Australia, ATSB and MH 370 - Printable Version

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RE: Australia, ATSB and MH 370 - ventus45 - 11-20-2024

Michael John says:
November 19, 2024 at 4:41 pm

Based on an estimated cruise speed of 683 mph & assuming Mh370 was flying in a straight line then my estimated location at 19.41pm is around 3°13’51″S 92°53’58″E

What’s everyone else estimating?

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ventus45 says:
November 19, 2024 at 9:16 pm

@Michael John

Ah ha, the vexed question of the 19:41:00 intercept raises it’s ugly head yet again.

As a general comment, I would say at the outset, that the unresolved problem of the ASTB/DSTG’s “geographic inconsistency” with the 19:41 arc intercept, is most likely a direct by-product of the “unverified and unverifiable Malaysian Military Radar Data” (which by necessity produces the FMT north of Ache) and that is, in my frank opinion, the root cause of our inability to find MH370. But more importantly, this unverifiable radar data has produced a location that also causes significant difficulties interpreting the First Arc log on BFO’s. As we all know, many theories have been examined over the years, for example, the crystal oscillator oven warm up effects, the proposed ‘right offset of 15Nm from N571’ for possible traffic avoidance, and even the more recent Air France Captain’s scenario. None of them have produced a definitive outcome. More to follow on this matter, see below.

I take a purely practical approach to solving MH370, as a pilot, as a navigator, but more particularly, as a mission planned. We have to accept that MH370 was the Captain’s last flight, that he knew it was going to be his last flight, that he had been preparing for it for a long time, many months in fact, and that he had planned it in meticulous detail, with nothing left to chance.

The official Malaysian government narrative is the direct opposite of all of that. Furthermore, as I have explained before, I do not accept ‘the Lido Slide’ as being the true path of MH370, certainly not past Pulau Perak Island anyway.

My track to the 2nd (19:41:00utc) arc is based on my theory that MH370 DID NOT proceed all the way up the Malacca Strait, but rather, made a LEFT turn off the Vampi Track just South-East of Pulau Perak Island, in other words, just after the end of the civil radar data. (I totally dismiss the remainder of the radar data, the so-called military radar data to Vampi and beyond, as unverifiable)

Why I believe Zahari had to cross Ache can be simplified down to one thing, fuel. I have explained it all in detail in other places before, but the essential point is that his original plan had been made off a flight where he had significantly more fuel than MH370 had. He absolutely had to “cut his track miles” to get to his planned destination, so he had to “escape to the northern Indian Ocean” much earlier than his original plan. Therefore, he could not go up to the north of Ache, he had to cut across southern Ache.

My route from the end of the civil radar data is as follows: (generated from Barry Martin’s spreadsheet).

(a) Turn left just SE of Pulau Perak Island (from heading 288T to 240T) towards waypoint TASEK
(b) Thence (to OVERFLY ACHE) – Track DCT waypoint IVRAR (formerly Nagan – just north abeam of WITC)
© Within 10Nm of reaching IVRAR – Repower All Electrical Systems
(d) Go “Feet Wet” (cross the coast – out into the ocean – never to see land again)
(e) Thence track DCT waypoint MABIX
(f) Thence – Cross the 1st arc – continue
(g) Thence – (within 5Nm of waypoint MABIX) commence the FMT
(h) Complete the FMT at 18:39:30 at (94.7030 East / 3.0680 North) at FL400, Heading 192.8963 degrees True, GS 467.52kn
(i) 1st Satcall (do not answer) at 18:40:00 at (94.6891 East / 3.0046 North) at FL400, Heading 191.8956 degrees True, GS 467.28kn
(j) At 19:01:30utc pass 27.252Nm East ABEAM of waypoint ISBIX (closest approach to ISBIX) (94.1188 East / 0.2782 North) at FL400, GS 467.2kn
(k) Cross Equator (19:03:45utc) at (94.0591 East / 0.0078 South) at FL400, Heading 191.8791 degrees True, GS 467.71kn
(l) Cross 2nd arc (19:41:00utc) at (93.0666 East / 4.7467 South) at FL400, Heading 191.9203 degrees True, GS 467.71kn

In other words, my 19:41:00 latitude is 4.7467 SOUTH, which is way further south than most other people’s calculated latitude [and I cross the 7th arc (00:19:30utc) at (86.2442 East / 39.226 South)].

To return to the beginning (knowing that most will dismiss what follows, but, tin hat on).

My suggestion is that we should concentrate our attention on resolving ‘the elephant in the room’, the ASTB/DSTG’s “geographic inconsistency”, something that the ATSB seemed quite happy to just leave ‘swinging in the breeze’, with apparently no real attempt having been made to ever resolve it.

It has to be resolved, and to that end, I propose that ‘the number crunching experts’ should re-examine the circa 18:25utc log on BFO’s, but, this time, on the assumption that they occurred in a different geographic location to that currently accepted, specifically, my location, near WITC.

To begin, it is readily apparent by simple inspection alone, that one thing is very obvious.

The line of sight to the Inmarsat Satellite from Sanob is about 260 degrees true, and from WITC it is about 264 degrees true.
At Sanob, the aircraft is generally considered to be heading about 290 degrees true, but at WITC, my heading is 240 degrees true.

This produces an obvious and significant difference in the aircraft’s relative heading to the satellite for the two locations.

Up near Sanob, the aircraft heading (290 – 260) is about 30 degrees TO THE RIGHT of the line of site to the satellite.
Down near WITC, the aircraft heading (264 – 240) is about 24 degrees TO THE LEFT of the line of site to the satellite.

I have a ‘gut feeling’ that this difference in relative headings is significant, and that it could be ‘the smoking gun’ that we need to solve ‘the riddle of the circa 18:25 Log-On BFO’s, and the whole case.

Number crunchers, on your marks, get set, GO.

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