20:00z.

For the sake of argument, let's say, that at 20:00z, he is on the Equator at 95 East, at FL260, with Flap 20, IAS 120 kn, heading 180 M.
Why select 180M ?  See below.

Now, we have to work out Where he will he be at 00:19z.

Doing the "vertical first".
20:00z to 00:19z = 4hrs 19 minutes = 259 minutes.
VS = -100 fpm = loss of altitude of 25.900 feet (so that is why we start at FL 260).
Descent is "to the surface" precisely "on time".
Check, good so far.

Now it gets complicated.  

The number crunchers are invited step up to the plate, at this time.

Jumping "ahead" to the "ditch", to answer the "Why select 180 M".

Besides the fact that 180 takes him to "nowhere in particular", other than "out into the middle of nowhere", in the "end game", the advantage of using 180 M is as follows.

Depending on "just where" the aircraft ends up, it would still be on a heading of 180 M, which would most likely be around 150-160 True.

Since the "wave axis" in the IO is most likely to be around  340-160, and since it is it is most important that the aircraft "alight" as it were, "as parallel to the swell as possible", selecting 180 M would give a close approximation those "alignment" conditions, for a successful "ditching".

Now, the aircraft could come down on the crest, or in the trough, or "on a slope" either on the "front side" of a wave, or the "rear side" of the wave.

If on a crest, or in a trough, (given the long wavelengths of the swell) would be perfect, almost "Sully like".

But, the available "evidence", of the right flaperon, and the inboard section of the right outboard flap, and all the other "starboard side pieces" suggests, (to me) a ditch on the "front side of a swell", with the right wing "digging in" first. Thus the aircraft would "yaw right", and the forward fuselage would slam into the wave, fracturing it at the door R1 frame, thus releasing that "hosties table piece".

It all fits.

Tin hat on, and furiously digging foxhole !!


Edit:
(I put this up on JeffWise.net)



Got a reply:-


INCOMING:  

[P7_TOM]

OK, who upset Chillit?  Fess up, you know you want to.  Mike has worked tirelessly to solve ‘the riddle’ and been steadfast in his belief that the search is too far South.  Today the IG seems to be confirming his view – not that I’d know what’s correct or who has the right of it.  Anyway Mike, if you are reading, we’ll keep your spot warm and the beers cool.

[Peetwo]

  : "V"...

"...Tin hat on, and furiously digging foxhole !!..."

Hey Ventus I'd suggest you ease up on the Kool-aid but then again your 'ghost' theory is no worse and in some cases more credible than most out there. However even the self-appointed auditor of the ATSB SIO search & fellow MH370 truth-seeker, Brock McEwan seems to think you've gone a bridge too far this time (see above).

My questions on this latest contribution from the IG is how come it has taken this long for them to come to this conclusion; & was it the Tanzanian flap discovery the 'straw that broke the Camel's back' - so to speak?

In light of Victor's analysis it is worth reflecting on this post from the DOI series... : The DOI (debris of inconvenience) - Part II


Especially from about here:

From Mike Chillit blog - Australia’s Drift Model

...It is only necessary to examine real-time wind and current visualizations to realize that CSIRO’s drift model has problems. A relatively new entity uses the “nullschool dot net” domain and gets its data from NASA’s GEOS-5; the data is classified as experimental, but it tends to be very consistent with traditional visualizations. So let’s take a look at 60-second clip for the southern Indian Ocean. Perhaps this is what CSIRO used as its source:

 

It’s easy to see that the “current” shown in this high-tech model using data from March 25, 2016 moves from the search area southwest of Perth to the Madagascar and Mascarene Island areas. But wait! Something’s wrong with that. It has already been shown that drift does not move from the search area to the northwest. It can’t.

I used a little slight-of-hand with the clip above. It was important to show how nature works in that part of the world. What is depicted in the video clip above is wind current, not ocean water current. So let’s see what happens when we use ocean water current in another visualization.

Much different outcome. These two clips are both correct: one shows wind, the other water. It is what really happens out there. Wind currents frequently move from the southeast to the northwest in the southern Indian Ocean. But ocean currents behave much differently. Most debris flows from the area between Java and Exmouth, Australia (inflow from Timor Sea) to the west or northwest; debris south of Exmouth will slowly drift in circles, eventually being pulled into the circumpolar current that flows west-to-east south of the Australian continent. Debris in the mid-latitude areas between Java and Exmouth invariably drifts toward Madagascar and the Mascarene Islands. But debris in the search area cannot do that because it cannot escape endless eddies west of Australia caused by the Coriolis effect.

But, when debris turned up in the Mozambique Channel in February, and similar debris was then reported dating back to December 2015, CSIRO decided it had to rethink its position. That’s when it came up with this model that does exactly what Geomar did 9 months earlier. But neither CSIRO nor ATSB nor the Australian Prime Minister’s office acknowledged they suddenly realized they were searching the wrong part of the Indian Ocean. In fact, they still insist they are in the right location.


It is fairly clear at this point that Australia will do whatever Australia decides to do. It will not be reasoned with or cajoled into making changes that put the search where Australia doesn’t want it to be.

So, it doesn’t really matter what is or what is likely to be. The search will go on in a part of the Indian Ocean that cannot possibly be hiding a passenger plane.

Nevertheless, there is encouraging recent news. Malaysia has independently indicated that it intends to mount a search for surface debris through the Mozambique Channel and perhaps south of there along the South African coast. That may be the single most important decision since we learned the Reunion Island flaperon definitely came from MH370. So now we wait for Malaysia to lead the search in a more fruitful direction; perhaps with assistance from China.

 
Despite the Chillit comment,..

"..But I have the distinct impression David and his work have been heavily influenced by the internal national politics of this search: possibly by the Abbott administration early on, but certainly now by the Turnbull administration. Mr. Turnbull seems determined to prove ATSB has been right about something all along, even if it has been mostly wrong about everything..."


..I would argue this 'passing strange' disparity with popular opinion & empirical evidence is nothing new for the Infrastructure & Transport Ministry and it's agencies.
You only need look at the Civil Aviation Act regulatory reform program, where the bureaucracy has been lording the 'mystique of aviation safety' over governments (of both persuasions) and industry for 30+ years and at a cost of $300 + million (& counting) for little to no benefit, except possibly the decimation of a vital industry..
 
..It could be that the Turnbull government and it's agencies are privy to some vital cog of information that reinforces their belief that the ATSB SIO search priority area, is indeed correct; or it could be that they are passed the PNR, where to withdraw now is no longer an acceptable alternative - who knows? Still it will be fascinating to see how the government directs the narrative and extricates itself between now and the SIO search conclusion...

{Note: That post was dated the 27 March 2016 }


Now consider this blog post by Mike Chillit, again note the date:

Triangulating MH370

Posted on May 3, 2016 by Mike Chillit — 12 Comments ↓

Note the last comment:

[/url]Mike Chillit on [url=http://www.seventharc.net/2016/05/03/triangulating-mh370/#comment-78]May 6, 2016 at 4:47 pm said:FWIW, I have checked the accuracy of the BTO values for areas where we have independent GPS coordinates. Such areas include KLIA and elsewhere. I’m happy to say, those particular pings are accurate to within a couple dozen kilometers. Close enough for me.

In addition to that, I have mathematically shown how easy it is to fabricate BTO values IF we are not permitted to examine the source record. Inmarsat, as you may know, has not permitted the digital record to be examined by others. So, if there was any criminal or mischievous intent on Inmarsat’s part, it would have been very easy to provide BTO values that place the plane wherever “they” want it to be “on paper”. I published all of that via Twitter more than a year ago. It remains valid and accurate.

Having said that, I do not currently have evidence BTO is inaccurate, other than the fact that it is not a precise metric to begin with. But no one who has worked on this so far has had illusions about perfect accuracy other than some of the early contributors to Jeff Wise’s blog who infamously claimed they knew where the plane was to within 5 nmi. That is the very same area that has been searched thoroughly now and does not now nor has it ever harbored anything remotely resembling a Boeing 777. But he, and a few others, were just Peacocks from the very beginning.
More interested in getting personal attention than in making a contribution to the search effort.

We are all aware that the earth hasn’t been flat since the Church got out of the astronomy business. Nevertheless, our calculations are not wildly inaccurate. They can be confirmed with GPS to within a very narrow range. The margin of error is not large.

I’ll finish here, and ask if you know I published an updated “triangulation” article yesterday? Here is a direct link to it on this blog: http://www.seventharc.net/2016/05/05/ref...ngulation/
Cheers. Welcome

Still in the trenches with my Tin Hat donned...MTF - P2 

Ps Those QON aside, I do so hope that the latest from the IG does prompt one or all of the 'Tri-parties' to reassess their thinking on a) the termination of MH370 SIO search and; b) their currently defined priority IO search area - yep I know wishful thinking.

[ventus45]

Waypoint OLPUS has been mentioned on JeffWise.net

It is possible that OLPUS was in 9M-MRO’s FMS, since it is on the route between PERTH and JOHANNESBURG, which I think used to be a MAS route ?

It is also interesting to note that the route passes between Amsterdam Island and Isle Saint Paul.

Had Z flown that route in the past ?

From UPROB to OLPUS ?

( steady P2 ! )

[Brock McEwen]

MH370 aggregate drift study (including Tanzania):

https://twitter.com/Brock_McEwen/status/...6753460224

Current search box strongly counter-indicated.

[Peetwo]

MH370 aggregate drift study (including Tanzania):

https://twitter.com/Brock_McEwen/status/...6753460224

Current search box strongly counter-indicated.

P2 - Excellent stuff Brock, thank you for that...

MH370 Aggregate Debris Drift Analysis w Tanzania final



&.. 

[ventus45]

Excellent work Brock.

It is becoming increasingly obvious, that the 7th Arc search, is "the search that never was".

It is time to seriously doubt the provenance of the Isat data.

So why does the retiring Chief Commissioner of the ATSB, Martin Dolan say that the 7th Arc search must be expanded ?

[ventus45]

If we continue to trust the Isat data, at least the BTO's and the 7th Arc in general (but disregarding  the current understanding of the BFO's) we still have to accept the fact that it did not take a northern route, and did in fact go south to the SIO.

That said, everything post IGARI is up for discussion.  The Malaysian radar and the Malacca Strait information can not be accepted as fact, for too many reasons to list.

But, if we accept the Isat BTO's, then obviously the aircraft had to fly west, fast enough to reach the 18:25 / 18:40 arcs.

There are multiple ways the aircraft could have got from IGARI to the 18:25 / 18:40 arcs.  Performance limits for the aircraft set both northern and southern limits on those arcs.

The "accepted" theory, is within the "northern limit" and is:
Igari - Penang - Mekar and onwards north-west to the FMT.

I do not accept that theory for many reasons, as previously explained in this thread.

My theory is, pretty close to the "southern limit" and is:
Igari - Penang - Gotla - Medan VOR - Merim and onwards south-west towards Uprob, to a position 60 nautical miles short of Uprob.

The aircraft flew out of the radar coverage of the TNI's Sibolga PSR, and then, whilst maintaining heading towards Uprob (237.5 degrees true), initiated a fairly rapid descent to ensure dropping below the radar horizon.

Whilst on descent, passing FL300, it then commenced the FMT, to head south. The aircraft would have remained at or below FL300 probably until reaching the Equator, where it would have climbed to obtain optimum LRC conditions for onward cruise.



And here are the relevant times (for OceanKoto).

[ventus45]

Is Paul Smithson correct ?

I posted Paul's theory in post #130.
http://auntypru.com/forum/-MH370-time-to...24#pid3424

Paul's theory in essence
After an in-flight emergency at 17:21 UTC Captain Zaharie and his crew were trying to get the plane home.
Webpage: http://www.findmh370.com/
Download a PDF of Paul Smithson's full MH370 report (70 pages, 16Mb file).
http://www.findmh370.com/Head_for_Home_2_Feb_2016.pdf

Was MH370 really "HEADING FOR HOME" ?

IT PROBABLY WAS !

Is it possible, that the MH-370 disaster may have been a tragic re-run of the American Airlines Flight 965 Cali Disaster of the 20th December 1995 ?

I think there is a possibility that it may be, for the same reason, "WAYPOINT CONFUSION".

In the case of AA965, it was the erronius selection of ROMEO instead of ROZO.

In the case of MH370, it may have been the erronious selection of UPROB instead of UPRON.

Is MH370 a tragic case of The Cali Disaster Revisited - perhaps ?

First, a REFRESHER on the Cali Disaster.

(Edited from Wiki)

Cali's approach uses several radio beacons to guide pilots around the mountains and canyons that surround the city.
The airplane's flight management system already had these beacons programmed in, and should have, in theory, told the pilots exactly where to turn, climb, and descend, all the way from Miami to the terminal in Cali.

Since the wind was calm, Cali's controllers asked the pilots whether they wanted to fly a straight-in approach to runway 19 rather than coming around to runway 01. The pilots agreed, hoping to make up some time.
The pilots then erroneously cleared the approach waypoints from their navigation computer.
When the controller asked the pilots to check back in over Tuluá, north of Cali, it was no longer programmed into the computer, and so they had to pull out their maps to find it.
In the meantime, they extended the aircraft's speed brakes to slow it down and expedite its descent.
By the time the pilots found Tuluá's coordinates, they had already passed over it.
In response to this, they attempted to program the navigation computer for the next approach waypoint, Rozo.
However, the Rozo NDB was identified as R on their charts.
Colombia had duplicated the identifier for the Romeo NDB near Bogotá, and the computer's list of stored waypoints did not include the Rozo NDB as "R", but only under its full name "ROZO".
In cases where a country allowed duplicate identifiers, it often listed them with the largest city first.
By picking the first "R" from the list, the captain caused the autopilot to start flying a course to Bogotá, resulting in the airplane turning east in a wide semicircle.
By the time the error was detected, the aircraft was in a valley running roughly north-south parallel to the one they should have been in.
The pilots had put the aircraft on a collision course with a 3,000-meter (9,800 feet) mountain. (3°50′45.2″N 76°06′17.1″W)
Twelve seconds before the plane hit the mountain, named El Diluvio (The Deluge), the Ground Proximity Warning System activated, announcing an imminent terrain collision and sounding an alarm.
Within a second of this warning the first officer disengaged the autopilot, and the captain attempted to climb clear of the mountain.
However, neither pilot had remembered to disengage the previously deployed speed brakes, which reduced the rate of climb.
At 9:41:28 pm Eastern Standard Time it struck trees at about 8,900 feet MSL on the east side of the mountain.
The crash was six miles south of Tuluá VOR and 28 miles north of the approach end of runway 19 at Alfonso Bonilla Aragon International Airport.


Now, let us return our attention to MH370.

Assume that there was some emergency between IGARI and BITOD.
Assume that they got to, or very close to, BITOD before deciding to RETURN to KL.
From that position, their best bet would be to turn right to intercept Airway R208 for a direct return to KL.
For the sake of argument, assume that due to the emergency, Z takes back the aircraft as pilot flying, and H reverts to being PM.
Z commences the turn, and during the troubleshooting the aircraft gets to a point at or near waypoint IPRIX.
Z orders H to program return to KL via R208.
As a "first step", to intercept R208, H decides to select waypoint UPRON.
This makes perfect sense, since it puts them on Airway R208, with two very good options.
(1) If the emergency is critical, and landing as soon as possible is required, they are heading direct for Kuala Trengganu Airport.
(2) If the emergency is less severe, they can OVERFLY Kuala Trengganu Airport and continue on for the return to Kuala Lumpur.

But it all goes wrong !

In his haste to enter UPRON, he (H) types "UPRO and immediately "inadvertantly" selects the first waypoint that comes up on the FMS - UPROB !!!

Whatever the emergency was, the aircraft now turns a few degrees more than planned.
iNSTEAD OF TURNING TO 223 degrees true to track from around IPRIX to UPRON (69 nautical miles), it turnes ONLY AN ADDITIONAL 15 DEGREES, to 238 degrees true, to track from around IPRIX to UPROB (677 nautical miles).

Since the crew never detected this mistake, it must be assumed that they became incapacitated soon after selecting UPROB, since, their intended waypoint UPRON was only about 8 or 9 minutes flying time away from that moment.

The aircraft was then a ghost flight, and proceed to UPROB (which also happens to be directly over MEDAN).

Now we need:
(A) ALL Indonesian primary radar data for that night, specifically Medan radar (both civil and military), and Sibolga military radar data.
(B) to examine all possible ghost flight scenarios from the last waypoint, UPROB.



The INTENDED RETURN







The ERROR - and TRAGIC RESULT ?