[Peetwo]

The 0739 key to the PelAir wx imbroglio -  



Quotes from this week's SBG: Sublime or Ridicules? Your call.

CASA must, by a simple process of elimination, known, full well that the 0803 report was vital. If James had received it – they had him stone cold; gross negligence – and we would have cheered that decision. To continue on regardless of the 0803 was indeed, reckless. But James never, ever got the message. That, standing alone exonerates James completely. From that one omission every possible hole in the cheese lined up. CASA cannot possibly deny knowledge of this fact; and, by extension, neither can Hood. There are so many holes and patches on the legal and procedural case that it cannot hold water.

&..in answer to Ol'Tom's QON:

CHAIR: Of course. I've got to tell you, if your investigator didn't ask it, you want to get him or her down into the car park and get them out of your business as quickly as you can. That would have to be the most fundamental question.

P7 - Didn't James do an interview like that? - No recording made etc...

Indeed it is true that on the 16 December 2009 DJ was 'informally' interviewed by CASA  legal and investigative officers. This interview was described by Hoody in the 24 December 'NOTICE of SUSPENSION' letter as - "discussions with CASA officers". The reason given for making these so called 'discussions' informal (not recorded) was that if made 'formal' (recorded) it may one day be used in a court of law.

Q1/ Was this the first indication that CASA were attempting to prosecute a case that was factually deficient in 'damning evidence' (reference SBG quote above); therefore potentially contestable in either a true court of law or the AAAT? 

Q2/ Could this also be an indication that due to the ToR for 'parallel investigations'...

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Reference 2010 MOU Part 4 (PDF pg 28), from CASA AAI submission - Attachment 5(PDF 6032KB) 

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...that the CASA investigative/ops officers were privy to the full weather records that the ATSB had obtained, including the 0803 AMD TAF?

Q3/ If so, I wonder if at that stage the ATSB and CASA were aware that the flightcrew of VH-NGA never received the 0803 AMD TAF? 

Q4/ Could this also be why, sometime after the 8 December 2009, it was decided that CASA wouldn't contribute funds to recover the CVR/FDR?

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Of course this is probably more likely to be typical incompetence by CASA and their so called 'experts' involved in the DJ embuggerance were blissfully unaware of the significance of the 0803 AMD TAF?

However eventually (by July 2010) the penny obviously dropped as the MALIU Richard White referred several times to the 0803 and it's significance in his CAIR 09/3 cover-up report...

This brings me to another omission of fact. Apparently on top of the non-relayed 0803 TAF there was a significant SPECI METAR that was also not passed on by Nadi to the flightcrew.

Extract (PG 60) from original ATSB VH-NGA Final Report:

...The cloud base continued to descend (Figure 8), and at 0739, the automatic weather station (AWS) issued an extra report beyond its normal half-hourly reports. The extra report was issued as the weather conditions had deteriorated to the extent that the reported aerodrome weather report had changed from requiring the issue of a METAR to that of a SPECI (special), because overcast cloud had been observed 1,100 ft above the ARP, which was less than the highest alternate minima. The wind direction had not changed.

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The 0739 SPECI: SPECI YSNF 180739Z AUTO 29010KT 9999 OVC011 21/19 Q1012 RMK RF00.0/000.0

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 The 0739 was significant because that was the wx report that triggered the BOM officer to issue the 0803 AMD TAF: Ref pg 61 VH-NGA FR

...In the light of this unforecast change in the weather conditions, an amended TAF was issued at 0803, valid from 0800. The amended TAF forecast Broken cloud at 1,000 ft above the ARP, and that the wind direction was not forecast to change from a westerly direction until 1500, with the passing of the cold front. This amended TAF forecast that the weather conditions would be less than the alternate minima, but not less than the landing minima at the ETA of VH-NGA at Norfolk Island...

  
Note that despite the rapid deterioration in wx conditions, as reported in the 0830 SPECI (see above), neither Nadi nor Auckland attempted to contact VH-NGA with the details from this SPECI weather report...

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Reference transcripts via Bryan Aherne Senate AAI submission - Attachment 9(PDF 265KB)

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Even more disturbing was that the 0830 SPECI did not prompt the BOM forecasting officer to issue a further amended TAF to reflect that there was now BKN cloud being reported below the aerodrome landing minima. Hopefully the new (500+ page) Final Report will be able to proactively explain how this BOM aberration occurred? My best guess would be that the BOM officer was fooled by the temporary lull in deteriorating SPECI wx as reported in the 0856 SPECI and 0900 METAR. 
       
However the lull was to be short-lived and ironically what should have been the amended TAF issued at approximately 0830, was to be issued at 09:58 (2 minutes before VH-NGA commenced it's first instrument approach):

...The aerodrome weather reports indicated that the cloud base continued to descend after 0830. At 0925, the AWS issued another report beyond its normal half-hourly reports. The weather conditions had deteriorated to the extent that a safe landing was unlikely to be achieved following an instrument approach because Broken cloud was observed 300 ft above the ARP. The horizontal visibility had deteriorated from over 10 km to 6,000 m in the previous 31 minutes. It also started to rain at around this time.

Due to this further unforecast change in the weather conditions, another amended TAF was issued at 0958, valid from 1000. This TAF forecast the same weather conditions in the amended 0803 TAF; however, it also included a TEMPO, forecasting an intermittent deterioration in the weather conditions for no longer than 60 minutes, with the cloud changing to Broken at 500 ft above the ARP, a horizontal visibility of 4,000 m and associated showers of rain. The TEMPO conditions in this forecast were not worse than the landing minima, but were worse than the alternate minima...

       
Finally I want to focus on how the MALIU Richard White (IMO maliciously) manipulated/glossed over/omitted important factual wx reports and forecasts that led and/or allowed the CASA delegate Greg Hood to administer a ill-informed and ignorant enforcement decision (embuggerance - ).

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Reference CAIR 09/3 PDF pages 50 to 53, from CASA AAI submission - Attachment 5(PDF 6032KB)

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P2 comments/obs:

1) Note how the two critical wx reports - 0739 SPECI and 0830 SPECI - that weren't transmitted or received by the flightcrew of VH-NGA are completely glossed over by Richard White;
2) Note how the only wx forecast (TAFOR) referred to by White is cynically added into the timeline between the 0801 and 0841 Nadi transmissions. White continues to falsely imply that the flightcrew were aware of the operational requirements of the 0803 AMD TAF.
3) Finally note how White completely omits the wx details from the 0630 METAR which was relayed first in the 0801 VH-NGA v Nadi HF radio exchange.



MTF..P2