The 777 event is deemed ‘an incident’. The A330 event is defined as a ‘serious’ incident.
There’s a head scratcher for starters. I expect the difference is because the EPGWS chimed in. But it’s the ‘result’ section of both ‘summary’ reports that makes me despair of ATSB.
Quote:Q – In response to this occurrence Qantas updated their training material for visual approaches and enhanced similar material in their captain/first officer conversion/promotion training books. In addition, targeted questions were developed that required check pilot sign off for proficiency. Finally, visual approaches were included as a discussion subject during flight crew route checks for the period 2013–2015.
The ATSB “Safety message” cracks me up; Qantas have done all the heavy lifting, fixed up as best they can the result of the duck up; and taken steps to prevent a reoccurrence. ATSB just point out the blindingly obvious, then call it a ‘complex’ investigation and publicly claim it as ‘their’ fix.
Quote:VA – The ATSB has been advised by Virgin Australia International Airlines that the SHEED approach is no longer available for use by its Boeing 777 crews.
The ATSB “Safety message” cracks me up; VA have done all the heavy lifting, fixed up as best they can the result of the duck up; and taken steps to prevent a reoccurrence. ATSB just point out the blindingly obvious, then call it a ‘complex’ investigation and publicly claim it as ‘their’ fix.
But I like the VA response, cut and dried, don’t use that approach. It is at least succinct, does it address the deeper implications? We’ll never know, VA sorted it out, internally and once again without any need for ATSB or CASA assistance.
Q – Incident March 2013; report release June 2015. ATSB, near enough two years to arrive at a non conclusion, state the blindingly obvious and contribute nothing of any value to the discussion.
V – Incident Aug 2013; report release June 2015. ATSB just a shade under two years to arrive at a non conclusion, state the blindingly obvious and contribute nothing of any value to the discussion .
ATSB were superfluous, not required in either incident. Both matters were resolved in house, by experts, at a pace in keeping with the needs of the airline to keep operating. No one engaged in real world, real time operations can be ducking about, waiting 24 months for a ‘safety’ analysis ; they have to crack on.
The point I’m struggling to make is that both incidents were, potentially serious accidents. The airlines involved moved swiftly, positively and effectively to mitigate the immediate risk. Bravo, well done, but no more than we could reasonably expect from first class air carriers. The ATSB didn’t help too much, nor did the complex ‘safety’ regulations, or those who wrote them.
Where ATSB fail miserably is in the area where one could reasonably the ATSB to be of real value for money. There are some deep, esoteric and subtle elements in the ‘chain’ of events leading up to the incidents; these have not been analysed, therefore there is no ‘deep and meaningful’ academic assessment of the peripherals, which may have assisted either airline to ‘modify’ their thinking. There is nothing published which may assist the ASA to modify their thinking and perhaps make some changes to the Melbourne terminal airspace. After a two year study, costing gods only know what, I’d have expected something adding value. It’s a pity the airlines can’t publish their reports; they may be worth reading.
In short Minister, the tax paying, travelling public got ripped off – again.