[Peetwo]

The Empire strikes back at Estimates -

The following quote from "K" got me cogitating...

"...How, could Carmody; or Aleck support and explain how a barely experienced junior flight instructor, may be the ‘over sight’ expert of a Flight Safety qualified crew when (A) he barely managed a pass on type on the third attempt at Flight Safety: (B) he has exactly ZERO operational hours as a command pilot on any jet in ‘professional’ operations and © is a proven liar to boot. The man in charge of a private operation, with the power of pass/fail over both a 30,000 hour veteran and a well qualified captain ? Bollocks..."

I believe "K" (above) was reflecting on this part of the farcical CASA testimony at Estimates:

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Senator PATRICK: Mr Campbell, on 8 December did you fly with any of these pilots?

Mr Campbell : On 8 December was the Dominic James flight to lift the conditions off his air transport pilot licence that were invoked after the Norfolk accident.

Senator PATRICK: Who was the pilot in command?

Mr Campbell : The pilot in command for that was David #####, the check pilot, who was No. 1.

Senator PATRICK: Despite the fact that it was too dangerous for these guys to fly, you allowed one of your staff—in fact, two of your staff, I believe—to go flying with these people. Is that correct?

Mr Carmody : That's correct.

Senator PATRICK: I don't—

Mr Carmody : It was a private flight. We can discuss the difference between the two. We were confident that we could manage that flight. That flight had been planned.

Senator PATRICK: The CASA people on board are not pilots. They can't assist if something goes wrong in the aircraft.

Mr Campbell : I was in the rear of the aircraft. We had a qualified Falcon 20 pilot in the jump seat supervising and monitoring.

Senator PATRICK: That was pilot No. 1.

Mr Campbell : No.

Mr Carmody : No, it was one of our staff.

Senator PATRICK: And he's qualified?

Mr Campbell : He's qualified.

Senator PATRICK: He's done all of the checks? The OPC? The IPC?

Mr Campbell : He's done the IPC. He's not within that company, so he doesn't do an operator proficiency check.

CHAIR: He wouldn't have been legitimate to fly either. He had the same status as No. 1.

Mr Carmody : No, he was legitimate to fly. He was completely qualified.

CHAIR: Sorry. Again, I am interfering in your line of questioning.

Senator PATRICK: No, I think you're asking questions that need to be asked.

CHAIR: He hadn't had his proficiency check in an aircraft of that particular company.

Mr Campbell : No, but he had of that particular type.

CHAIR: The distinction was made before, when it was asserted—not disputed—that No. 1 had done that too in another company but it didn't count.

Mr Campbell : Correct.

CHAIR: So the fellow in the jump seat, in the copilot seat, wouldn't have traditionally qualified to fly that aircraft.

Mr Campbell : He would in a private situation. The operator proficiency check specifically details—

CHAIR: Let me tell you this. We get a bit excited here from time to time. If your defence around this is some split hair between 'it's a private flight' and 'it's a commercial flight', that doesn't wash with me. I'll be up-front with you. That's one cent either way on that.

Mr Crawford : Can I try and answer that?

CHAIR: No, we'll come back to you, Mr Crawford. I just want to clarify this. In the jump seat. In the copilot seat. So you are telling me there are different standards for private flights.

Mr Campbell : If I could explain.

CHAIR: Of course. That would be helpful.

Mr Campbell : With an operator proficiency check, one of the key points is crew coordination, where you've got specific company procedures that are different from company to company. So an interaction between a flying pilot and non-flying pilot in normal situations is coordinated, rehearsed and documented. In an emergency, it is coordinated, rehearsed and documented. So it's a drill. They don't have to think about it. That is what part of the operator efficiency check is. The operator proficiency check also includes an element of training. That training brings people's proficiency back up to standard prior to the check.

CHAIR: I appreciate that. But your fellow wouldn't have qualified under No. 1.

Mr Campbell : He wasn't qualified in that organisation, but he was in our control seat. He was in the jump seat. He was sitting behind the two crew. He was familiar with their procedures because he was the oversighting inspector.

CHAIR: Mr Campbell, I'm sure you've heard the old nursery rhyme about having your cake and eating it too. You've got to choose here. If your defence to Senator Patrick's line of questioning is 'We had a pilot in the right-hand seat who did not qualify to fly that aircraft and we had a pilot in the left-hand seat who didn't qualify to fly that aircraft'—in a technical sense; they both seemed to be competent pilots of type—then I'm looking for, and I think Senator Patrick was looking for, the distinction between those circumstances. All I have heard is 'private versus commercial'...

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Which brings me to this from CASA released FOI documents to DJ:

 
Although not referred to by Mal-function (above) apparently there was another reason for there to be no CASA oversighted proficiency checks from the jump seat? From the same FOI released documents: Ref - AO-2017-057.

 
This begs the question, what the hell changed to make it suddenly acceptable to ignore the 'Ross Air' moratorium when it came to the CASA observed DJ command proficiency flight? Especially when you consider the minimal operational experience (read zero) FOI Worthington had on type and in multi-crew operations?

Then I reflected on this revelation from "K": "..His last and only shot at that job netted the horrific crash at Young in NSW with multiple fatalities. He was the chief pilot. He did encourage and authorise that flight – he as good as killed ‘em all..."

This got me dredging up the extremely informative but disturbing BASI report for the Young accident, to which I extracted the following in reference to the former Chief pilot of Monarch Airlines: BASI 9301743  

1 September 1992 The assigned FOI met with the Chief Pilot and inspected documents. The Chief Pilot assured his willingness to ensure compliance with CAA
requirements. Staff were going through a learning process.

Issues to be addressed were:

Check and Training
– two checks per year to be conducted
– records to be maintained
Emergency procedures proficiency
– pilots to be certified annually
– Flight and duty records to be kept.

13 October 1992 Report by assigned FOI on ramp checks conducted at Cowra and
Cootamundra on 9 October 1992. The check at Cowra was satisfactory.
The check at Cootamundra was cancelled as the Monarch flight did not
operate due to lack of passengers.

The FOI proposed to undertake planned en route surveillance of
Monarch, commencing this month (October). Would also like to follow
up with unannounced surveillance flights. Also intended to organise at
least one ramp check along similar lines to those conducted on 9 October,
and to conduct specific checks of Monarch passenger manifests, rosters
and fuel load. Anecdotal evidence that Monarch were operating
overweight.

30 November 1992 Airworthiness inspectors visited Monarch regarding a complaint
concerning engine TBO for VH-WZW.

3 February 1993 At a meeting between Airworthiness Inspectors and the GM of Monarch, the GM undertook to ensure compliance with the regulatory
requirements regarding the Maintenance Controller. The CAA
commented to the effect that it considered a line pilot operating for up to
12 hours per day could not be expected also to fulfil the functions of the
Maintenance Controller.

9 February 1993 Airworthiness inspections carried out on VH-WZW and VH-TXK. Some
serious non-conformances identified which needed to be addressed as a
matter of urgency. Maintenance Controller heavily involved with line
flying.

11 February 1993 At a further meeting with the GM and Chief Pilot, discrepancies
identified in maintenance control were discussed, including defect
reporting and recording, use of the MEL, and certification procedures.
The Maintenance Controller did not appear to be fulfilling that function.

Pilots were also not recording defects, as found in a review of VH-TXK
and VH-WZW maintenance records.

Monarch was advised that it was clear that their failure to observe all of
the requirements of the MCM was in breach of regulatory requirements.
The GM was directed to respond in writing by 15 February 1993.

30 March 1993 Monarch was required to surrender all maintenance records of VH-TXK
and VH-NDU to Bankstown Airworthiness for examination.

2 April 1993 The LAME responsible for certifying Monarch Air maintenance
operations withdrew his services.

8 April 1993 A letter was sent to the GM, Monarch Air, from CAA Airworthiness
requesting that no maintenance be carried out by Monarch until a
suitable LAME was engaged.

16 April 1993 Monarch GM applies for PUS to permit continued operation of VHNDU
with an inoperative autopilot. PUS issued, valid to 16 May 1993.

19 April 1993 A ramp check was carried out at KSA to verify whether Monarch was
complying with the conditions of the PUS for VH-TXK and VH-NDU. A
number of deficiencies were found, including identified breaches of the
CAR’s concerning the operation of VH-NDU. The aircraft was permitted
to operate RPT flights on the responsibility of the Chief Pilot and pilotin-
command.

As a result of the ramp check, a recommendation was made by the acting
DAM to DFOM that Monarch be asked to show cause as to why its AOC
should not be varied, suspended or cancelled. The DFOM was also to
consider taking action against the Chief Pilot.

21 April 1993 A show cause letter was sent by the DFOM to the Chief Pilot asking him
to state why his Chief Pilot approval should not be cancelled as a result of
the ramp check at KSA on 19 April 1993. If the response is considered to
be unsatisfactory the DFOM proposes to suspend Monarch AOCs until
such time as a new Chief Pilot is appointed. The Monarch GM was also
asked to show cause why action should not be taken. A response was
required by 7 May 1993.

29 April 1993 The Chief Pilot was granted route checking approval to cover Southern
Airlines operations.

6 May 1993 Both the Chief Pilot and GM respond to the show cause letters.

14 May 1993 PUS for VH-NDU reissued in response to a letter from Monarch GM.
PUS valid to 16 June 1993.

17 May 1993 A letter was prepared to permanently withdraw the approval of the Chief Pilot; however, the letter was not sent as the Chief Pilot resigned from
that position on the same day.

17 May 1993 A new Chief Pilot was nominated by Monarch.

24 May 1993 A meeting was held between the new Chief Pilot and the assigned FOI to
discuss problems with Monarch.

28 May 1993 A letter approving the new Chief Pilot signed by the CAA.

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Plus:

1.19.2 Management structure

Prior to 18 May 1993 the day-to-day management of Monarch Airlines had been under the control of a GM who had been in that position throughout the formation and operation of the airline. Both the Chief Pilot/Operations Manager, and Chief Engineer or certifying LAME, reported to the GM, who in turn was responsible to the Directors of Aviation Operations Pty Ltd.

On 17 May 1993 the Chief Pilot resigned from that position, but remained as Operations
Manager. A new Chief Pilot took over on the same day and was occupying that position at the time of the accident .

A former Chief Pilot of Monarch, who had subsequently been retained on a part time basis to conduct Check and Training, resigned to take up a position with another company in early May 1993. The new Chief Pilot also took over the Check and Training responsibilities...

Oh the ironies when you consider Malcolm Campbell's oversight of Pelair pre the 2009 ditching of VH-NGA and now of FalconAir - UDB!  

MTF...P2