Mount Non-compliance & upcoming ICAO/FAA audit?

Dear Lachie - Part II

Via PAIN_Net email chain:

Quote:Dear Lachlan,

I note that my (24/02/2018) email reply to you was neither acknowledged or responded to. In case this was due to being lost in the cyber-sphere; or caught up in Departmental spam/security filters etc. I again forward that email (with questions) for your reference.
Quote from your original correspondence:

Quote:Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance. 

Plus from correspondence from the Dept Secretary to the Senate RRAT Legislative Committee at additional budget Estimates: https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates....pdf?la=en
 
Quote:[Image: ICAO-ND-2.jpg]

Following on from my previous reply email (below), please note the following Senate RRAT Committee Hansard from a References inquiry ( see: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...lAirRoutes ) public hearing held at Cloncurry, QLD on the 12 April 2018:

Quote:...ACTING CHAIR: This committee's bailiwick is to do with aviation. We are very alive to the issues around CASA, less so around the ATSB. Let's not flinch: they're not CASA's regulations; they're the government's regulations that are often recommended by CASA. We're aware of the current impacts on general aviation with new CASA regulations, the shortage of pilots and the maintenance issue with licensed aircraft maintenance engineers and the like. We as a committee have called for some figures—and I don't know if Ms Redden is in a position to update us. We want to look at comparisons with international standards. The FAA has done an audit on CASA in Australia. I understand it's going to be interesting reading. They're resisting publication of that at the moment. We're trying to muddle our way through getting that out into the open. So we're very alive, to the point where we have contemplated out loud whether we will hold an inquiry such as this into this regulatory environment—not just the operation of CASA but by extension the impact that that is having on general aviation...

Next there is a reference from a recent Aunty Pru forum post relevant to the PAIN Net inquiries: ref - http://www.auntypru.com/forum/showthread...29#pid8829


Quote: And if people are under the misbelief that under the new CMA USOAP system that an ICAO audit no longer requires a proper summary audit report think again- refer to this ICAO powerpoint presentation link: 

From pg 9: 

 Phase 3 ― Validation and Report Production (Post-audit/ICVM) • ICAO forwards draft audit report to State. • State submits comments and Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). • Comments are incorporated into final audit report. • Final audit report is published on USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF): http://www.icao.int/usoap.   

And pg 27-28:

IV. Timeline of Validation and Report Production Phase (Post Audit/ICVM)


[Image: USOAP-1.jpg]

Q/ The above would suggest that (a) there should now be an ICAO audit report available; and (b) that it is the intent of the Dept and the Government to make that audit report publicly available. Yet, unlike previous ICAO reports, a search of the Dept website would appear to indicate that report is still not publicly available. Could we please get an indication from the Dept when this report will become publicly available? 

Q/ Also from the Hansard extract (in bold), I am almost certain that the Acting Chair meant to say that ICAO had conducted an audit of CASA, the Department and the other aviation safety related agencies (ATSB, Airservices, AMSA etc.) and not the FAA. However in case the FAA has conducted an IASA audit of CASA, would it also be possible to get a published link for a copy of that report as well? 


Regards,

And Lachie's reply:
Quote:Dear P2,
 
Thank you for your correspondence.  In response to the first of your two questions, Australia has received the final report from ICAO regarding our assessment in October 2017.  It is not our understanding that the previous ICAO audit report was made public, however we are happy to share the current report.  The Department is currently identifying the appropriate part of our website and should have it online shortly, and we will let you know when it is live.
 
Regarding the issue of a possible audit by the FAA, I cannot speak for the Acting Chair, but I can confirm that there has not been a recent FAA International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) of CASA in recent years.  By way of background, while the FAA publishes IASA category ratings on their website, they do not publish or provide copies of assessment findings to third parties. 
 
Regards,

And my response:

Quote:Dear Lachlan,

Thank you for your prompt response and I look forward to reviewing the 2017 ICAO report when published on the Department website.

For your information please go to the following links for copies of the 2008 ICAO audit report, the 2004 ATSB ICAO audit report and the 1999 CASA ICAO audit report:

https://amroba.org.au/wp-content/uploads...rt2008.pdf

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2004/icao_audit/

https://cfapp.icao.int/fsix/AuditReps/in...999_en.pdf

Not so sure about the 2008 audit report but I believe the 2004 and 1999 reports were once available on the Dept website.

Finally, thank you very much for confirming that the FAA IASA have not conducted a recent audit of CASA.

Reference links for information related to the 2009 FAA IASA audit report of the CASA: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf & http://wikileaks.redfoxcenter.org/cable/...A1040.html

PAIN has confirmed, with a recent rejection of a FOI request for the November/December 2009 FAA IASA audit report, that the FAA are not in the habit of publishing their audit assessment findings to 3rd party stakeholders.

However given the passage of time and the significant industry financial contribution ( fuel levy - $89.9 million?) that was levied from industry to help rectify the deficiencies from that report; PAIN associates would still like to request from the Department (informally or formally through the FOI Act) copies of that report and relevant correspondence associated with the conduct of the FAA IASA audit. Therefore if you could facilitate that request, or provide contact details for your FOI office to process a formal FOI request, it would be greatly appreciated.

Kind regards,

MTF...P2  Cool
Reply

Lachie (finally) comes through - nearly?  Dodgy

Finally Lachie has come through with his promise for the Dept to provide a copy of the 2017 ICAO audit report - see: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...t_full.pdf

However it would appear the report is still yet to receive a proper CAP ( https://soa.icao.int/usoap/USOAP%20Docum...02017..pdf ) for the State to address the identified deficiencies:

Quote:APP 1 - 2

ICVM Final Report — Australia March 2018 Analysis

Considering the overall results outlined in Figures 1 and 2, the information below has been developed to assist the State in prioritizing its remedial actions.

High Priorities:

LEG:

1) Review the processes, procedures and/or arrangements in place to ensure that all relevant State safety oversight and investigation authorities (particularly with respect to Annexes 3, 12 and 13 to the Chicago Convention) are involved, in a coordinated manner, in the processing of adopted Annex amendments, with a view to:

a) identifying all differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
and the State’s regulations and practices; and
b) determining any need to amend the State’s legislation.

2) Ensure a timely and consistent update of national regulations whenever amendments to
Annexes 1, 6 and 18 are received.

3) Ensure a consistent, thorough and documented review of the State’s enabling
airworthiness-related regulations and national standards subsequent to an Annex amendment or an amendment by the originating State/organization, if applicable, to decide on the next course of action.


4) Establish requirements regarding the documents to be carried on board, to include the journey logbook.

5) Establish requirements, based on scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience, for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations applicable for cabin crew.

6) Establish requirements for human factors principles to be observed in the design and application of maintenance programmes.


7) Amend the State’s legislation to require the re-opening of an investigation if new and significant evidence becomes available.

ORG:

1) Include all required training in the training programmes established for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)’s airworthiness inspectors and engineers, and ensure the effective
implementation of such training, in particular during the on-the-job training (OJT).


2) Finalize the recruitment and training of additional investigators to ensure that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) can meet its national and international obligations with respect to aircraft accident and incident investigations.

PEL:

None.

APP 1 - 3

High Priorities: (cont.)

OPS:

1) Establish and implement procedures to ensure that air operators develop instructions to preserve flight recorders to the extent possible, in the event that the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident and to keep flight recorders and associated records in safe custody pending their disposition.

2) Establish a system to ensure that air operators implement and maintain requirements, in the operations manual, to establish flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations for cabin crew.

3) Establish a system to ensure full compliance of air operator certificate (AOC) associated
operations specifications with the elements and the format/layout outlined in the relevant
provisions of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

4) Establish and implement a system to ensure that procedures for the approval of operations specifications are fully defined and implemented.

5) With respect to the transport of dangerous goods by air, ensure that procedures for the
surveillance of authorized or non-authorized air operators, national and foreign operators are fully defined and implemented, and include regular and random inspections.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:

1) Establish and implement procedures for the approval of leases among commercial air transport operators.

2) Review procedures/guidance for adequacy and, where possible, use standardized terminology to minimize misinterpretation.

Design Certification and Production:

None.

AIG:

Fully implement the ATSB’s action plan to ensure that all accident and incident investigation reports are completed within the established timelines.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.

2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain.

APP 1 - 4

Other Priorities:

LEG:

1) Amend the State’s primary aviation legislation to include explicit provisions to recognize as valid personnel licences, certificates of airworthiness and radio station licences issued/renewed by the State of the Operator under an Article 83 bis agreement between two third-party States.

2) Ensure that the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) contains all significant differences, not only with the SARPs, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-OPS and PANS-ATM, but also with all other PANS and the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS).

ORG:

Ensure that aerodrome inspectors are provided with training related to the regulation, acceptance and surveillance of the safety management system (SMS) which is customized to suit to specificities of aerodromes.

PEL:

None.

OPS:

None.

Airworthiness Inspection:

Clarify the procedures, including associated flowcharts, which describe the granting of the noise certificate.

Design Certification and Production:

1) Review the documentation published on CASA’s intranet to ensure that obsolete documents (in particular AEB Form 002) are not available to staff, in order to minimize inadvertent use.

2) Enhance the control of existing forms and checklists by including revision/issue control reference in addition to date of revision.

AIG:

None.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

MTF...P2  Cool

Ps Compliments to Dr Jane and the RRAT Committee Secretariat for their tireless efforts in ensuring the Dept kept their word on making public the 2017 ICAO audit report. 

Pps All we need now is the CAP -  Rolleyes
Reply

(08-13-2018, 09:56 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  Lachie (finally) comes through - nearly?  Dodgy

Finally Lachie has come through with his promise for the Dept to provide a copy of the 2017 ICAO audit report - see: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...t_full.pdf

And from the Dept website:

Quote:Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program
Listen to this page
A A A

The first stage of the program, launched in 1996, was voluntary. Its initial success led the 31st Session of the ICAO Assembly (October 1998) to endorse an enhanced program and provide the necessary funding. The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) commenced on 1 January 1999, replacing the voluntary program. The basis of the ICAO audit was the degree to which the States complied with safety related Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and associated procedures laid down in three of the eighteen Annexes to the Chicago Convention: Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing), Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) and Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft). It was envisaged that ICAO would audit other annexes in future programs. Australia's first audit under this system took place 9–20 August 1999.

The 35th Session of the ICAO Assembly considered the proposal of the Council for the continuation and expansion of USOAP in 2005, and resolved that USOAP be expanded to cover the safety-related provisions in all safety-related Annexes (all Annexes with the exception of Annex 9 Facilitation and Annex 17 Security) and also to implement a comprehensive systems approach (CSA) for the conduct of safety oversight audits. The six-year cycle of USOAP CSA concluded at the end of 2010. In September 2007, the 36th Session of the Assembly directed the Council to examine different options for the continuation of the USOAP beyond 2010, including the feasibility of applying a new approach based on the concept of continuous monitoring.

The 37th Session of the Assembly agreed the best and most cost-effective option was the implementation of a continuous monitoring approach (CMA) and directed the Secretary-General of ICAO to begin to develop the methodology and tools required to implement a CMA, including the necessary detailed guidance to States. It also directed the Secretary-General of ICAO to provide a transition period to the CMA, in order to allow States and ICAO to gradually implement the different elements of the new approach. CMA came into effect 1 January 2013.
Under the USOAP CMA, Australia's most recent assessment was through an ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM), which occurred 9–13 October 2017.
  • Final Report Of The ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission In Australia PDF: 593 KB [Image: readspeaker_listen_icon.gif]


However it would appear the report is still yet to receive a proper CAP ( https://soa.icao.int/usoap/USOAP%20Docum...02017..pdf ) for the State to address the identified deficiencies:

Quote:APP 1 - 2

ICVM Final Report — Australia March 2018 Analysis

Considering the overall results outlined in Figures 1 and 2, the information below has been developed to assist the State in prioritizing its remedial actions.

High Priorities:

LEG:

1) Review the processes, procedures and/or arrangements in place to ensure that all relevant State safety oversight and investigation authorities (particularly with respect to Annexes 3, 12 and 13 to the Chicago Convention) are involved, in a coordinated manner, in the processing of adopted Annex amendments, with a view to:

a) identifying all differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
and the State’s regulations and practices; and
b) determining any need to amend the State’s legislation.

2) Ensure a timely and consistent update of national regulations whenever amendments to
Annexes 1, 6 and 18 are received.

3) Ensure a consistent, thorough and documented review of the State’s enabling
airworthiness-related regulations and national standards subsequent to an Annex amendment or an amendment by the originating State/organization, if applicable, to decide on the next course of action.


4) Establish requirements regarding the documents to be carried on board, to include the journey logbook.

5) Establish requirements, based on scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience, for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations applicable for cabin crew.

6) Establish requirements for human factors principles to be observed in the design and application of maintenance programmes.


7) Amend the State’s legislation to require the re-opening of an investigation if new and significant evidence becomes available.

ORG:

1) Include all required training in the training programmes established for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)’s airworthiness inspectors and engineers, and ensure the effective
implementation of such training, in particular during the on-the-job training (OJT).


2) Finalize the recruitment and training of additional investigators to ensure that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) can meet its national and international obligations with respect to aircraft accident and incident investigations.

PEL:

None.

APP 1 - 3

High Priorities: (cont.)

OPS:

1) Establish and implement procedures to ensure that air operators develop instructions to preserve flight recorders to the extent possible, in the event that the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident and to keep flight recorders and associated records in safe custody pending their disposition.

2) Establish a system to ensure that air operators implement and maintain requirements, in the operations manual, to establish flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations for cabin crew.

3) Establish a system to ensure full compliance of air operator certificate (AOC) associated
operations specifications with the elements and the format/layout outlined in the relevant
provisions of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

4) Establish and implement a system to ensure that procedures for the approval of operations specifications are fully defined and implemented.

5) With respect to the transport of dangerous goods by air, ensure that procedures for the
surveillance of authorized or non-authorized air operators, national and foreign operators are fully defined and implemented, and include regular and random inspections.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:

1) Establish and implement procedures for the approval of leases among commercial air transport operators.

2) Review procedures/guidance for adequacy and, where possible, use standardized terminology to minimize misinterpretation.

Design Certification and Production:

None.

AIG:

Fully implement the ATSB’s action plan to ensure that all accident and incident investigation reports are completed within the established timelines.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.

2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain.

APP 1 - 4

Other Priorities:

LEG:

1) Amend the State’s primary aviation legislation to include explicit provisions to recognize as valid personnel licences, certificates of airworthiness and radio station licences issued/renewed by the State of the Operator under an Article 83 bis agreement between two third-party States.

2) Ensure that the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) contains all significant differences, not only with the SARPs, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-OPS and PANS-ATM, but also with all other PANS and the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS).

ORG:

Ensure that aerodrome inspectors are provided with training related to the regulation, acceptance and surveillance of the safety management system (SMS) which is customized to suit to specificities of aerodromes.

PEL:

None.

OPS:

None.

Airworthiness Inspection:

Clarify the procedures, including associated flowcharts, which describe the granting of the noise certificate.

Design Certification and Production:

1) Review the documentation published on CASA’s intranet to ensure that obsolete documents (in particular AEB Form 002) are not available to staff, in order to minimize inadvertent use.

2) Enhance the control of existing forms and checklists by including revision/issue control reference in addition to date of revision.

AIG:

None.

ANS:

None.

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

MTF...P2  Cool

Ps Compliments to Dr Jane and the RRAT Committee Secretariat for their tireless efforts in ensuring the Dept kept their word on making public the 2017 ICAO audit report. 

Pps All we need now is the CAP -  Rolleyes
Reply

ICAO flogs Australian oversight.

Severely, with a small, damp lettuce leaf. That’ll fix it all up, quick smart – right?

How about this for a thrashing:-

“Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.”

Wow , tough stuff (not). The many posts on the 'Airports' forum will assist the casual reader in deciding if the punishment fits the crime. Search word - ESSENDON. 

But of course, no one bothers to read, let alone take our safety watchdogs to task; and so, the whole carefully worded confection will slowly find it’s way to the ‘shelf-ware’ section of the basement, to moulder away with all the other embarrassing documents. The time honoured system has never let the minister down. Softly, softly the damning paper work creeps away, while ICAO swans off to new engagements, trusting that the DoIT will make the suggested changes happen, sometime over the next decade or so; no rush….

You have to wonder why this innocuous, bland report has been kept out of the public purview, we did after all pay for it. Then there is the question of the CAN. But, for my money, the stellar performance of the Canberra back line takes the biscuit.

The 'who' authorized the building ‘ball’ goes into the Senate scrum – the Canberra back's get it and the speed at which the ball (and the responsibility) is passed along is truly breathtaking. It seems that no one is 'wholly’ responsible for parking a bloody great big building, full of ‘happy shoppers’ in harms way. The crowd watching begin the traditional chant “No, weren’t us” -  loud and long.......

BOLLOCKS; Mr Genuine Minister needs to pay close attention – the law suites are coming; soon as ATSB gets off it’s beam ends and actually does something that is not window dressing and prevarication. Murky knows who rewrote the ‘definitions’ and who flogged off the airports to developers; him and Beaker, up their eyebrows.

I hope the Yanks crucify ‘em – I’ll even help them. No matter, great audit, really helpful. iCAO ‘on –the-money’.

Toot – toot – one for luck – Toot.
Reply

Of departmental enemas, stammering fools and giant headed monsters

‘K’;

”Murky knows who rewrote the ‘definitions’ and who flogged off the airports to developers; him and Beaker, up their eyebrows”.

Nothing to see here, move along. Beaker is enjoying the fruits of his semi-retirement and his huge superannuation nest egg filled to the bream over the decades by bludging off the taxpayer. Great timing to go and get your PHD. Phew.

Pumpkin Head is enjoying his new $800k role over at Community and Arts after receiving a new plumb role for being loyal to Turdball. Again, great timing for the giant headed former Infuckstructure department head and serial senate spin doctor.

Within hours of the DFO bingle the Fort Fumble shredders had smoke pouring out of them and the bowels of TRIM had received an enema and been emptied to ensure no signed paperwork could or would ever be found that might aportion blame, or heaven forebid, accountability.

As for ICAO, well they will never bite the hand that feeds them. The likes of Rudd, Gillard, Turdball and Stick Insect Bishop have been oiling he UN’s wheels for years with healthy, robust infusions of taxpayer money, and in return receiving AAA status and lavish trips to New York to hobnob with the rich, powerful, lobbyists who will ensure their post political life is well cared for. ICAO is just another branch of the despicable UN who are nothing short of being a bunch of self appointed, conceited, inept fucktards draining countries of their taxpayers money.

Expect justice over the Essendon crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the Pelair ditching? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the Lockhart River crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice over the MH370 crash? Keep dreaming.

Expect justice, honesty and transparency in any way, shape or form from any government, political party, bureaucracy or public servant? KEEP EFFING DREAMING

TICK TOCK
Reply

ICAO ICVM Australia FR CAP: Where the bloody hell is it? 

Ref: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/i...t_full.pdf

Note the following text from the - FINAL REPORT OF THE ICAO COORDINATED VALIDATION MISSION IN AUSTRALIA (9 to 13 October 2017): 

Quote:5. FOLLOW-UP ACTION

5.1 In accordance with the MOU agreed to between Australia and ICAO, Australia replied in a letter dated 23 February 2018 that it had no comments on the draft report and also reiterated its commitment to develop its CAPs accordingly.

5.2 According to the MOU, the State undertakes to submit its updated CAPs directly on the USOAP CMA online framework (https://www.icao.int/usoap) within 45 days after receipt of this final report.

5.3 The CAPs should provide specific actions and estimated implementation dates, as well as a responsible office for taking action to correct the deficiencies identified in the findings. Further guidance on how to develop effective CAPs is outlined in the “Guidance for States on Developing Corrective Action Plans (CAPs)”, which can be found in the “CMA Library” of the online framework.

5.4 ICAO will provide Australia with feedback on the acceptability of the proposed updated CAPs. If any proposed corrective actions do not fully address the associated findings, the State will be notified accordingly.

5.5 If no CAP is submitted, ICAO will contact Australia to determine the reasons for not providing a CAP and report its findings to Council.
 
Considering that one of the significant findings of the ICAO ICVM audit team included this under the AGA (Annex 14):

Quote:AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.
   
Which highlighted a repeated ICAO significant identified safety issue from the 2008 ICAO USOAP audit of Australia:
[Image: Untitled_Clipping_091018_103524_AM.jpg]

 
This significant safety issue should have been proactively addressed by the supposedly fully compliant Australian Annex 19 SSP more than 6 years ago. This deficiency in the SSP was recently identified in a seriously delayed ATSB investigation: ref- http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-30-...ml#pid9476

Quote:ATSB finds no application of safety principles

The ATSB carried out an investigation four years later in 2013 into the procedures of these decision-making processes. This was done as a response to a REPCON report received in September 2012 (P2 comment - bizarrely the ATSB REPCON database doesn't appear to go back to 2012??) expressing concerns a proper safety case was not conducted on the proposal. The ATSB’s Final Report concluded that whilst the procedure was compliant with the Airports Act 1996 and the Regulations, it “did not require the application of risk management principles to the Department’s consideration”. This was highlighted as a safety issue.

IMO this not only highlights major deficiencies in Govt departmental and agency processes but also highlights serious flaws and lack of transparency of our supposedly fully ICAO compliant Annex 19 SSP... Blush ref: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/s...ction.aspx


MTF...P2  Cool
Reply

Read - THIS– without throwing up.

There's more of the same following - the 'revised' Act- will be a masterpiece, but as Paul Phelen predicted two decades ago - Nothing will change.

This is political flummery, to baffle those who have their breakfast in front of the TV.  A sham which shames those who pay for it - 'those' being us.

Disgraceful.
Reply

The legendary Paul D Phelan wrote and presented this report eighteen years ago. It is a masterful, accurate analysis of the situation between CASA and industry at the time. There are 104 pages detailing industry operational concerns and the long term effect of those concerns on safety.
 
In 2014, Phelan provided a submission to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR). This, like the 2000 submission provided detailed, accurate, supportable information and analysis clearly identifying not only the increasingly fraught, tense relationship between the CASA and the industry, but the almost unbelievable mess the regulations have become. Once again, his forecasts have proven accurate.

Senator O’Sullivan has challenged industry to provide ‘proof’. I say let him stir his bones, find his reading glasses and spend an hour or so with Phelan. There is the only ‘proof’ he should ever need.
 
Has government failed aviation?
 
That boys and girls is a no brainer.
 
Will the government continue to fail aviation and ignore the blindingly obvious?

It certainly seems to be that answer will be in the affirmative – going on O’Sullivan’s less than impressive performance at Estimates and a wool blind minister who can't seem to tie his boot laces without 'expert' advice.
 
No matter; if you have an idle hour or two over the Christmas break; take some time to read Phelan. It may bring some clarity, although history clearly shows there is little hope of sanity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2000 AD).

1. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s handling of its enforcement responsibilities has already seriously degraded Australia’s air safety climate by generating mounting mutual distrust and antipathy between industry and regulator. There is now more confrontation, and less mutual respect and cooperation, than has ever existed between the regulatory body and an industry which now considers itself to be under siege from its own regulator.

2. Every certificate holder is continually faced with the threat that it can be shut down almost at the whim of a single CASA decision maker through the continued exploitation of apparently unintended provisions of the Civil Aviation Act and Regulations – some would describe these as loopholes:

3. The confrontation has been worsened by gross and growing deficiencies in the delivery of regulatory services, which shackle the conduct of aviation businesses; and the fear that the apparent abuse of regulatory processes by CASA can shut them down immediately without recourse to due process.

4. At the centre of these problems appears to be the absence of effective management, training, defined and uniform policy, guidance, and prioritisation.

5. This has resulted in an appalling degradation of morale amongst operators, industry employees, and the diminishing number of individuals within CASA who still subscribe to the principles of fairness, due process, and the rule of law.

6. CASA has apparently elected to circumvent normal and available legal avenues, due process, natural justice and procedural fairness in pursuit of the policy goal of reducing the number of air operator certificate holders. This is demonstrated by the application and the apparent abuse of administrative procedures available to it under the Act, as an alternative to available remedies offered by proper investigation, legal process, and prosecution.

7. CASA now says it intends to apply identical treatment to major air carriers, in order to be seen to be equitable in its application of what it perceives to be its regulatory functions. This will naturally have even more serious implications for Australia’s international reputation, with a demonstrably negative impact on the industry’s safety performance and image.

8. Declining to acknowledge the impropriety of its actions, CASA’s Office of Legal Counsel makes it clear that while Government allows it, CASA will continue to pursue its goals through the application of administrative decisions rather than through proper and available legal channels and the legal processes by which other regulatory bodies in Australia are bound.

9. This has resulted, in an unacceptable number of cases, of air operators (and significant employers) being forced out of business by the weight of their financial burdens, without CASA’s allegations against them ever having faced the scrutiny of a court or without according the victim the opportunity to face and cross-examine its accusers.

10. CASA is clearly acting contrary to legal advice it obtained from the Attorney General’s department which states that “there is a high risk of liability for defamation under current legislation.” CASA is now apparently defaming certificate holders by publishing unsubstantiated allegations against them. Its Office of Legal Counsel has asserted that he believes it has a government mandate to continue with this course of action.

11. The above tactics are apparently necessary because CASA, which has a dismal record in the investigation and prosecution of alleged rule breaking, has a fear that the use of normal legal processes would expose the inadequacy of its rule structure, and its investigation and surveillance procedures.
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Save Aviation - CHART.

[Image: CHART--624x904.jpg]

Reference: http://proaviation.com.au/trust-restoration-checklist/

(12-14-2018, 06:25 AM)Kharon Wrote:  The legendary Paul D Phelan wrote and presented this report eighteen years ago. It is a masterful, accurate analysis of the situation between CASA and industry at the time. There are 104 pages detailing industry operational concerns and the long term effect of those concerns on safety.
 
In 2014, Phelan provided a submission to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR). This, like the 2000 submission provided detailed, accurate, supportable information and analysis clearly identifying not only the increasingly fraught, tense relationship between the CASA and the industry, but the almost unbelievable mess the regulations have become. Once again, his forecasts have proven accurate.

Senator O’Sullivan has challenged industry to provide ‘proof’. I say let him stir his bones, find his reading glasses and spend an hour or so with Phelan. There is the only ‘proof’ he should ever need.
 
Has government failed aviation?
 
That boys and girls is a no brainer.
 
Will the government continue to fail aviation and ignore the blindingly obvious?

It certainly seems to be that answer will be in the affirmative – going on O’Sullivan’s less than impressive performance at Estimates and a wool blind minister who can't seem to tie his boot laces without 'expert' advice.
 
No matter; if you have an idle hour or two over the Christmas break; take some time to read Phelan. It may bring some clarity, although history clearly shows there is little hope of sanity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2000 AD).

1. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s handling of its enforcement responsibilities has already seriously degraded Australia’s air safety climate by generating mounting mutual distrust and antipathy between industry and regulator. There is now more confrontation, and less mutual respect and cooperation, than has ever existed between the regulatory body and an industry which now considers itself to be under siege from its own regulator.

2. Every certificate holder is continually faced with the threat that it can be shut down almost at the whim of a single CASA decision maker through the continued exploitation of apparently unintended provisions of the Civil Aviation Act and Regulations – some would describe these as loopholes:

3. The confrontation has been worsened by gross and growing deficiencies in the delivery of regulatory services, which shackle the conduct of aviation businesses; and the fear that the apparent abuse of regulatory processes by CASA can shut them down immediately without recourse to due process.

4. At the centre of these problems appears to be the absence of effective management, training, defined and uniform policy, guidance, and prioritisation.

5. This has resulted in an appalling degradation of morale amongst operators, industry employees, and the diminishing number of individuals within CASA who still subscribe to the principles of fairness, due process, and the rule of law.

6. CASA has apparently elected to circumvent normal and available legal avenues, due process, natural justice and procedural fairness in pursuit of the policy goal of reducing the number of air operator certificate holders. This is demonstrated by the application and the apparent abuse of administrative procedures available to it under the Act, as an alternative to available remedies offered by proper investigation, legal process, and prosecution.

7. CASA now says it intends to apply identical treatment to major air carriers, in order to be seen to be equitable in its application of what it perceives to be its regulatory functions. This will naturally have even more serious implications for Australia’s international reputation, with a demonstrably negative impact on the industry’s safety performance and image.

8. Declining to acknowledge the impropriety of its actions, CASA’s Office of Legal Counsel makes it clear that while Government allows it, CASA will continue to pursue its goals through the application of administrative decisions rather than through proper and available legal channels and the legal processes by which other regulatory bodies in Australia are bound.

9. This has resulted, in an unacceptable number of cases, of air operators (and significant employers) being forced out of business by the weight of their financial burdens, without CASA’s allegations against them ever having faced the scrutiny of a court or without according the victim the opportunity to face and cross-examine its accusers.

10. CASA is clearly acting contrary to legal advice it obtained from the Attorney General’s department which states that “there is a high risk of liability for defamation under current legislation.” CASA is now apparently defaming certificate holders by publishing unsubstantiated allegations against them. Its Office of Legal Counsel has asserted that he believes it has a government mandate to continue with this course of action.

11. The above tactics are apparently necessary because CASA, which has a dismal record in the investigation and prosecution of alleged rule breaking, has a fear that the use of normal legal processes would expose the inadequacy of its rule structure, and its investigation and surveillance procedures.

From Phelan's 2016 article:

Quote:..Readers might care to compare the CHART checklist with the charter letter from our most effective recent minister, John Anderson, to (then) incoming CASA CEO, Bruce Byron. The high-quality letter could easily have been drafted by somebody like Mr Shane Carmody, who rejoined the Department on April 1 as Deputy Secretary, Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, with what the Department describes as “broad overarching responsibilities in aviation.”...

Think about how ironic the above extract is when you consider the events that followed which ultimately led to Carmody Capers taking up the role as the latest Fuhrer of CASA... Dodgy

[Image: mq3-1.jpg]

MTF...P2  Cool
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