Accidents - Domestic - Printable Version

+- AuntyPru Forum (https://auntypru.com/forum)
+-- Forum: MH 370 -Media unscrambled. (https://auntypru.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?fid=53)
+--- Forum: Accidents and aftermath (https://auntypru.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?fid=60)
+--- Thread: Accidents - Domestic (/showthread.php?tid=103)

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Kharon - 10-26-2019

From the ‘Strictly Gossip’ department.

The Essendon accident and the DFO runway incursion are still topics of conversation and wonder. As often happens, you bump into someone you know and toddle off to have a catch up and a coffee; the DFO/ Essendon business got a mention as my mate is a Melbourne based, local lad with an interest in the event. I let this casual remark pass without comment: “the pilot was in the habit of using two hands to rotate” (words to the effect).

True or not is a matter for the ATSB to confirm or deny; speculation pointless. However, it should be a consideration of the report. In single pilot operations this not a good practice, nor is it normal. It is possible to forget to tighten the throttle (power lever) friction lock. It is a small knob, (Be20) one below each individual power lever which prevents the power lever moving from the selected position. A power lever backsliding, toward a low power setting produces the same effect as an engine failure, indeed it often used when ‘EFATO’ is simulated during a check ride. During a take off in a single pilot aircraft, one hand is on the control yoke, the other on the power levers – released only to select the undercarriage ‘UP’ and then returned to the power levers. Simply sound practice when there is no FO to keep the power at the scheduled value.

Can’t say if the two handed rotation was a routine practice – but if the ATSB can establish whether this was the case, it adds weight to the argument for a power lever roll back. Even if it has nothing to do with the accident, it is a true ‘safety’ matter and a reminder from ATSB to aircrew about ‘proper’ practice could do no harm in anyway.

Idle gossip – food for thought – intrinsic value Zero.

Toot - toot.

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - P7_TOM - 11-25-2019

The Seaview disaster: conscience, culture and complicity
By
Adrian Park
-
Sep 10, 2014
22443
Artwork © CASA
Adrian Park reflects on the grim but important lessons from a watershed crash that happened 20 years ago..

A little after midday, on Sunday 2 October 1994, an Aero Commander 690 operated by Seaview Air taxied for take-off from Williamtown, NSW, on a flight to Lord Howe Island. Eight passengers, including honeymooners and a family with two children, boarded the single-pilot aircraft. Unknown to the passengers, the pilot’s conscience, and the culture within which it breathed, had sealed their fate.

Half an hour later the 25-year-old pilot made a call on the company’s internal communications frequency: ‘I’ve lost it, Clive, I’ve lost it’, as the aircraft descended at high speed into the ocean. The chief pilot and manager of Seaview, who were on a separate company aircraft also flying to Lord Howe, heard the radio call but continued on, and after landing retired for the afternoon, apparently in good conscience, as Flight Service tried desperately to raise the missing aircraft. Nothing was found of it apart from two aerials, some cabin trim and seat cushions, a radio compartment panel and a section of wing insulation. There was no trace of the occupants.

Conscience is often portrayed as an internal compass providing true direction when other cues fail. To conduct oneself with an approving conscience, to pursue principles along a line of reason as ‘straight and clear as a ray of light’ (to quote the 18th century radical philosopher, Thomas Paine), seems a noble ambition.

The problem, especially in aviation safety, is that a ray of light is neither straight nor clear. It can be refracted, reflected, dispersed and warped. And what’s true for the metaphor is true for the subject: no person is an island; they exist within a continent of influences, compulsions and biases. They exist within culture. And culture has its own set of accepted values, behaviours and norms—each affirming, rebuking and modifying the thing we call conscience. In fact, by definition and by application, if culture is, as most definitions express it, ‘accepted values’ culture is conscience.
So, while ‘let your conscience be your guide’ seems like good advice, what guides your conscience? What cultural atmospherics are distorting that ‘straight and clear ray of light’?

How would culture influence your conscience in a small but busy aviation company where, as a newly licensed 25-year-old, you gladly accept a step-up pilot’s job? Applying the new guy’s old adage ‘eyes open, mouth shut’ you quietly refresh yourself on local procedures, aircraft technical matters and operations documentation. You’re excited about the opportunity and willing to make certain concessions to prove yourself—including long hours and low pay.

You soon notice some inconsistencies. You notice the twin-engine aircraft you are to pilot must be regularly overloaded to ‘get the job done’. You notice the company, although operating as regular public transport (RPT), only has approval for charter work. You notice safety equipment such as life rafts is inaccessible. You notice other significant breaches of regulations. Then you start hearing tales of the previous chief pilot submitting confidential reports to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) after being sacked.

You like the new chief pilot though, and he seems to like you. You notice he doesn’t seem to worry too much about being overloaded and regularly does it himself—again ‘to get the job done’. Perhaps you have considered broaching the subject with the chief pilot. Perhaps you are worried about the implications of a ramp check and have finally worked up the courage to raise the issues when you and the other company pilots receive a memo from the chief pilot. The memo is advice on how to respond to the regulator when you or the other pilots are questioned regarding company misdemeanours. The advice is firstly to ‘plead ignorance’, and if that doesn’t work ‘plead contrition’. The memo wraps up with ‘… only use believable bullshit—you [pilots] appear dumb, shouldn’t be too hard …’

What is ‘guiding your conscience’ at this point? It might be, from fear of the regulator, ‘don’t breach the regs—it’s your licence if you get caught’. It might be, from a sense of professionalism, ‘come on, you know about airmanship—is this really appropriate?’ It might even be, when looking into the eyes of the passengers boarding your plane, ‘do they deserve all these safety deficiencies?’ But the dominant culture trumps all: the hand that signs the pay cheque gets the final say.
The cruel twist of culture and conscience on that day was this: the passengers had the least control, with the most to lose. They always do. But what if the consciences of the passengers had been informed? What if, somehow, the safety cards (a cruel misnomer in this case) really had provided a snapshot of the safety of the aircraft?

This is what they would have said …
Welcome and thank you for flying with us. Your aircraft today is an Aero Commander 690 conducting an overwater flight to Lord Howe Island.

Your aircraft is probably overloaded by about 300kg. Your pilot is 25 years old and has 60 hours flying this type. He has an infection and is taking unregulated antibiotics and analgesics. His annual medical certificate elapsed last month and has not been renewed.

The latest weather report may or may not have been obtained and indicates the aircraft will be flying in significant icing conditions. There is a placard restricting flight into icing because of equipment deficiencies.

The maintenance control officer lives 500km away, in Wagga Wagga, and has acted as a clerk rather than directing and controlling maintenance. In the last 12 months numerous defects have not been recorded. Airworthiness directives have been actioned tardily, or not at all, and the right engine of your aircraft has exceeded a 5400-hour manufacturer’s limit.

The chief pilot of your airline was employed six months ago after the previous chief pilot was sacked. The sacked chief pilot reported directly to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) citing serious safety concerns. In recent years your ‘airline’ (in reality a charter operator) has been involved in 11 air safety reports and two of these allege unauthorised RPT operations in overloaded states with unsecured cargo and inaccessible life rafts.

In May your ‘airline’ was mentioned negatively in Parliament and numerous inspectors and managers within the CAA have failed to address these issues.

Please ensure your seatbelt is buckled and enjoy your flight …

It’s hard to imagine any passenger remaining on board after reading such a card. But of course the only information on the ‘safety’ cards was the normal emergency information.
When asked at the subsequent commission of inquiry why no alarm had been raised, the manager and chief pilot replied they were unaware anything serious had occurred. It appeared the chief pilot was now following his earlier advice on ‘how to handle the regulator’, except that now the bullshit was no longer believable.

Following is the transcript of the call between the chief pilot and the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC).
RCC: “… what are your thoughts on his comments ‘I’ve lost it with the vibration’? Lost control or lost …?”
Chief pilot: “Can I speak off the record?”
RCC: “Well I can call you back. This is a recorded tape.”
Chief pilot: “Well my comment basically, the impression both John and I got [was] that he had lost control of the aeroplane … if the guy was still under control of course he would have said something …”

The same question asked of the 25-year-old pilot can be asked of the disingenuous chief pilot; that is, ‘what is your conscience being told?’ It may be, by the fear of severe litigation, ‘I have to cover myself’. It may also be, by the fear of losing revenue, ‘I have to protect my job’. It may even be told, by fear of disrepute, ‘I have to protect my reputation or I may never work in this industry again’. The commission had its own ideas about why the lies were told—the main one being fear of a lost insurance payout.

In any case the commission bluntly stated:
The chief pilot and manager are lying … their failure to report was inexcusable. It was consistent with their having formed the view the aircraft had crashed … and there was nothing to be done … There was however a great deal to be done … elaborate search and rescue procedures have been established precisely because there is always the chance that somehow, miraculously, someone might survive.

The more authoritative conscience and culture of a $20-million commission of inquiry had little time for the ‘believable bullshit’ conscience and culture of Seaview Air.
Other cultures were distorted. The commission heard how a CAA officer warned his superior, in Canberra, about Seaview. His report was passed to a district manager, who the commission found was ‘furious at having been bypassed’ and ‘determined to thwart the inquiry’. This he did, ensuring only token efforts were made.

The commission would eventually ascribe responsibility for the accident to a ‘wanton operator and an incompetent and timid regulator’.

As the managers of Seaview deceived in an accumulation of ‘small’ things they—pre-accident at least—were merely following a line of reasoning that appeared as ‘straight and clear as a ray of light’. In the full words of Paine’s quote—more poignant in this context—‘he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.’  Seaview’s managers allowed their conscience to be their guide, but failed to see it was being guided by a complex and powerful array of biases that would eventually see nine lives lost.

If the lesson of Seaview Air can be condensed into a ‘bold-face item’ it should be this: for good or ill your culture is your conscience. Your organisational culture—your company’s shared ‘norms’ and shared assumptions are the value metric by which all other actions are measured. When the values are good and true they will be the atmosphere oxygenating conscience: when they are bad, they will suffocate conscience.

And when we consider the modern motifs of ‘safety systems’, ‘safety culture’ and ‘compliance’ the Seaview lesson has a sobering corollary: it is possible to have a system—even a safety system—and not be safe. Seaview had safety cards in its aircraft—but it wasn’t safe. Seaview had an early form of what could loosely be called a safety culture—but it wasn’t safe. Seaview was even tacitly compliant with the regulator (in as much as the regulator hadn’t shut them down), but it wasn’t safe. It is of little value to have a safety management system and be tacitly compliant without a good and true safety conscience, without a robust safety culture. The product must match the billboard. The story of Seaview Air is a cautionary tale deserving our full attention when next we gauge our own culture and conscience. Or the next time we fly.

Adrian Park is a pilot and safety manager with an east coast helicopter operator
Suggested reading

The Coroner: Investigating Sudden Death. Derrick Hand and Janet Fife-Yeomans (Memoirs of NSW State Coroner, Derrick Hand, including his account of the Seaview Investigation.)
Investigation Report 9402804, Rockwell Commander 690B VH-SVQ en route Williamtown to Lord Howe Island New South Wales. 2 October 1994, Department of Transport and Regional Development, Bureau of Air Safety Investigation.
Commission of Inquiry into the Relations between the Civil Aviation Authority and Seaview Air, 1996

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - P7_TOM - 11-25-2019

A MUST read.

Above this post is an excellent article, it is a must read.

The ‘Seaview’ accident, from Adrian Parkes perspective is well worth the time and many of the comments remain valid today. Choc frog and ‘well done’ to Mr Parkes.

As it happened I was flying that day, from North to South (almost coastal). It was an unpleasant day and icing was a feature. It also happens that I not only ‘knew’ the characters involved, but the operation as well as company frequency. I listened to the whole thing – my heart in my mouth. I had no way to record it; but if I had done so, I believe the outcome and reports would have been just a little more savage than they were. CAA copped a lot of flack over this one, which, IMO was unjustified.

How, without physic powers, CAA could ‘see’ the culture and attitude within, which IMO, was directly responsible for this avoidable accident, is beyond me. Mr Parkes comments should be sent to every operating pilot in Australia; as a reminder, that ‘in command’ of a flight service means exactly that. A ‘command’ decision may not be popular; ‘No’ may be a word which annoys management – so what? Your flight, your decisions, your arse in the saddle. Never be afraid to call it as you see it. Never.

Here endeth the first lesson.

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 12-10-2019

Via the Oz:

Jetstar pilots forgot landing gear

ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider


An Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation has found a plane was forced to go around when an alarm alerted the pilots to the fact the landing gear wasn’t down. Photo: Marc McCormack

A Jetstar aircraft coming into land at Ballina Airport on the New South Wales’ north coast, was forced to go around when an alarm alerted the pilots to the fact the landing gear wasn’t down.

The A320 had already conducted one go around at the captain’s command because the aircraft was coming in too high and too fast for a stable landing.

An Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation into the incident on May 18 last year, found on the second attempt at landing a “master warning” was triggered because the landing gear had not been selected “down”.

After another go around, it was a case of third time lucky with the aeroplane landing without further incident.

ATSB transport safety director Stuart Godley said the report noted that an incorrect aircraft configuration for landing was rarely the result of a single action of identifiable event.

“In this case a number of factors, such as distraction and limited use of aircraft automation, combined to result in the landing gear not being selected to down,” Dr Godley said.

“While highly undesirable, it should be noted that the aircraft’s warning system effectively alerted the flight crew to the problem and the crew responded promptly to the warning and initiated a second go around.”

The report came at an unfortunate time for Jetstar pilots who are preparing to stop work this weekend over stalled enterprise bargaining negotiations.

The airline claims the pilots want a 15 per cent immediate pay rise but the Australian Federation of Air Pilots said this was not true.

“Put simply, Jetstar have manufactured the alleged 15 per cent increase based on inaccurate and flawed costings of our non-salary claims, such as those claims relating to rostering and fatigue mitigation,” said AFAP executive director Simon Lutton.

He said pilots were seeking 3 per cent annual increases

---

Somewhat surprising, for what was seemingly downplayed by the Oz as a relative non-event, this article has garnered over 50 comments - 

For a different take and IMO better summary of this clusterduck event here is Steve Creepy via Airlineratings.com ...  

---

JETSTAR PILOTS FORGOT TO LOWER THE LANDING GEAR
By Steve Creedy December 10, 2019



The pilots of a Jetstar A320 forgot to lower the landing gear as they approached Ballina airport in northern New South Wales and were forced to conduct a go around after they were alerted to the oversight by a master warning.

The aircraft operating a flight from Sydney in May, 2018, had already conducted one go-around after the captain decided its airspeed and altitude were higher than a normal approach profile.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau found the flight crew did not follow the Jetstar standard procedures during the first go-around and this created distractions that contributed to the landing gear oversight.

READ: Storms and communications brought jets too close

In particular, the flaps remained at the Flaps 3 position during the visual circuit rather than the company standard of Flaps 1.

The first go-around was performed correctly by the first officer until the Jetstar A320  reached the circuit altitude of 1500ft.

Watch the ATSB video reconstruction of the incident:

Video: https://www.airlineratings.com/wp-content/uploads/uploads/ATSBweb.mp4?_=2

As the first officer leveled the aircraft, it accelerated quickly towards the Flaps 3 limit speed and the FO called for approach mode to be activated to reduce the plane’s target speed.

Worried about a potential flaps overspeed, where the airspeed exceeds safe limits for the flap setting, the FO  retarded the thrust levers to idle and by doing so de-activated the auto-thrust system and its protections.

“With Flaps 3 still set and 10-degree nose-up pitch altitude, the aircraft performance deteriorated, requiring intervention by the captain,’’ the ATSB said.

Other distractions affecting the crew included the fact the first officer was expecting a left circuit instead of a non-standard right circuit and had not been briefed about the change.

Adding to this was the handover of flight duties to the captain, the need to correct the flight path and the fact the captain continued to fly the aircraft manually, adding to his workload.

The captain elected to remain at Flaps 3, which investigators described as permissible and safe but not Jetstar’s standard configuration for a visual circuit.

“The operator’s sequence of configuring the aircraft for landing required the landing gear to be selected DOWN prior to the selection of Flaps 3,’’ The ATSB report said.

“As the captain turned on to the final approach during the second approach, he scanned the flight instruments, observed Flaps 3 already set and instinctively commanded Flaps FULL, which was the normal sequence from Flaps 3.

“The FO selected Flaps FULL but then also turned his attention to monitoring the aircraft’s flight path.

“As such, neither of the flight crew were aware that the landing gear had not been selected DOWN.”

Investigators said that because the pilots flew the second circuit at 1500ft, the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM)  had not reset on the second approach and it did not display a landing memo at 950ft.

“The absence of the landing memo should have prompted the flight crew to perform the items of the landing checklist as a ‘read-and-do’ checklist,’’ it said.

“Had they read the required actions from the checklist, both the captain and FO would have been required to independently check and announce that the landing gear was down.

“This method should have effectively ‘trapped’ their error.”

When the landing memo did appear at 800ft, the crew were focused on intercepting the final approach path and performing radio calls and neither recalled seeing it.

“Both the captain and FO were subsequently alerted to the incorrect configuration for landing by a master warning message triggered at about 700 ft,’’ the report said.

The flight crew conducted a second go-around and landed without incident.

ATSB transport safety director Dr Start Godley said the incident highlighted the importance of adhering to standard operating procedures and correctly monitoring the aircraft’s approach.

“In this case a number of factors, such as distraction and limited use of aircraft automation, combined to result in the landing gear not being selected to down,” Dr Godley said.

“While highly undesirable, it should be noted that the aircraft’s warning system effectively alerted the flight crew to the problem and the crew responded promptly to the warning and initiated a second go-around.”

Jetstar said that as a result of the incident, the pilots attended debriefings with operations management and underwent specific simulator and line flying training related to the event.

---

Finally here is a link and safety summary off the final investigation report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/aair/ao-2018-042/

Quote:Safety message
Unexpected events during approach and landing phases can substantially increase what is often a high workload period. Adherence to standard operating procedures and correctly monitoring the aircraft and approach parameters provides assurance that a visual approach can be safely completed. The selection of inappropriate auto-flight modes, unexpected developments, or any confusion about roles or procedures can contribute to decisions and actions that increase the safety risk to the aircraft and its passengers.

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. Handling of approach to land is one of these priorities.

MTF...P2 

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Kharon - 12-13-2019

A matter of some interest.

“The Australian understands another scheduled flight training session at Soar was cancelled because of unsuitable weather conditions.”

The average student has not got a blind clue about what the current ‘weather’ conditions mean. Traditionally, it has always been up to the student’s mentor to decide if Bloggs should or should not be let loose in the prevailing conditions. For example; the ‘hate-sheet’ reflects more practice at cross-wind landings – before solo operations. "Sorry mate, too much wind today" end of....Commercial considerations never, not ever, entered into that decision.

"At the time of the crash, just before 10am on Thursday the winds were between 10 and 12 knots, with a 12 knot crosswind."

10 to 15 knots across a runway ain’t a problem – for an ‘experienced’ student. Not one who has had the X-wind landing box ticked – but one who can actually manage such a thing. It ain’t difficult – but it requires training and practice. The decision to send a fellahin out in a gusty X-wind is subjective, based on the instructors assessment of progress – not a bloody box ticked; but competency – tested, proven and documented…..


Another crash involving a Soar student pilot and training instructor remains under investigation by the ATSB.

It is of concern that a first class operator like Buckley is fighting for survival after attempting to bring in a system which would not have allowed the injured child out alone in a breeze he could not handle. Yet this ‘Soar’ thing, using airspeed, weight and CoG ‘critical’ aircraft to mass produce ‘legally’ qualified (tick a box) pilots is allowed to continue? WTD?

CASA, part 61 and Part 141/2 have a lot to answer for; before the operator gets to answer some fairly prickly questions. It seems to me that the aircraft being used, whist ‘cheap’ are intolerant of the fumbles new pilots make – does a speed, weight and centre of gravity critical aircraft really suit a training environment; despite a CASA ‘tick’? I think not. Great for the weekend warrior – but as a suitable platform for training? Seems there are some deeper questions which demand answers here.

Toot - hate AP night shift – toot.  {P7 has matters ‘Christmas’ related to attend}. Hurrumph!

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - P7_TOM - 12-14-2019

QoN.


"An investigation has been launched into the crash of a light aircraft during a solo training flight by a student of Soar Aviation at Moorabbin in Victoria on Thursday morning.



"Another crash involving a Soar student pilot and training instructor remains under investigation by the ATSB.



"Soar was recently forced to suspend flight training for students of Box Hill Institute after its joint commercial pilot licence course with the TAFE college was audited by the Australian Skills Quality Authority.

"A number of former Soar students are pursuing the flight training school in the Victorian Civil Administrative Tribunal, seeking a refund of their fees.


How many serious accidents, ‘safety’ incidents and investigatons has Buckley had?

How many serious accidents and ‘safety’ incidents has Soar had?

Which school is still operating?

WTD ? Crazy Autocratic Sanctimonious Airheads.

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - P7_TOM - 01-14-2020

Two brothers, one aircraft, no more.

Tragic.

No platitudes, thoughts with family and friends.

- HERE -.

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 01-15-2020

(01-14-2020, 07:36 PM)P7_TOM Wrote:  Two brothers, one aircraft, no more.

Tragic.

No platitudes, thoughts with family and friends.

- HERE -.

Via the Oz:


Brothers die in light aircraft crash



The pilot of a light plane that crashed in dense bushland on Sunday won a national award last year for his immaculate construction of the two-seater Wittman W10 Tailwind.

Robert Dull and brother Owen Dull, both aged in their 60s, were flying from Casino in northern NSW to Boonah in southern Queensland, when the single engine plane went down.

Bad weather might have played a part in the crash in the Koreelah National Park, not far from the aircraft’s last known position over Tooloom National Park.

The Australian Maritime Safety Agency initiated a search when the Tailwind failed to arrive at Boonah as expected, an hour after leaving Casino.

A Westpac rescue helicopter spotted the wreckage about 9.45am on Monday and ground crews were activated to access the aircraft in steep and heavily wooded terrain.

Using chainsaws and axes to slash through the thick bushland, police and State Emergency Service volunteers took several hours to reach the crash site, 1.5km from a walking trail.

Just before 3pm, the wreckage was located and the two men confirmed dead, dashing the hopes of relatives who took to social media to urge friends to pray for their survival and send positive thoughts.

Robert Dull, of Toowoomba, built the Wittman W10 Tailwind in 2018, and was last year awarded “best hybrid experimental amateur built aircraft” by the Sport Aircraft Association of Australia.

His passion for flying was shared by his brother Owen who previously built gyrocopters.

The men’s families on Monday requested privacy as they came to terms with their loss.

Police said the Australian Transport Safety Bureau would be responsible for any investigation into the crash.

A statement from the ATSB said investigators would travel to the site, and access permitting, examine the wreckage and site surrounds.

“The ATSB will also analyse available flight and other data and interview any witnesses,” said the statement.

The investigation was expected to take a year, with a final report to be delivered in the first quarter of 2021.

Quote:AO-2020-004

The ATSB is investigating the collision with terrain involving a Wittman Tailwind, VH-TWQ, at Tooloom National Park, New South Wales, on 12 January 2020.

Both occupants were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed.

As part of the investigation, the ATSB will travel to the site, which is located in very steep and rugged terrain. Access permitting, the ATSB will examine the wreckage and site surrounds. The ATSB will also analyse available flight and other data, and interview any witnesses.

A report will be released at the end of the investigation. Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant stakeholders so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken.

 RIP - P2

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 01-24-2020

Thor the Hammer comes down - RIP 

Via the Oz:

---

Bushfires: US heroes came to help, lost in ball of flames as air tanker crashed



Devastated firefighters watched on in horror as a Lockheed C-130 Hercules crewed by three American firefighters erupted in a fire ball after it crashed in the Snowy Mountains during a routine water bombing run in NSW’s south.

Anguished onlookers shared an emotional embrace in the realisation the firefighters had been killed, as the local NSW Rural Fire Service relayed news of the tragedy to Command: “Message this is red … Crashed … It’s just a ball of flames.” The three Americans who had travelled to Australia to save lives in the country’s worst bushfire ­disaster had lost theirs.

Listen to the distress call here

With visibility poor and conditions treacherous, military personnel helped emergency services reach the crash site at Peak View and confirm the worst — a large air tanker down and no survivors.

Under contract to the NSW RFS from Coulson Aviation in Canada, the C-130 was in its fourth or fifth year in Australia, and the US crew was well known to local firefighters.

Coulson Aviation immediately grounded its other aircraft in Australia as the owners boarded a flight to Sydney to support devastated colleagues of the men.

RFS Commissioner Shane Fitzsimmons said the crew members were “absolute professionals” who had many friends in the tight-knit firefighting community.

“Our hearts are with all of those … suffering the loss of three remarkable, well-respected crew who have invested so many decades of their life into firefighting and fire management and who are professionals in the aviation sector,” he said.



“The owners of Coulson … are in the process of making contact with the loved ones of the victims.”

He said the C-130 had been operating routinely, travelling from Richmond to the Snowy Monaro for waterbombing activities, when it suddenly went off air just before 1.30pm on Thursday.

“We simply lost contact with the machine and the flight tracker that we use stopped,” Commissioner Fitzsimmons said.



“There is no indication at this stage of what caused the accident.”

NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian said the crash was a reminder that the fire season was far from over, and how every person defending life and property was at risk. “Today again we’ve seen the tragic consequences where three people have lost their lives,” she said.

“It was a company contracted by the RFS to undertake that vital work, and our deepest condolences go to those families affected.”

Coulson’s decision to immediately halt operations in Australia was “absolutely warranted”, Commissioner Fitzsimmons said. “It will have an effect on our aerial cap­acity (to contain bushfires) but I support them 100 per cent.

“They’re very mindful of the emotional and psychological effect such a tragedy will have on the rest of their workforce.”

At least 80 fires are burning in NSW and half are not contained.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau launched an immediate investigation into the crash with the intention of releasing a preliminary report within 30 days.

A spokesman said a team of transport safety investigators with experience in aircraft operations, maintenance and data recovery had been deployed to the crash site to collect evidence. “ATSB investigators will analyse recorded data, review weather information and interview witnesses,” he said.

The National Transportation Safety Board in the US has also been notified.

---

MTF...P2

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 01-27-2020

Thor crash update.

Although now more than a couple of days old, the following is an extremely informative 15 minute video by Blan Coliro that explains how the LAT (Large Air Tanker) operations are managed, the risks involved and the possible causes for the crash of the C130 LAT 134. definitely worth the 1 cup of coffee to watch...  

Quote:

The Airtanker industry is a small, tight knit aviation community. Today's news from Australia was devastating.

UPDATE:

25 Jan- Crash site video:
[color=var(--yt-endpoint-visited-color, var(--yt-spec-call-to-action))]https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-2...
[/color]
Colson Aviation Releases Crew member Information:
[color=var(--yt-endpoint-visited-color, var(--yt-spec-call-to-action))]https://www.coulsonaviationusa.com/ne...[/color]

LINKS:
Associated Aerial Firefighters Memorial Trust Fund
[color=var(--yt-endpoint-visited-color, var(--yt-spec-call-to-action))]https://airtanker.org/aaf-memorial-fund/[/color]

U.S. Aerial Firefighters Memorial Wall
[color=var(--yt-endpoint-visited-color, var(--yt-spec-call-to-action))]http://airtanker.org/memorial/[/color]

 

Via 10newsfirst:




MTF...P2 

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Kharon - 01-30-2020

If at first etc. Try again - C130 video

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Kharon - 02-03-2020

Cessna 310 –JMW.

An interesting report from the ATSB. I’ve no quarrel with it, as it stands; the ‘assumptions’ made and investigation seem both fair and reasonable.

One thing always jumps off the pages in the reports ATSB do – the references to the FAA Airplane Flying Handbook. It is world wide acknowledged as the ‘standard’ for flight operations; a well deserved reputation; no wonder our Australian ‘experts’ have never bothered to produce one – why bother. The thing that rankles is I can quote, chapter and verse, three personal experiences where CASA FOI have rubbished and dismissed ‘advice’ copied and pasted into a company check and training system ‘Operations Manual’. It should be made mandatory reading – I digress.

Two statements (IMO) stand out:-

ATSB: "However, with no fuel records or other evidence available, that quantity could not be determined.

Call Bollocks there. The fuel company and the owners bank account would tell them exactly where, when and how much fuel was purchased – even drum stock.

ATSB: "While the system was correctly set up, the ATSB could not verify this figure because there were no fuel records or fuel consumption rates.

This is a thing CASA could correct in a heart beat. Not a difficult task for the average ‘private’ owner; considering the cost of fuel and the interest private owners take in their machinery. A simple diary – or log if you will. I suspect many do it even if only to check the ‘bill’ against uplift. This needs to made mandatory. It won’t bother the ‘honest’ folk; but the ‘nip and tuck’ crowd may not be best pleased. But then; it’s not them having to examine the wreckage.

A simple system –

01 Jan Full tanks – flight time 1.0 hour – Scheduled burn off 30-litres.
02 Jan Full tanks – uplift 35 litres. Flight time 2.3 hours. Scheduled burn off 69 lts.
03 Jan Full tanks – uplift 70 lts.

With 45 minutes ‘in the bank’ and an accurate assessment of what the aircraft actually burns – in reality provides a sound basis for ‘planning’. Sure the consumption may vary – depending on ‘task’ – however a sensible estimate of expected ‘burn off’ could be determined. Hot day – big load – short flight – 35 LpH. Cool day long sector 30 LpH. Ball park sure, but at least someone is going to be aware when  ‘friendship’ (and luck) is being stretched. It is of no value, whatsoever to tell the clever fuel computer that it has ‘full’ tanks when it does not; it is even of less value to ignore a ‘trend’ where 65% power should provide ‘X’ and the reading is ‘Y’ - . Never by-pass the bowser if any doubt whatsoever exists. I wonder, would another 50 lts. Loaded at TWB have seen this aircraft safe home, crew in the pub, having a beer?

Is there a safety recommendation to be made – you bet there is..

Toot – toot…

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 02-19-2020

Breaking News via 3AW:

---

‘It doesn’t look good’: Two planes crash near Seymour

http://www.3aw.com.au/it-doesnt-look-good-planes-crash-near-seymour/




Two planes have crashed at Mangalore, near Seymour.

Fire trucks, ambulances, including the air ambulance, the SES and police are on the scene, which is not far from the flight training school.

The planes went down just before 11.30am.

One plane has gone down in a defence force explosives zone.

Channel Nine’s Tony Jones, who was at the scene the damage looked serious.

“It doesn’t look good, I’m afraid.

“It has broken up, a number of parts of that plane … have broken free from the actual aircraft.

“It’s quite a grim scene.”

The condition of the pilot is unknown.

The CFA has confirmed a second plane was also involved in the collision.

The exact circumstances surrounding the crash remain unclear.

---

Via 9 News: https://twitter.com/9NewsMelb/status/1229945707202674688?s=20

MTF...P2

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 02-20-2020

Mangalore midair collision, fatal crash cont/- 

Via the Oz:

Quote:Victoria light plane crash kills 4 at Mangalore, as planes collide mid-air


JOHN FERGUSON
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
@fergusonjw

MARK SCHLIEBS
REPORTER
@mark_schliebs

ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider


Emergency services staff found wreckage from both planes in separate locations on the ground near Seymour, about 120km north of Melbourne. Picture: Mark Stewart

Australia’s first mid-air crash in more than a decade claimed four lives yesterday when two light planes on training flights collided high above central Victoria, tumbling in front of bewildered eyewitnesses.

Emergency services staff found wreckage from both planes in separate locations on the ground near Seymour, about 120km north of Melbourne, with the victims trapped after the twin death spirals.

Police Inspector Peter Koger said people had seen the planes fall from the sky after colliding at 4000 feet, with two killed in each plane.



"One plane almost certainly crashed immediately and the other plane crashed about two kilometres north from here and both were extensively damaged prior to colliding with the ground," he said.

"There were some people in the paddocks at the back of this facility and there was also a helicopter in the air and we're working with them to get witness statements.’’

Police said that neither plane had caught fire and the bodies were being recovered from the wreckage, which forced the closure for part of the day of the Hume freeway, the main Melbourne to Sydney road.

The Piper Seminole operated by Moorabbin Aviation Services and a Beech Travelair from the Peninsula Aero Club at Tyabb were both undertaking instrument flight rules (IFR) training with an instructor and student pilot on board.

Emergency services were called to two crash sites near the Mangalore Airport, about 120km north of Melbourne, about 11.30am on Wednesday.

The Mangalore plane had only been in the air for three or four minutes, police said, while the second had been en route from the Mornington Peninsula.


Police and paramedics near Mangalore. Picture: 7 News
The Piper had taken off from Mangalore Airport north of Melbourne as the Beech Travelair was approaching the airport for landing, when the collision happened.

Although both flights were apparently for the purpose of instrument flying, it was not immediately clear if the aircraft were being flown under IFR or visually.

One plane crashed near a woolshed and the other in bush.

“It is believed two aircraft have collided mid-air before crashing,” Victoria Police said. “Two occupants in each aircraft have died at the scenes.”

All four people were yet to be formally identified.

Airspace over Mangalore is not under the operation of air traffic control, but rather CTAF – or common traffic advisory frequency – which requires incoming and outgoing aircraft to inform each other of their movements.

Both Moorabbin Aviation Services and Peninsula Aero Club have a history of compliance and are considered reputable training schools, although the crash will open both companies to heavy scrutiny.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau deployed investigators from its Melbourne, Canberra and Brisbane offices to the scene at Mangalore.

A statement from the ATSB said the investigators were experienced in “human factors, aircraft operation and maintenance”.

Witnesses to the crash were being sought, and the ATSB appealed for anyone with dashcam footage to contact them via their website.

Australia’s last mid-air crash in December 2008 also involved two flight training school aircraft over southwest Sydney.

Two women in one plane were killed in the collision but two men in the other aircraft escaped with minor injuries.

RIP - 

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Kharon - 02-20-2020

Bloody tragic.

Of all the things which haunt a pilot’s conscious – a mid-air – in cloud – is the least spoken of. Probably because the chances (statistical probability) of such an event are fairly much off the planet – these days. Or: they should be. In CTA it’s a very, very low risk matrix; but OCTA the risk increases – slightly. One reason perceived for reduction of service is the alleged reduction in risk simply because of the low volume of traffic (statistics) – but does that analysis work only away from ‘known’ instrument flight practice and testing facilities? In the densely populated airspace? Close to a city, OCTA, with a navigation aid? Given the cost of ‘dual’ in a multi engine aircraft – it is only reasonable that a place, close to town would attract ‘a crowd’. It can and does get busy. But, it still only takes two to ‘Tango’.

Flight crew are only human. The ‘candidate’ or ‘student’ is usually ‘under the pump’. Particularly when engine failure is simulated and an instrument approach is to be completed within tight parameters. The examiner is paying close attention to the ‘victim’. Should things in the cockpit get a little awry, then it becomes a ‘thing’ which can distract. How easy is it to miss a call? Particularly when two frequencies are being monitored. Sure, area is on low volume, CTAF is noisy, all crew are paying attention to their allotted task. Put ‘em both in cloud and the risk matrix goes off the scale- unless there’s some assistance.

This is known risk, a given, across the globe. Yet here, with relatively uncluttered skies, pretty fair weather (mostly) two aircraft manage the almost statistically impossible point of collision. How?

The cost cutting and constraints placed on ASA operations – in an effort to show a profit – (or pay for One Pie) have produced a first world cost for a third world system of traffic management. Slow, weighed down by rules and regulation to avoid government ‘responsibility’. Placing the ATCO’s in an almost untenable situation; short of facilities and authority. ATSB won’t help –you could get very old waiting for any sort of helpful report in three years time.

However; I would like to have just two questions answered honestly.- How many at Melbourne centre ‘saw’ the two aircraft? How many of those thought – ‘Oh, they’re going to be close’? And; for a choc frog – who spoke up and said something? My Choc Frog is very, very safe – ain’t it.

A sad, bleak day. Six foot clearance would have saved it – an early warning would have avoided it – Alas. We live in an age of high technology and Fate is still ‘the hunter’. We can only hope things improve – for ‘safeties sake’.

My respects and sincere condolences to those left behind – waiting on ‘the report’.

Soto voce – Toot – toot.

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 02-21-2020

(02-20-2020, 09:24 PM)Kharon Wrote:  Bloody tragic.

Of all the things which haunt a pilot’s conscious – a mid-air – in cloud – is the least spoken of. Probably because the chances (statistical probability) of such an event are fairly much off the planet – these days. Or: they should be. In CTA it’s a very, very low risk matrix; but OCTA the risk increases – slightly. One reason perceived for reduction of service is the alleged reduction in risk simply because of the low volume of traffic (statistics) – but does that analysis work only away from ‘known’ instrument flight practice and testing facilities? In the densely populated airspace? Close to a city, OCTA, with a navigation aid? Given the cost of ‘dual’ in a multi engine aircraft – it is only reasonable that a place, close to town would attract ‘a crowd’. It can and does get busy. But, it still only takes two to ‘Tango’.

Flight crew are only human. The ‘candidate’ or ‘student’ is usually ‘under the pump’. Particularly when engine failure is simulated and an instrument approach is to be completed within tight parameters. The examiner is paying close attention to the ‘victim’. Should things in the cockpit get a little awry, then it becomes a ‘thing’ which can distract. How easy is it to miss a call? Particularly when two frequencies are being monitored. Sure, area is on low volume, CTAF is noisy, all crew are paying attention to their allotted task. Put ‘em both in cloud and the risk matrix goes off the scale- unless there’s some assistance.

This is known risk, a given, across the globe. Yet here, with relatively uncluttered skies, pretty fair weather (mostly) two aircraft manage the almost statistically impossible point of collision. How?

The cost cutting and constraints placed on ASA operations – in an effort to show a profit – (or pay for One Pie) have produced a first world cost for a third world system of traffic management. Slow, weighed down by rules and regulation to avoid government ‘responsibility’. Placing the ATCO’s in an almost untenable situation; short of facilities and authority. ATSB won’t help –you could get very old waiting for any sort of helpful report in three years time.

However; I would like to have just two questions answered honestly.- How many at Melbourne centre ‘saw’ the two aircraft? How many of those thought – ‘Oh, they’re going to be close’? And; for a choc frog – who spoke up and said something? My Choc Frog is very, very safe – ain’t it.

A sad, bleak day. Six foot clearance would have saved it – an early warning would have avoided it – Alas. We live in an age of high technology and Fate is still ‘the hunter’. We can only hope things improve – for ‘safeties sake’.

My respects and sincere condolences to those left behind – waiting on ‘the report’.

Soto voce – Toot – toot.

Update news links etc: https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/fly-ido-young-pilot-remembered-after-two-planes-crash-killing-four-20200220-p542ld.html

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/aviation/aviation-world-mourns-passionate-and-loved-crash-pilots/news-story/75e47c31b037cbca999d28f561d7e871

Plus the ATSB investigation webpage: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2020/aair/ao-2020-012/

Quote:The ATSB is investigating a mid-air collision involving Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, VH-JQF, and Beech D95A Travel Air, VH-AEM, near Mangalore, Victoria, on 19 February 2020.


After colliding in mid-air, both aircraft subsequently collided with terrain and were destroyed. The two occupants of the PA-44 and the two occupants of the D95 were fatally injured.

The ATSB has deployed a team of transport safety investigators with experience in aircraft operations, maintenance, human factors and materials analysis to the accident site to begin the evidence collection phase of the investigation, including conducting site mapping.

As part of the investigation, ATSB investigators will analyse available flight path data and audio transmissions, review weather information, aircraft maintenance and flight crew records, and conduct witness interviews.

Should any safety critical information be discovered at any time during the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify operators and regulators so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken.

A final report will be published at the conclusion of the investigation.

It would seem, that except for ATC, the whole world had the ability to track the crash aircraft in real time...  





Hmm...thank the heavens for mandatory ADSB in IFR aircraft...  


MTF...P2

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Kharon - 02-28-2020

Busy, busy, busy.

The following is a boilerplate catchall ATSB put out for media benefit. For a Choc frog – who can tell me what essential, specific part of the ‘scheduled’ investigation missing?

“As part of the investigation, ATSB investigators will analyse available flight path data and audio transmissions, review weather information, aircraft maintenance and flight crew records, and conduct witness interviews.”

I’ll give you a hint – HERE –

I’ve probably got three years to save up for the CF prize; there will be no ‘book’ running for the result of the ATSB deliberations; however, for the closest in ‘word count and conclusion to the final ATSB report there is a liquid prize on offer.

Extract – LMH:-

Hitch - “[we] really have very little idea about what unfolded, except to say that trusted safeguards failed to keep four people safe.

Good point Hitch – but I wonder what are the safeguards ‘in place’? There were two qualified, experienced men, one in each aircraft, that qualifies as a safeguard. There were serviceable radio’ on board each aircraft, that also qualifies as a safeguard. But, the only ‘true safeguards’ – when push came to shove – was the ability of those two safeguards to keep the aircraft separated. ATC involvement ceased once the obligation to ‘inform’ each aircraft of the others presence: end of. It is not a bad system at remote locations where conflicting traffic is a rare event – even allowing for coincidence. But is it a ‘good’ system for airspace with a relatively high density of traffic – which is conducting ‘training and testing’ of IFR operations? I think we’ve all been in a situation where two or even three aircraft are conducting a let down at the same aid – ‘follow my leader’ is an old game, often played. But, IMO while the rules of ‘airmanship’ have not changed (since Pontius) the operating environment has. Radio congestion is a factor; the urge to turn the volume down on ‘centre’ while concentrating on CTAF and self separation, opens the gate to missed or confusing radio calls; which in turn reduces the concentration level of those operating. Particularly during ‘training’ where the instructing pilot needs to be talking. The notion of a ‘sterile cockpit’ is a sound one – particularly when playing for real. The accident airspace gets busy, noisy and the possibility of ‘confusion’ and crossed wires is increased. I just wonder if some form of ‘controlled’ airspace would eliminate the problem? Just saying – even if only a Class E wedding cake situation – during peak periods – positive separation and peace of mind. Maybe even hand that space to the military – a feed and patch – give ‘em somewhat to do – What? 

Hitch – “Its the inevitable examination of those safeguards that I suspect will result in some changes to aviation in Australia”.

How I wish that was so. It should be so – but then history and rhetoric and ‘cost’ have a track record to consider. ATSB is a ‘corporation’ now, with KPI bonus, executive salaries and bonus to pay, expensive ‘consultants’ ;and, in huge debt and much hot water with One Sky etc. The battle for reform of airspace has a long, bitter history, the carnage and waste in monumental proportions.  IMO ‘inevitable change’ is an outside runner, I’ll lay 12/1 against anything ‘positive’ arising from the tragedy.

Hitch – “Until the ATSB releases its preliminary findings in a few weeks time, etc.

Yes, well – I reckon the Easter Bunny will beat that home, with Santa Claus running home second.

No matter – only random thoughts, not evidence based, but a neatly phrased ‘thinker’ from Hitch sure opens the doors to speculation. Nice one….

Toot - toot

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 03-07-2020

Slow news week for Ironsider; or something else??

Ref the Oz: 

Quote:Kangaroo crashes catch planes on the hop



It’s not only airborne animals that pose a threat to aircraft. In the decade from 2008 to 2017, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau recorded 396 strikes by non-flying wildlife, including 58 by kangaroos.

One of the most recent roo strikes involved a community service flight by a Beech 58 Baron from Inverell to Maitland Airport in NSW on January 14. A pilot and two passengers were on board the plane which overflew the airport before joining the circuit to land.

No kangaroos were spotted during the overfly, but as the aircraft came in to land the pilot noticed a mob of roos to the left of the runway.

One of hem bounded onto the tarmac, striking the Baron’s nose gear.

“The nose gear collapsed, and the aircraft skidded along the runway for approximately 150m,” said the ATSB report.

As the Baron continued down the runway, the pilot shut down the engines and turned the fuel off, then evacuated all occupants through the rear doors when the aircraft came to a stop.

Although no one was hurt, the Baron suffered substantial damage to the nose gear, propellers and lower fuselage.

In response to the incident, the ATSB issued a safety message, highlighting the hazard posed by kangaroos.

“Due to their size and unpredictable behaviour, they pose a serious safety risk for aircraft,” it said. “Pilots should mitigate this risk as best they can by maintaining adequate situational awareness, particularly when operating at regional strips known for significant wildlife hazards.”

Airservices Australia’s enroute supplement for Maitland makes special mention of the roo risk.

Maybe the Oz was scrabbling to find content to fill their Friday aviation pages but the above 'something, nothing' article based on a half-arsed ATSB occurrence report - Kangaroo strike involving a Beech 58 Baron, Maitland Airport, NSW, on 14 January 2020 - seems a little to contrived and almost desperate to be considered as serious aviation safety journalism? Perhaps it was the community service flight connection; or the linked ATSB report that perked Ironsider's interest??

Quote:..Kangaroos are among the ground-based animals that are most frequently struck by aircraft, as found in the ATSB report, Australian aviation wildlife strike statistics (AR-2018-035). Due to their size and unpredictable behaviour, they pose a serious safety risk for aircraft. Pilots should mitigate this risk as best they can by maintaining adequate situational awareness, particularly when operating at regional strips known for significant wildlife hazards...

On Twitter Airport safety expert Dan Parsons was also bemused by this article:

Quote:Dan Parsons
@danparsons80
Replying to @PAIN_NET1

Is that the whole article or is there more behind a paywall?

---

Replying to
@danparsons80

The article is about 10 paragraphs??

---

@danparsons80

Yeah, and it doesn’t give much information. The headline suggests it was going to look at the issue generally. It would have been good for them to link to the Kempsey court case and appeal.

Curious I asked if he could provide links for the 'Kempsey court case and appeal', to which he did a lot better by providing links to 2 archived blog pieces that he did on the subject; for a very interesting two coffee read here are the links:

1) https://t.co/dX7uzvSMRQ?amp=1 & 2) https://t.co/896V20MWPI?amp=1

Hmm...for some reason my mind drifts back to this:

ScoMo/Mick Mack Govt pork barrels & rorts - Part III



Just a thought but wouldn't you think it would be worthwhile for the ATSB to suggest or recommend that the Govt look at providing funding, under the RAP rorts scheme, for possibly resourcing wildlife controls such as Roo-proof fencing around the perimeter of affected regional airports? -  

MTF...P2 

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - Peetwo - 03-11-2020

Lockhart River fatal crash, Cessna 404 VH-OZO. 



Via the ABC News:

---

 Five dead after light plane crashes on Queensland's Cape York







































































PHOTO: The Lockhart River system in Far North Queensland. (Supplied: Tim O'Reilly)

---

RIP - 

---

RE: Accidents - Domestic - P7_TOM - 03-12-2020

Lockhart – Second event.

Grim, bleak and as tragic as the Lockhart River second fatal accident may be; there may be some ‘good’ come from it.

"It's really early days — I've got an inspector as a forward commander in place there at the moment and I've got a team of expert police in the building behind us supporting those people," he said.

"Tomorrow, we'll have a further nine staff flying to Lockhart from the disaster victim investigation squad and we'll be doing a joint investigation with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau."


The police lost one of their own in the last event. That, is not a thing they will forget, when you consider the shambles of the Metro accident and subsequent ‘inquiry’ you can understand why the local ‘Bobbies’ ain’t relying on ATSB or CASA. Anyone who followed the last Coroners inquest will taste the bitter ashes of that debacle.

Good on the local force; let’s hope they make the rules of evidence and their own investigation keep the ATSB and CASA honest. One thing I’ve learned from police mates – you may fool ‘em once – but that is all you get. They will make certain, this time around, that all is as it should be. They, unlike ATSB are bound and sworn to uphold ‘the law’. I wish ‘em well.

Somehow I can’t see a Godley late phone call or implied threat affecting their evidence or opinion – except to piss ‘em off.

It must be a little hard for Shane Urquhart about now – our thoughts are with him and those left behind wondering why, how and what for. A tough road ahead for them. Sincere condolences don’t buy much peace – but that and a fair investigation is about the best we have to offer.

---